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1. General introduction 
CHAPTER 1 
General introduction 
1.1. Motivation 
Over the past decade, debates centring on the “African growth tragedy” have made room for a 
radically different grand narrative that portrays an Africa “on the rise.” This mood swing has 
been accompanied by glamorous images of an emerging African middle class playing a 
leading role in this new narrative (see Giesbert & Schotte, 2016). Encouraged by an 
influential report by the African Development Bank (Ncube, Lufumpa, & Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 
2011) business analysts and policy makers have set great expectations in the new middle-class 
consumers (Deloitte, 2012; Hattingh, Russo, Sun-Basorun, & Van Wamelen, 2012). 
Beyond the hopes that Africa’s new middle class will trigger further economic growth 
by shifting the composition of consumer demand (for a theoretical discussion on the link 
between changes in the distribution of income and industrialisation, see Murphy, Shleifer, & 
Vishny, 1989), the list of favourable value orientations often attributed to the middle class is 
long. Amongst others, it includes traits such as a commitment to saving and investment, a 
belief in meritocracy, entrepreneurial spirit, and the importance attached to education (see, 
inter alia, Bhalla, 2007; Cárdenas, Kharas, & Henao, 2015). Furthermore, in the tradition of 
modernisation theory, a sizeable and well-established middle class has been associated with a 
shift in public priorities away from a focus on the satisfaction of “basic needs,” which are the 
main concern of the poor, towards so-called “higher order” goods that may benefit the 
creation and consolidation of democratic institutions (Birdsall, Graham, & Pettinato, 2000; 
Easterly, 2001; Inglehart, 1990). 
Inherent to many of the expectations commonly placed on the middle class’s role in 
politics and economic development is an understanding of this class as an “empowered” and 
economically secure part of society. Due to their better income situation compared to the 
poor, middle-class citizen are assumed to be equipped with a higher capacity and tolerance for 
delayed gratification (Acemoglu & Zilibotti, 1997), be less vulnerable to credit market 
imperfections (Galor & Zeira, 1993), and thus be able to engage in mid- and long-term 
planning. In accordance with these assumptions, being in an economically stable position has 
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been found essential for people to self-identify as belonging to the middle class (see Phadi & 
Ceruti, 2011). In consequence, most interpretations of what constitutes the middle class relate 
in some way to the degree of economic security and self-sufficiency that people experience.  
Nevertheless, standard approaches found in the economics literature to operationalise 
class concepts do not sufficiently account for this dynamic aspect that characterises a “stable” 
middle class. Instead, there is a dominance of static approaches that locate the middle class 
within a particular income or expenditure range, where the lower boundary is often set at the 
poverty line (see Chapter 2). These studies, however, fail to acknowledge that being able to 
afford a certain basket of goods at a given point in time provides an insufficient indication of 
whether the same will be true in the near future. In other words, they ignore that some of 
those who are currently non-poor may face a non-negligible risk of falling into poverty. This 
economic insecurity may not only be a source of considerable discomfort, bearing the risk of 
negative psychological and health effects (Cafiero & Vakis, 2006), but also tends to affect 
people’s economic choices and may create a low-income trap; for example, if the vulnerable, 
in order to minimise risks, are forced to engage in economic activities which are low-risk and 
guarantee constant, but low returns (Cafiero & Vakis, 2006; Dercon, 2006).  
Furthermore, the unequal distribution of poverty risks – or, generally speaking, of 
chances of upward and downward social mobility – may also condition people’s political 
choices (see, for example, Acemoglu, Egorov, & Sonin, 2018). While it is often assumed that 
the middle class is fairly homogenous in terms of the political attitudes of its members, the 
fact that individuals within the middle-class income stratum may perceive themselves as 
being on different economic trajectories may in turn condition their political values and 
priorities in various ways. This may result in an important, but so far not sufficiently explored 
extent of heterogeneity in the political attitudes of middle-class citizens (see Chapter 5).   
Another related aspect, which even the few studies that differentiate between the 
vulnerable and the stable middle class are blind to (see, for example, Birdsall, 2015; Lopez-
Calva & Ortiz-Juarez, 2014), is the fact that not all households below the poverty line are 
alike. Many people, especially in the developing world, experience poverty at some time in 
their lives, but some face significantly higher chances of (re-)escaping from poverty than 
others. In this regard, the lived realities and policy needs of those who experience transitory 
poverty as the result of a temporary financial setback are likely to be very different from those 
who are stuck in a situation of structural deprivation (see Dercon, 2006; Glewwe & Gibson, 
2006; Klasen & Povel, 2013). In this regard, if the growth of a stable middle class is a desired 
development outcome and focus of government policy, then it will be indispensable to gain a 
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better understanding of the multidimensional causal mechanisms, processes, and pathways 
that can either facilitate or impede sustained escapes from poverty. 
1.2. Research objectives and design 
The previous section highlights a number of issues that, in my view, up to date have been 
insufficiently addressed in the economics literature on the middle class in the Global South. 
This dissertation aims to speak to these gaps. 
Contrary to most standard approaches in the economic realm, the main argument I 
make is that social class is insufficiently understood by a person’s current standard of living 
alone. Therefore, in this dissertation I propose a conceptual framework that takes the 
distribution of chances of upward and downward social mobility explicitly into consideration. 
I compare my proposed approach to those that have been suggested in the previous literature 
and illustrate the main messages that can be learnt from linking the demarcation of social 
strata to an in-depth analysis of mobility patterns.  
1.2.1. Case selection and generalisability 
To this end, South Africa is used as a case study. This focus has been chosen for three main 
reasons: First, given its middle-income status, South Africa has been identified as one of the 
countries in sub-Sahara Africa with a relatively large and growing middle class (Ncube et al., 
2011). Second, despite important advances towards poverty reduction over the past two 
decades, the level of economic inequality in the country remains among the highest in the 
world (see, inter alia, Leibbrandt, Finn, & Woolard, 2012; Özler 2007). Moreover, even 
though the extent, nature, and legacy of poverty and inequality are relatively well understood 
in the country, there is still only limited knowledge about the drivers of poverty transitions, 
particularly in urban settings (see discussion below). Third, the dynamic perspective adopted 
in this dissertation critically relies on the availability of panel data. While panel surveys are 
now being conducted for an increasing number of low- and middle-income countries, South 
Africa is among the few countries in sub-Sahara Africa where multiple survey rounds have 
been collected within the last ten years at regular and not too widely spaced time intervals. 
Most of the empirical analysis presented in this dissertation looks at South Africa as a 
whole. However, some parts concentrate on the South African urban context specifically. This 
is owed to ongoing shifts in the geography of poverty. Although pockets of deep poverty 
persist in rural regions, de-agrarianisation, rural-to-urban migration and high population 
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growth in cities are pushing the absorptive capacities of South Africa’s urban centres to their 
limits (Viljoen & Sekhampu, 2013). In consequence, particular attention is given to the 
vulnerability context associated with the resulting proliferation of informal settlements and 
increasingly densely populated townships, suffering from high un- and underemployment and 
socio-economic insecurity (Visagie & Turok, forthcoming). The use of newly available 
nationwide longitudinal data analysed through a particular urban focus define this research in 
relation to most of the previous literature, which has mainly been confined to exploring 
poverty traps and transition pathways in rural settings (see Adato, Carter, & May, 2006; 
Adato, Lund, & Mhlongo, 2007; Agüero, Carter, & May, 2007; Carter & May, 1999, 2001). 
Even though the focus of this dissertation is on South Africa, I highlight a number of 
key messages that are considered relevant beyond the South African case and that may – to 
some extent – be generalizable to similar country contexts in the Global South.  
In this regard, it is worth noting that throughout this thesis poverty is defined in 
absolute terms. As such, it is tailored to low- and middle-income countries rather than high-
income countries, where relative-poverty concepts dominate. In addition, the relevance of the 
developed conceptual framework that links the analysis of patterns of social stratification to 
the distribution of chances of upward and downward social mobility is highest in country 
contexts marked by systematised and enduring (or even rising) socioeconomic inequality – 
including an unequal distribution of risks and access to coping mechanisms as well as of 
opportunities for upward mobility. The proposed conceptual angle furthermore is considered 
most informative when applied to economies experiencing fast growth spurts that are not 
sustained, with the consequence that those rising out of poverty may remain vulnerable to 
falling back, or to countries experiencing slow growth that occurs in a context marked by 
significant volatility around the poverty line. Lastly, the predominantly urban lens of this 
study has implications for than a few low- and middle-income countries where rapid 
urbanisation offers both opportunities and challenges, placing high demands on infrastructure 
and service provision, and job creation (see Rakodi, 2002). 
1.2.2. Research questions and approaches 
This dissertation features four stand-alone research articles presented in Chapters 2 to 5. 
While all four contributions can be read and understood independently, they are connected to 
each other thematically and build successively upon each other. Chapters 2 and 3 are joint 
work with researchers from the Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit 
(SALDRU) at the University of Cape Town. Chapters 4 and 5 are single-authored.  
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Chapter 2 
Setting the scene for the remainder of the dissertation, Chapter 2 aims to add clarity to the 
debate that is currently unfolding regarding the size, growth and purchasing power of South 
Africa’s middle class, by making two main contributions: First, we provide a structured 
overview of a wide array of definitions of the middle class that have been suggested in the 
economics literature, and assess their strengths and shortcomings with an application to South 
Africa. Second, arguing that the notion of economic (in-)security is central to the social and 
political meanings of being middle class, we then focus our analysis on an empirical strategy 
recently suggested by López-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez (2014). This approach importantly relies 
on the notion that members of the middle class should be at reasonably low risk of falling into 
a situation of precarity in which they are incapable of meeting their basic needs. We replicate 
López-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez’s (2014) original approach by estimating a simple model of 
poverty transitions using South African panel data. This way, we provide an indication of the 
minimum income or expenditure level that, following this vulnerability approach, identifies 
the stable middle class in the given country context, and compare the size of the identified 
middle class to the class sizes under alternative definitions. 
The main research questions that this chapter seeks to address are:  
2.1. How do previous approaches to define the middle class compare in their implications 
for the size and growth of South Africa’s middle class? 
2.2. What are the main advantages and disadvantages of these various approaches? 
2.3. What is the minimum income or expenditure level associated with being stably middle 
class in South Africa? 
Chapter 3  
Chapter 3 builds on the analysis presented in Chapter 2, but seeks to move beyond existing 
approaches. In this chapter, we suggest a framework of social stratification that links the 
demarcation of social strata to an in-depth analysis of poverty transitions. Extending previous 
approaches, the proposed schema not only distinguishes between the vulnerable and the stable 
middle, but also allows differentiating between transient and chronic poverty. In doing so, we 
aim to bridge the gap between the poverty dynamics literature and the middle class literature 
in economics, which – in our understanding – should no longer be treated in isolation. 
Applying this schema to the same South African panel dataset, we strive to provide a better 
understanding of the key characteristics that differentiate each of the identified social groups 
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and to explore the positive and negative economic events and coping strategies that help to 
explain observed mobility patterns.  
The main research questions that this chapter seeks to address are:  
3.1. How can previous economic approaches to define the middle class be strengthened 
and expanded? Specifically, how can dynamic approaches to the study of poverty, 
vulnerability and the middle class be combined into a coherent framework that allows 
analysing patterns of social stratification more broadly? 
3.2. What are the key characteristics that define South Africa’s stable middle class?  
3.3. What are the main challenges that impede people from entering the ranks of the stable 
middle class in South Africa? 
Chapter 4  
Chapter 4 shifts the focus onto those in society who cannot yet be considered as members of 
the stable middle class. Given the close interlinkage between poverty dynamics and middle 
class growth, it aims to provide a nuanced understanding of the key factors that both facilitate 
and hinder structural poverty escapes and descents in South Africa, with special attention given to 
the urban African population.1 To this end, going beyond conventional monetary definitions and 
approaches to studying poverty dynamics, I adopt an asset-based approach that draws on the 
concept of sustainable livelihoods, which allows me to decompose poverty transitions into 
structural and stochastic components. This quantitative analysis is triangulated with evidence 
from qualitative interviews that I conducted in the township of Khayelitsha, Cape Town. 
Using this mix of quantitative and qualitative research methods, I attempt to provide a deeper 
understanding of the key sources of risk and vulnerability, on the one hand, and determinants 
of economic stability and progress, on the other.  
The main research questions that this chapter seeks to address are:  
4.1. How much of the mobility into and out of poverty observed in South African panel 
data can be accounted for by stochastic factors? And conversely, to what extent do 
these movements reflect a change in people’s livelihood assets? 
4.2. What are the main dimensions of urban poverty in South Africa? 
4.3. What are the main trigger events associated with upward and downward mobility? 
How do these events relate to each other? 
                                                          
1 In South Africa, four main racial groups are commonly distinguished: Africans (Blacks), Coloured people 
(people of mixed race), people of Indian/Asian descent, and Whites. 
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Chapter 5  
Chapter 5 deals with the question of how patterns of social stratification are manifest in 
political attitudes. Albeit middle-class citizens have generally been assumed to support 
democracy, studies investigating this class’s political attitudes using opinion survey data have 
produced mixed results. While some studies find suggestive evidence consistent with pro-
democratic civic and political engagement on the part of the middle class (see, for example, 
Cheeseman, 2015), others have, quite to the contrary, concluded that this class appears rather 
“apathetic” in terms of their political participation (Resnick, 2015). Diverging from the 
previous literature that generally treats the middle class as a homogeneous group, this chapter 
aims to offer a more nuanced perspective that may help to reconcile these two opposing 
views. Specifically, consistent with the main line of reasoning adopted throughout this 
dissertation, I explore how diverging perceptions of social mobility tend to condition political 
attitudes toward democracy within different social strata, particularly within the middle class. 
The main research questions that this chapter seeks to address are:  
5.1. In theory, what is the link between class and attitudes toward democracy? 
5.2. How do differences in living standards reflect in South Africans’ political attitudes? Is 
South Africa’s middle class more pro-democracy than the poor and the elite? 
5.3. How can we explain differences in the attitudes toward democracy among people that 
share similar living standards? What role do patterns of upward and downward social 
mobility play in this regard? 
1.2.3. Data sources  
The main source of data for Chapters 2 and 3 is the South African National Income Dynamics 
Study (NIDS) implemented by SALDRU at the University of Cape Town (SALDRU 2016a, 
b, c, d). NIDS is South Africa’s first national panel study, which started in 2008 with a 
nationally representative sample of over 28,000 individuals in 7,300 households. At present, 
there are four waves of data available, each of which is spaced approximately two years apart 
(2008, 2010/11, 2012, 2014/15). The NIDS data is publicly accessible and can be downloaded 
at: http://www.datafirst.uct.ac.za/dataportal/index.php/catalog/NIDS/about. 
The primary data source for the qualitative element presented in Chapter 4 consists of 
30 semi-structured life-history interviews (LHIs), which my colleague, Rocco Zizzamia, and I 
conducted together with a local research team between July and September 2017 in the 
township of Khayelitsha, Cape Town. The LHIs were supplemented by four independent 
focus group discussions as well as a short quantitative questionnaire.  
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Chapter 5 draws on the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS), which has 
been conducted annually since 2003 by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC, 
2012a, 2012b). Each data round is designed to yield a nationally representative sample of the 
adult population (16 years and older). Respondents are drawn from 500 enumeration areas, 
stratified by province, geographical subtype, and majority population group. The publicly 
released SASAS data can be downloaded at: http://www.hsrc.ac.za/en/departments/sasas/data.  
The empirical analysis presented in this dissertation was performed using Stata 14.2 
and Stata 15. All codes will be made available upon request. 
1.3. Contribution to the literature and resulting lessons for policy 
This dissertation is intended to fill some of the research gaps outlined in Section 1.1. To this 
end, it establishes a direct link between the class position of individuals and their chances of 
social mobility. Analysing quantitative and qualitative evidence for South Africa, I identify 
and characterise upwardly and downwardly mobile class-sublayers and draw conclusions 
about the main opportunities, risk factors, constraints, and policy needs that they are facing. 
To this effect, Chapters 2 and 3 focus on conceptual and methodological issues, 
grappling with the definitional problem of who exactly constitutes the middle class. In theory, 
there should be an important overlap between the varying approaches to study the same 
phenomenon subsumed under the umbrella “middle class.” However, our analysis presented 
in Chapter 2 reveals that in practice, depending on the chosen classification method, very 
different parts of society are identified as middle class, which can make up between 10 and 60 
per cent of the national population. While none of these definitions should be seen as right or 
wrong (Reeves, Guyot, & Krause, 2018), we argue that in country contexts marked by high 
levels of inequality along with widespread poverty – as in the case of South Africa – some 
definitions can be considered more suitable than others.  
First, as a starting point to any definition that aims to capture an economically stable, 
secure, and empowered middle class, we emphasize the need to define an absolute minimum 
consumption floor necessary for long-term physical well-being. We argue that this is most 
adequately captured by the specification of a cost-of-basic-needs poverty line, below which 
people are considered unable to satisfy their basic needs (not only in terms of food, housing, 
and clothing, but also including other consumer goods, health, education, and transport, for 
example) and thus should not be identified as middle class. This speaks against most purely 
relative definitions that locate the middle class in the literal middle of the income or 
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expenditure distribution in a country context, where more than half of the population are 
considered poor by national standards. Similarly, this perspective also opposes a number of 
absolute definitions that identify the middle class in relation to the two-dollar-a-day 
international poverty line or a similarly low minimum income requirement.  
Second, we highlight the importance of accounting explicitly for the volatility that 
people face in terms of being capable to meet their basic needs. As the available panel data 
allows us to follow individuals over time, we can observe movements into and out of poverty. 
We find that out of 11 million South Africans who were non-poor in 2008, about one in four 
had fallen into poverty by 2012. From our point of view, those individuals who stand just at 
the edge of poverty should not be considered part of the middle class.  
Summarising, we argue that to be considered stably middle class, households need to 
be able to meet their basic needs at present, and be sufficiently secure against falling into 
poverty in the near future. That is, they must be non-poor and must face an acceptably low 
degree of vulnerability to poverty (compare Section 1.1).  
Based on these considerations, López-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez’s (2014) vulnerability 
approach provides a promising starting point to conceptualising the middle class. Their 
approach had originally been developed in reference to a set of Latin American countries and 
our replication of their methodology is one of the first applications to a different country 
context. In line with the original approach, we use a simple probability model fitted to NIDS 
panel data to provide an estimation of the risk a person faces to either remain poor or fall into 
poverty over a given time horizon, conditional on a set of observable characteristics of the 
household that the person lives in at present. On this basis, we propose a monetary definition 
of the middle class, where we select the expenditure level associated with a maximum risk to 
poverty of 10 per cent as the lower bound, and the expenditure level associated with effective 
invulnerability to poverty as the upper bound. This gives us a monthly per capita expenditure 
range of R2,794 to R10,954 (in January 2015 prices), equivalent to $11.7 to $45.7 (in 2005 
PPPs), which is relatively close to the range of $10 to $50 that had originally been identified 
by López-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez (2014) in the Latin American context. Using these 
thresholds, we find that South Africa’s stable middle class is smaller than most previous 
studies suggest, and has grown sluggishly since 1993. Despite this, there has been a 
considerable demographic transformation within the middle class, with Africans now 
outnumbering whites by a significant margin. However, even though the share of Africans in 
the middle class has tripled since 1993, it still remains far removed from demographic 
representativeness. 
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Notwithstanding the foregoing argumentation in favour of using a vulnerability 
criterion to define the middle class, there are a number of limitations to this approach. In 
particular, the simple probability model which is used to derive the vulnerability index that 
identifies the middle class falls short in a number of aspects compared to state-of-the-art 
approaches in the poverty dynamics literature. Therefore, in Chapter 3 we move away from 
this simple modelling framework and instead fit a multivariate model of poverty transitions to 
the same data. Our approach follows a methodology originally suggested by Cappellari and 
Jenkins (2002, 2004, 2008) to model low income transitions in British panel data. The 
advantage of the proposed regression design is that it explicitly allows for possible feedback 
effects from past poverty experiences and accounts for the potential endogeneity of initial 
conditions, unobserved heterogeneity, and non-random panel attrition – four factors that the 
vulnerability approach presented in Chapter 2 failed to account for. 
Another limitation of the class concept presented in Chapter 2 consists in the exclusive 
focus on the distribution of poverty risks among those with expenditure levels above the 
poverty line. In fact, just as some of the non-poor face much higher chances of falling into 
poverty than others, some of the poor face much higher chances of exiting poverty than 
others. To account for these discrepancies in mobility patterns, in Chapter 3 we incorporate 
the differentiation between the middle class and a non-poor but vulnerable group into an 
extended schema of social stratification that additionally differentiates between transient and 
chronic poverty. Our analysis identifies an important extent of variation in the poverty risks – 
predicted based on traditional social stratification variables (such as education and 
occupation) and demographic characteristics (such as race, gender, and household 
composition) – faced by people with similar current income or consumption levels. Unlike in 
the previous approach presented in Chapter 2, in Chapter 3 we therefore refrain from the 
definition of absolute monetary thresholds to identify class sublayers and instead base our 
analysis directly on the predicted poverty transition probabilities (derived from the 
endogenous switching model) and defined risk cut-offs. In our view, this revised and 
expanded conceptual framework presents a relevant addition to both the poverty dynamics 
literature and the middle-class literature in economics, proving a link between the two.  
Five key findings emerge from our application of this framework to the South African 
case: First, with an average population share close to 24 per cent between 2008 and 2014/15, 
we re-confirm that the share of South African’s who can be considered as stably middle class 
or elite is considerably smaller than most other studies suggest. However, the share of the 
middle class is approximately five percentage points larger (and, accordingly, the group of the 
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vulnerable is five percentage points smaller) than the relative class share that would have been 
identified if a monetary threshold was applied. That is, by using a monetary threshold to 
identify the stable middle class, we risk missing out on a non-negligible share of the 
population that falls below that threshold but is nevertheless relatively secure against falling 
into poverty. At the same time, by directly basing the classification on the latent poverty 
propensity scores, we are better able to identify those in the population who have crossed the 
expenditure threshold but nevertheless face an elevated risk to poverty.  
Second, we find that the transient poor and the vulnerable, at 27 per cent, constitute a 
considerable share of South Africa’s population. Interestingly, these two groups who straddle 
the poverty line are strikingly similar in terms of their average household characteristics. We 
argue that they differ from both the chronically poor and the stable middle class and elite not 
only in terms of household characteristics, but likely also in policy needs (see also Chapter 5). 
In this regard, the perspective that our social-stratification schema affords us is valuable in 
that it challenges the meaningfulness, in a dynamic sense, of the standard division of society 
into poor and non-poor groups. 
Third, investigating the differences between class categories, the number of household 
members in employment and particularly the employment status and the type of employment 
of the household head are exposed as key distinguishing factors. Specifically, most household 
heads in the middle class and elite are formally employed with a permanent work contract and 
union coverage. Among the vulnerable and the transient poor class, in contrast, unstable and 
informal employment relationships dominate and a larger share is either unemployed or 
economically inactive. From this we conclude that closing the skills gap and increasing both 
the quantity and quality of jobs will certainly remain central challenges that South Africa’s 
government, as many others, will need to address in order to lift larger parts of the population 
into the middle class and prevent backslides into poverty. In this regard, policymakers are 
likely to face an important trade-off between flexible labour market arrangements to foster job 
creation and the creation of fewer, but better and more stable jobs that will allow more people 
to escape poverty over the longer term. This is likely to be true not only in South Africa but 
also in other parts of both the Global South and North, where growing flexibility and 
precariousness in the labour market have been increasingly exposed as sources of rising 
economic insecurity (International Labour Office, 2004). In this context, it is also worth 
noting that under the proposed framework, economic growth per se will not necessarily 
translate into the emergence a stable middle class. Instead, the effect will depend on the 
distributional nature, sustainability and employment intensity of growth. 
12  Chapter 1 
 
Fourth, notwithstanding the substantial extent of churning around the poverty line, the 
transient poor and vulnerable groups still remain outnumbered by the chronic poor, who 
constitute the lion’s share of the South African population at close to 50 per cent. In spite of 
the recent interest in the middle class, particularly in country contexts marked by enduringly 
high socioeconomic inequality, policymakers should not lose sight of the large share of the 
population that remains locked in persistent poverty with very low chances of being fruitfully 
integrated into the labour market. In addition to the provision of basic services that ensure that 
this group’s health, education and nutritional needs are met, social transfers will remain an 
indispensable source of income for many of the chronic poor. 
Finally, there is indicative evidence that the poor and the vulnerable are not only more 
exposed to several risk factors but, in addition, also seem disproportionately deprived in terms 
of their access to effective formal and informal insurance mechanisms to confront these 
socioeconomic risks. This higher risk exposure and inadequacy of existing coping strategies 
gives scope for targeted social protection interventions. However, to fill this space, 
policymakers will require a closer investigation into how social stratification is related to the 
distribution, frequency and intensity of poverty-triggering events, on the one hand, and access 
to coping mechanisms, on the other.  
Picking up on these findings, Chapter 4 specifically focuses on investigating in greater 
detail the social realities and risk factors that affect particularly those in society who cannot 
yet be considered as members of the stable middle class. In the previous chapters, we were 
able to identify and profile those individuals who have good chances to exit from poverty 
temporarily at some point of their lives, but who rarely manage to escape sustainably. 
However, our investigation into the economic precarity of these groups was limited by the 
fact that the quantitative data at our disposal could only offer a limited understanding of the 
multidimensional causal processes and pathways that condition poverty escapes and descents. 
In other words, the quantitative analysis presented in Chapters 2 and 3 cannot tell us why 
exactly particular factors, or a combination thereof, are important in explaining poverty 
trajectories. 
Using a mix of quantitative and qualitative research methods, Chapter 4 attempts to 
provide some insights to this question. While the empirical analysis presented in Chapter 2 
and particularly Chapter 3 mainly serves to single out individual characteristics of the 
household (or the head of household) that can be associated with transitions into and out of 
monetary poverty, the sustainable livelihoods approach that is adopted in Chapter 4 offers a 
more holistic perspective. It considers the specific vulnerability context that South Africa’s 
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poor urban dwellers typically face, and examines their ability to access a range of tangible and 
intangible assets – comprising human, financial, physical, social, and geographic capital –, 
paying attention to the interlinkages between these.  
Under this framework, the pool of opportunities and resources that people can draw on 
to construct their livelihoods depends upon their asset holdings, which cut across all five 
capital types. This notion offers a more nuanced perspective on the poverty transitions 
examined in the preceding chapter. As discussed above, Chapter 3 identifies those among the 
poor who have above average chances of moving out of poverty. Chapter 4 points to two 
distinct factors that may underpin these dynamics. On the one hand, some of those who are 
expected to be upwardly mobile may have simply been unlucky in the present period. That is, 
they are stochastically poor. For them, the escape from poverty would reflect a return to an 
expected non-poor standard of living, given their available asset base. On the other hand, 
there may be a group of individuals who are structurally (asset) poor at present, but face 
above average chances of moving out of poverty through the successful accumulation of 
productive assets (or an increase in the returns to those assets). These two types of upward 
social mobility represent distinctly different experiences that need to be clearly distinguished.  
While both these movements would be expected to be sustained over time, there is 
also a third type of upward mobility that is stochastic in nature. That is, some of those who 
move across the money-metric poverty line from one period to the next may have simply been 
lucky in the respective period, without any accompanying change in the underlying income- 
generating processes and asset structure. These stochastic movements must be considered less 
likely to be sustained over time and therefore should not be confused with structural escapes.  
If the sustainable reduction of poverty is a major concern, then gaining a better 
understanding of the pathways that facilitate structural escapes from poverty as well as the 
processes that condition structural descents into poverty is a worthwhile endeavour. To this 
end, in the first part of the analysis presented in Chapter 4, I decompose the poverty 
transitions observed in NIDS panel data into stochastic and structural components. The asset-
based approach used for this purpose is conceptually similar to the one recently proposed by 
Radeny, Van den Berg, and Schipper (2012) to study poverty dynamics in rural Kenya, 
drawing on earlier work by Carter and May (1999, 2001) and Carter and Barrett (2006). This 
asset framework on its own, however, may be insufficient to identify the main determinants 
that explain transitions into and out of poverty (Radeny et al., 2012). Therefore, in the second 
part of the analysis, I triangulate my quantitative findings with evidence from 30 life history 
interviews that I conducted, together with a local research team, between July and September 
2017 in the township of Khayelitsha, Cape Town. The qualitative research design was partly 
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informed by the life-history interview techniques used by Davis and Baulch (2011) in rural 
Bangladesh and Adato et al.’s (2007) “household events mapping” technique used in rural 
KwaZulu-Natal. The urban focus and distinction between structural and stochastic movements 
distinguish my research from previous mixed-method investigations of poverty dynamics in 
sub-Saharan Africa, which – to my knowledge – either focus on rural settings or do not 
differentiate between stochastic and structural mobility patterns.   
Using data visualisation methods in the form of asset pentagons and livelihood 
trajectory diagrams, Chapter 4 illustrates the multidimensional deprivation and main risk 
factors that structurally poor urban households experience. Four interrelated dimensions 
characterising urban poverty in South Africa can be extracted from the analysis:  
First, reconfirming the findings from Chapters 2 and 3, transitions into or out of 
employment and job-to-job transitions are among the main trigger events associated with both 
poverty entries and exits.  
Second, given the low returns and high job volatility associated with low-skilled 
labour, people typically require additional physical and social assets to achieve and sustain a 
position of economic security. This matches with the findings by Carter and May (1999) for 
rural South Africa. While urban living has generally been associated with a fragmentation of 
social relationships, this may apply less to the urban poor, who are embedded in township 
community networks and often maintain strong linkages with their rural kin (Du Toit and 
Neves, 2009). Depending on the “quality” of the network, these social contacts may play a 
dual role – both enabling and constraining upward mobility.  
Third, as it is well-established in the literature, higher levels of education constitute an 
important enabling factor for upward social mobility (see, for example, Adato et al., 2006). 
Nonetheless, today’s youth struggle to enter the labour market and have particular difficulties 
in finding stable employment, this despite often having completed secondary schooling. 
Beyond the lack of jobs, this may be related to the poor quality of education as well as to a 
lack of work experience and the nonexistence of a social network that could facilitate contacts 
with potential employers (see Spaull, 2015, for further discussion).  
Fourth, reconfirming the findings by Carter and May (1999) for rural South Africa, 
poverty is not only a matter of few assets, but also of constraints to effectively using these 
assets. A specific constraint in this regard concerns the lack of access to financial capital, 
which especially affects people preparing for retirement. While access to credit generally 
presents an important enabling factor, my findings also suggest that accumulated debt can 
easily turn into a curse. Another constraint concerns the environmental or geographic context 
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confronted by the urban poor, characterised by a high exposure to risk factors from natural 
hazards and crime that threaten life and property. 
While the three preceding chapters have been concerned with formalising the link 
between class and social mobility and explaining key determinants, Chapter 5 deals with the 
question of how patterns of social stratification are manifest in political attitudes. Adding to 
the previous literature that generally looks at homogenous income groups, in this chapter I 
discuss the ways in which differences in perceived chances of social mobility tend to 
condition the political attitudes of people with otherwise similar living standards.  
To this end, I suggest a classification schema that distinguishes between five social 
classes: (i) the persistently poor; (ii) the upwardly mobile poor, called “escapers”; (iii) the 
downwardly mobile middle class, called “anxious”; (iv) the upwardly mobile middle class, 
called “climbers”; and (v) the elite. My empirical findings demonstrate the limits to 
understanding people’s political attitudes in relation to their current standard of living alone 
and illustrate the importance of taking mobility patterns explicitly into consideration. Using 
the suggested classification schema, I am able to show that it is not primarily differences in 
material well-being but in perceived chances of upward social mobility that account for 
significant variations in people’s political values and priorities.  
Specifically, the two upwardly mobile strata – the “escapers” and the “climbers” – 
show the strongest generic support for democratic rule. They also display the highest levels of 
trust in public institutions and inherit the firmest beliefs that voting is an effective tool to 
influence political processes in the country. At the same time, however, these two groups who 
perceive themselves as upwardly mobile may have earned some of their privileges through the 
existing political system and therefore, on average, are less likely to take on a more critical or 
demanding stance in politics. In fact, they are over-proportionally satisfied with government 
performance and are alarmingly more likely to tolerate government constraints on political 
freedoms and less likely to advocate for the immediate dismissal of corrupt politicians. 
In contrast, the “anxious” – despite being comparable to the climbers in terms of their 
standard of living, levels of education, and employment – show signs of political resignation. 
In fact, their political attitudes are closest to the ones displayed by the persistently poor. These 
two groups, who see threats of downward mobility and tend to perceive themselves as being 
cut off from opportunities to ascend the social ladder, are much less trusting of public 
institutions and less satisfied with governance performance. However, instead of raising their 
concerns, they show signs of disillusionment about the influence of their vote on politics in 
the country and are thus more likely to opt out of the political process. 
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Summarising, four main messages emerge from the analysis presented in this thesis: 
First, the chosen indicator(s) of social class will certainly make a clear difference not only 
with respect to the estimated size and growth of the middle class, but especially with regard to 
its characteristics, needs, and relationship to other economic or political outcomes (see also 
Burger, McAravey, & Van der Berg, 2017; Reeves, Guyot, & Krause, 2018; Visagie & Posel 
2013; Visagie, 2015). Therefore, when studying the middle class, it is extremely important to 
think carefully about which definition appears the most appropriate in view of both the given 
country context and the main research objective, and provide a careful reasoning for the 
conceptual decisions and modelling choices that are being made.  
Second, the notion of economic security and stability is central to the social and 
political meanings of being middle class. Approaches to conceptualizing and measuring social 
class should account for this notion and be capable of identifying a middle class that is free 
from concern about meeting basic needs – both statically and dynamically. The stable middle 
class that is identified using this stability criterion will generally be much smaller than 
approaches relying on less demanding criteria suggest. For the specific case of South Africa, 
this research shows that only one out of four persons can be considered stably middle class or 
elite. Conversely, about half of the population are locked in persistent structural poverty. 
Third, if the growth of a stable middle class is a desired development outcome and 
focus of government policy, then an explicit focus on the stability and quality of employment 
is essential. Not only the lack of jobs, but also the prevalence of casual and precarious forms 
of work impede the development of a stable middle class. In this regard, policymakers will 
likely face an important trade-off between high market flexibility to foster job creation, and 
the creation of fewer, but better and more stable jobs. However, the creation of employment is 
not the only concern. People must also be capacitated to take on the jobs that are being 
created. In this regard, improvements in the quality of education as well as in the provision of 
infrastructure and transport (at accessible prices) are indispensable.  
Lastly, the middle class that is identified using standard economic approaches is not a 
homogenous political actor and will not unambiguously support democratic processes and 
institutions (see also Neubert, 2014). Rather, even within the middle class, there is an 
important extent of heterogeneity in the political orientations and priorities of those who 
perceive themselves as winners or losers under the existing political system. Nonetheless, on 
the basis of my results, neither the upwardly nor the downwardly mobile sublayers within the 
middle class can be expected to move political processes in South Africa into a more liberal 
and inclusive direction. While those who perceive themselves as being cut off from 
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opportunities to ascend the social ladder display signs of political resignation, those people 
who perceive themselves as upwardly mobile tend, on average, to be less concerned with 
corruption and more tolerant of government constraints on political freedoms. 
1.4. Limitations of this study and avenues for future research 
Although this research was carefully prepared, there were some limitations that could not be 
fully addressed. Among these, three issues deserve particular attention. 
Endogeneity concerns  
First, there are a number of endogeneity concerns associated with analysing the effect of 
household characteristics on poverty transitions. Chapter 3 makes an attempt to address some 
of these. The multivariate regression model used which is here explicitly allows for possible 
feedback effects from past poverty experiences and accounts for the potential endogeneity of 
initial conditions, unobserved heterogeneity, and non-random panel attrition, each of which 
has been insufficiently addressed in previous studies that dynamically define the middle class 
based on simpler models of poverty risks, including the one replicated in Chapter 2.  
Nonetheless, there are two major limitations to the approach presented in Chapter 3. 
The first concerns the strict exogeneity assumption of the parental background variables used 
to instrument initial poverty status. While the provided test statistics seem encouraging and 
we provide careful reasoning for the selection of variables, ruling out all potential threats to 
instrument exogeneity is not an easy task particularly in the context of poverty transitions 
reflecting intricate social processes.  
The second shortcoming concerns the limited assessment of events that trigger upward 
and downward mobility (such as losing or finding a job, for example). These have been 
excluded from the regression model due to issues of endogeneity that may arise if there are 
omitted factors which influence, for example, whether someone participates in the labour 
market, and which also affect the chances of poverty entry or exit (Jenkins, 2011). Feedback 
effects from the dependent variable are another potential source of endogeneity, in the sense 
that changes in adjustable characteristics such as the composition of the household and 
employment decisions are likely to be influenced by changes in the poverty status. While the 
approach that I apply circumvents these concerns and presents a valid method to examine the 
effects of state dependence in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, it does not allow 
investigating the nature and direction of these possible feedback effects (Biewen, 2009). 
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Assessing the causal mechanisms that trigger poverty entries, on the one hand, and lift 
people out of poverty into the middle class, on the other, presents an important area of 
research that will require further attention in the future. However, it is a complex and difficult 
task as researchers need to model several processes simultaneously (Jenkins, 2011). While the 
livelihood strategies of the rural poor importantly rely on natural resources where weather-
related shocks present an imortant source of external variation, this becomes all the more 
relevant as poverty is becoming an increasingly urban phenomenon.  
Respondent bias in qualitative data 
During our field research in Khayelitsha, we were aware of the risk of respondents answering 
questions in a way that they perceive personally or socially desirable. Potential biases may 
range from respondents presenting their living conditions in the worst possible light in 
expectation of assistance or other benefits (expectancy bias), to reporting inaccurately on 
sensitive or personal topics to present themselves in the best possible light in order to be 
accepted and liked (social desirability bias). To minimise these biases, we worked with a 
small number of experienced research assistants that were carefully trained. Assistants were 
instructed to use a standard opening statement which clarified the purpose of the study, 
explicitly excluding any type of direct or indirect material benefit, to avoid words with strong 
connotations such as “poor” or “rich”, and to phrase questions in a neutral way.  
 When assessing the positive or negative welfare effects of events reported during the 
LHIs, emotional bias was another concern. For example, the birth of a child was generally 
perceived as a positive event, even if it weakened the economic position of the household, 
while the death of a household member was generally perceived as a negative event, even if 
the material impact was small. While clearly visible during the interviews, these effects were 
generally mitigated when respondents were asked to rate their welfare status at each state in 
life at the end of the interview. My impression was that the comparison across all events that 
had occurred over the life cycle helped respondents to evaluate the welfare effects of 
individual events. In my view, a similar (simplified) relative anchoring exercise could also be 
usefully incorporated when designing shock modules for quantitative surveys, in which 
respondents are asked to retrospectively rate the impact of certain events. However, this will 
require further research and testing.  
 Finally, related to the former, recall bias was a major issue. The livelihood trajectories 
assessed in Chapter 4 fully rely on self-reported, retrospective information. In this regard, it is 
important to keep in mind that, when people remember past events, they may not always have 
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a complete or accurate picture of what happened and may misrecall or misinterpret the causal 
interlinkages between events. Furthermore, consistent with the notion of a positivity bias in 
old age, evidence from psychological research suggests that people generally perceive 
positive memories as more central to their life story and identity than negative events 
(Berntsen, Rubin, & Siegler, 2011). These issues could not be resolved completely and must 
be kept in mind when interpreting results. 
Non-material dimensions of well-being 
Fourth, it is worth noting that the focus of this dissertation is on material dimensions of well-
being. This implies that social-psychological dimensions of poverty, deprivation and 
economic (in-)security, which tend to affect individual and household livelihood strategies, 
are not explicitly discussed. 
In this regard, an interesting observation from our field research is that, in spite of 
stubbornly high levels of unemployment in South Africa, respondents surprisingly frequently 
reported having turned down or quitted wage jobs. This behaviour was most often observed 
among young men with few dependents to support and strong family networks to rely on. 
These voluntary quits are generally explained by high levels of dissatisfaction with precarious 
forms of work, often marked by low pay, poor working conditions, long commuting distances, 
and/or low social recognition. In face of the considerable expansion of temporary employment 
services in South Africa over the past decade (Bhorat & Van Der Westhuizen, 2013), which 
are largely exempt from formal labour protections, a closer investigation of the effects of 
work precarity and volatility in the labour market on individual wellbeing may present a 
fruitful avenue for future research. 
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ABSTRACT 
The wave of upbeat stories on the developing world’s emerging middle class has sparked a 
debate on how social class in general and the middle class in particular can be defined and 
empirically captured. In economics, this debate has been focused on locating the middle class 
within a particular income or expenditure range, where the most appropriate class boundaries 
– especially the cut-off that separates the poor from the middle class – remain heavily
contested. Adding to this literature, in this chapter we provide a structured overview of a wide 
array of definitions that have been proposed in the economics literature, and assess their 
strengths and limitations with an application to South Africa. Arguing that the notion of 
economic security and stability is central to the social and political meanings of being middle 
class, in the main part of this chapter we replicate an empirical strategy recently developed by 
López-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez (2014), which uses (in-)vulnerability to poverty as the key 
criterion defining middle-class status. To our knowledge, this chapter provides the first 
application of this method to the case of South Africa. Using this approach, we find that South 
Africa’s stable middle class is smaller than most previous studies suggest, and has grown only 
sluggishly since 1993. Despite this, there has been considerable demographic transformation 
within the middle class, with Africans now outnumbering whites by a significant margin. 
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2.1. Introduction 
The emerging middle class in the Global South has gained growing attention since the turn of 
the century. It has been touted as a new and powerful consumer market that could drive 
economic growth, and as a torch-bearer of liberal democracy and good governance (Birdsall, 
Graham, & Pettinato, 2000; Kharas, 2010; Cárdenas, Kharas, & Henao, 2015).2 Specifically 
in the African context, this optimism has been fuelled by a number of reports which have 
claimed that the region’s middle class has experienced rapid growth over the past decades and 
now makes up a considerable share of the population (Hattingh, Russo, Sun-Basorun, & Van 
Wamelen, 2012; Ncube, Lufumpa, & Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 2011). However, recent research 
across the continent is increasingly providing evidence that estimations of the size and 
economic potential of Africa’s new middle class may have been exaggerated (see, for 
example, Giesbert & Schotte, 2016; Rodas, Molini & Oseni, 2017; Visagie & Posel, 2013). 
 At the core of these opposing views is a long-standing debate on what constitutes the 
middle class (see Melber, 2016). Countless criteria, subject to which social classes in general 
and the middle class in particular may be defined, have been proposed in the literature. In 
economics, most class definitions are based on financial indicators, which commonly locate 
the middle class within a particular range of the income distribution (see Reeves, Guyot, & 
Krause, 2018). An important complication in this regard concerns the selection of adequate 
class boundaries. In particular, the lower cut-off point that separates the poor from the middle 
class remains heavily contested (see Giesbert & Schotte, 2016).  
In order to bring some clarity to this debate on how to define and empirically measure 
the middle class, in this chapter we provide a structured overview of a wide array of rival 
approaches, focusing on the literature in economics. To enable direct comparisons, we apply 
these varying definitions to the same income distribution and discuss their advantages and 
limitations using South Africa as a case study.  
In view of the given country context marked by high inequality along with widespread 
poverty, for the purpose of this study, we chose freedom from concern about meeting basic 
needs as the main criterion to evaluate alternative approaches. Accordingly, people who are 
currently unable to purchase adequate food and non-food items should – in our understanding 
– not be identified as middle class. However, if we go further, and include economic security 
and stability as central elements of the social and political meanings of being “middle class” 
                                                          
2 These propositions draw on an established international literature which sees the middle class as having the 
potential to play an important social, political, and economic role in a country’s development process (see, for 
example, Barro, 1999; Chun, Hasan, & Ulubasoglu, 2011; Easterly, 2001; Josten, 2013; Loayza, Rigolini, & 
Llorente, 2012; Solimano, 2008). 
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(see Chapter 1), then this static requirement will not suffice. Taking on a dynamic perspective, 
we argue that members of the middle class should also be at a reasonably low risk of falling 
into a situation of precarity in the near future. Accounting for this latter criterion for middle-
class membership, in the main part of this chapter, we replicate an empirical strategy recently 
suggested by López-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez (2014), which aims to differentiate the “stable” 
middle class from a non-poor but vulnerable group. To our knowledge, this study presents one 
of the first applications of this method (originally developed in reference to a set of Latin 
American countries) to a different country context (see also Rodas et al., 2017 for Nigeria).  
Following López-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez’s (2014) original approach, in this chapter, 
we use panel data from the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) to estimate a simple 
model of poverty transitions for the South African case. The coefficient estimates allow us to 
predict a person’s risk of staying in or falling into poverty over a medium-term time frame, 
depending on a broad array of initial household conditions. On this basis, we propose a 
monetary definition of the middle class, where we select the expenditure level associated with 
a maximum risk to poverty of 10 per cent as the lower bound, and the expenditure level 
associated with effective invulnerability to poverty as the upper bound. This gives us a 
monthly per capita expenditure range of R2,794 to R10,954 (in January 2015 prices), 
equivalent to $11.7 to $45.7 (in 2005 PPPs), which is relatively close to the range of $10 to 
$50 that had originally been identified by López-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez (2014).  
Using these thresholds, we find that South Africa’s stable middle class is smaller than 
most previous studies suggest, and has grown sluggishly since 1993 – from about 12.4 per 
cent of the total population to about 15 per cent in 2012. Despite the unimpressive growth 
story of the middle class since the end of apartheid, consistent with the existing literature, we 
detect a considerable demographic transformation within the middle class. However, even 
though the share of Africans in the middle class has tripled since 1993 according to our 
findings, it still remains far removed from demographic representativeness. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 introduces the data 
and explains the way that poverty is measured in this study. Section 2.3 sets the context for 
the subsequent analysis by providing a quick overview of the extent of poverty, inequality and 
income polarisation in South Africa. Section 2.4 provides an extended review of previous 
approaches to the definition of the middle class that have been suggested in the economics 
literature, both nationally and internationally. Section 2.5 presents our replication of López-
Calva and Ortiz-Juarez’s (2014) vulnerability approach. It first describes the method and then 
presents our results along with a number of sensitivity checks. Section 2.6 concludes. 
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2.2. Data and definitions 
The main source of data for this chapter is the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) 
implemented by the Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU) at 
the University of Cape Town (SALDRU 2016a, b, c, d). NIDS is South Africa’s first national 
panel study, which started in 2008 with a nationally representative sample of over 28,000 
individuals in about 7,300 households. At present, there are four waves of data available, 
which are each spaced approximately two years apart (2008, 2010/11, 2012, 2014/15).  
As with all panel studies, there is some attrition between the different survey waves. 
Of the 26,775 interviews that were completed in 2008, 21,111 individuals were successfully 
re-interviewed in 2010/11. In comparison to this relatively high attrition rate of 21.2 per cent 
between the first two waves, attrition was negative in wave 3 (relative to wave 2). That is, 
21,390 individuals of the initial sample were observed again in 2012. In 2014/15 attrition 
went up again. 20,773 core household members were successfully re-interviewed. To mitigate 
the bias potentially caused by non-random panel attrition, panel weights (provided by 
SALDRU) have been used when investigating inter-wave transitions.  
As a supplementary data source that will allow us to give an indication of historic 
trends, we use data from the World Bank Project for Statistics on Living Standards and 
Development (PSLSD) – a nationwide survey conducted in 1993. It covers approximately 
9000 households, which were drawn from a representative sample.  
All monetary values used in this chapter are deflated to January 2015 prices using the 
Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) headline consumer price index (2015a).3 Following Stats 
SA’s general practice, poverty is defined in terms of per capita household expenditure, which 
is assumed to provide a better approximation of permanent household income than the 
reported income. As explained in the introduction and discussed in further detail in Sections 
2.4 and 2.5 below, in this chapter, we understand the satisfaction of basic needs as a necessary 
condition for being considered middle class. Accordingly, we classify household as being 
poor versus non-poor using Stats SA’s (2015b) upper-bound poverty line (UBPL). This line is 
set at R963 per person per month, equivalent to approximately $4 a day (in 2005 PPPs).4  
The UBPL is one out of three national poverty lines published by Stats SA in 2015 
using a cost-of-basic-needs (CoBN) approach. Of these, the food poverty line (FPL) is the 
                                                          
3 To adjust for inflation, for each line the food component (equal to the FPL) is inflated by using the food 
specific Stats SA CPI and the non-food component (equal to the difference between the FPL and the UBPL / 
LBPL respectively) is inflated by using the non-food specific Stats SA CPI (Stats SA, 2011, 2012, 2015).  
4 In this chapter, we use the 2005 PPP conversion factor and not the more recent one as of 2011. This decision 
was taken to ease comparisons with the class thresholds that have been suggested in the previous literature. 
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level of consumption below which individuals are unable to purchase sufficient food to fulfil 
their caloric requirements, even if all expenditure is dedicated to food. The lower-bound 
poverty line (LBPL) allows for spending on non-food items, but requires that individuals 
sacrifice some food consumption in order to fulfil their non-food needs. Only at the UBPL, 
individuals can purchase both adequate food and non-food items. For this reason, it has been 
chosen as the relevant poverty threshold for the purpose of this study.  
We are going to investigate the sensitivity of our results with regard to this choice. For 
this purpose, at the lower end, we use Stats SA’s LBPL, which is set at R629 per person per 
month, equivalent to approximately $2.6 a day (in 2005 PPPs). At the upper end, we use the 
upper bound poverty line that was recently developed by Budlender, Leibbrandt, and Woolard 
(2015) for South Africa. This line is set at R1,283 per capita per month, equivalent to 
approximately $5.4 a day (in 2005 PPPs). While both approaches follow Ravallion’s (1994) 
CoBN methodology, the difference to Stats SA’s UBPL is mainly due to specific 
methodological choices, especially with regard to the treatment of outliers and the definition 
of the “reference group” of the poor (Budlender et al., 2015). 
Before proceeding to the analysis, it should be noted that the 2008 NIDS sample was 
drawn on a nationally representative basis and the poverty headcount calculated from this data 
closely matches official statistics that draw upon the Living Conditions Survey (LCS) 
2008/2009. However, there are reasons to believe that the reduction in poverty observed 
particularly between the last two survey waves (2012 to 2014/15) may be overstated.5 In 
consequence, in the remainder of this chapter we keep the discussion of time trends observed 
up to 2014/15 to a minimum and instead focus on the 1993-2008 and 2008-2012 periods. 
Furthermore, we discuss explicitly how non-random panel attrition may bias our results. 
2.3. Brief historic recap of the extent of income polarisation in South Africa 
Apartheid represented a rigid racialised system of unequal resource distribution, resulting in 
an extremely polarised society. After two decades of democracy, economic inequality in 
South Africa remains one of the highest in the world. While survey comparability issues make 
the analysis of historic trends a challenging task, most researchers will agree that the positive 
                                                          
5 Using household expenditure, poverty increased up to 2010/11, with a remarkable rise of five percentage points 
in the share of households being pushed below the food poverty line. From 2010/11 to 2014/15 poverty levels 
decreased, with the strongest fall observed from 2012 to 2014/15. This general trend is consistent across key 
variables and robust across subsamples. However, particularly the strong reduction in poverty over the last two 
years of NIDS may raise doubts, given that it was not mirrored by any major event at the macro level and is not 
reflected in the official country statistics. The trend might in part be explained by changes in the NIDS sample 
(see Chapter 3), given that individuals with a lower risk of poverty appeared to be somewhat more likely to 
remain in the sample. 
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growth in average real incomes has not been accompanied by any decline in South Africa’s 
historically high levels of inequality. In fact, with the post-tax, post-transfer income Gini-
coefficient being above 0.65 for every nationally representative survey since 1993 (see 
Leibbrandt, Woolard, Finn, & Argent, 2010; Özler, 2007), aggregate inequality measures 
have generally shown an increase in inequality over the post-apartheid period.  
At the same time, the country has seen a considerable decline in poverty rates over the 
same time horizon. In fact, since the transition to democracy, the incomes of the poorest in 
society were growing at a faster rate than the average income of the population. An important 
proportion of this pro-poor growth was facilitated by redistributive policies, particularly the 
provision of social grants (Finn, Leibbrandt, & Woolard, 2013b) 
This apparent paradox of an episode marked by relative pro-poor growth, on the one 
hand, and rising income inequality, on the other, is explained by the highly polarised nature of 
growth for most of the post-apartheid period. As Figure 3.1 illustrates, not only did those in 
the bottom 40 per cent of the income distribution experience above average income growth 
from 1993 to 2008, but the same holds true for the richest 5 per cent of the South African 
society. By contrast, the incomes of those in the middle of the income distribution – especially 
between the 40th and 95th percentiles – were growing at a slower pace than the mean annual 
growth rate of close to 2 per cent.  
Figure 2.1 Growth incidence curve, 1993–2008 
The polarised nature of this growth pattern becomes even more apparent once we 
account for the fact that growth for those at the lower end of the income distribution occurred 
from an extremely low base. The apparently impressive growth rates, especially at the very 
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bottom of the distribution, imply a decline in the depth of poverty, but were largely 
insufficient to lift those households into an economically stable situation. As Table 3.3 below 
indicates, in 2008 about one third of the South African population still did not have sufficient 
money for food, and almost two thirds could not afford to meet both food and non-food needs. 
Table 2.1 Poverty incidence in 2008 according to different poverty lines 
Poverty Lines 
Stats SA 
(2015) 
Budlender et al. 
(2015) 
International 
(2011 PPP) 
Food (extreme) Rands 430 432 346 (= $1.9) 
Headcount 34.87% 35.04% 25.88% 
Lower Bound Rands 629 669 564 (= $3.1) 
Headcount 48.12% 50.46% 44.12% 
Upper Bound Rands 963 1,283 
Headcount 60.75% 67.31% 
Note: Poverty lines have been converted to January 2015 prices using Stats SA’s 
headline consumer price index (Stats SA, 2015a). 
In contrast, incomes at the top of the income distribution grew from an already high 
base in 1993, leading to an increasing concentration towards the richest ventile. Figure 2.2 
illustrates this gain in economic power experienced by those at the top 5 per cent of the 
income distribution. While the share in national income going to the bottom 40 per cent 
stayed virtually constant between 1993 and 2008, the top 5 per cent saw their share increasing 
by about 3.6 percentage points to just above 40 per cent in 2008. As income growth was 
lowest for those between the 40th and 95th percentiles (see Figure 3.1), those in the (upper) 
middle of the income distribution actually lost in economic power to the same extent as the 
top 5 per cent were gaining. 
Figure 2.2 Shares of total income by ventile, 1993 and 2008 
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2.4. Literature Review 
Notwithstanding the popularity of the middle-class concept, there is no universally accepted 
understanding of who constitutes the middle class in South Africa and beyond (see Burger, 
McAravey, & Van der Berg, 2017). On the one hand, sociologists have focused their attention 
on the functional role of the middle class. These definitions generally draw on people’s 
educational achievements and/or occupational status, their attitudes and values, or their access 
to political power and authority (for South Africa, see Garcia Rivero, Du Toit, & Kotze, 2003; 
Seekings & Nattrass, 2006; Southall, 2016). To this extent, there is some overlap with 
ethnographic explorations of the middle class, which tend to focus on people’s education, 
relationships of dependency, and their position in the social hierarchy (see Sumich, 2016 on 
Mozambique). In contrast to these externally defined criteria, some scholars have also used 
purely subjective definitions based on people’s aspirations and self-perception.6  
Economists, on the other hand, generally define the middle class in relation to their 
economic resources – especially in terms of income or expenditure, but also including other 
living standard measures such as assets ownership (for South Africa, see Finn et al., 2013a; 
Levy, Hirsch, & Woolard, 2014; Ncube et al., 2011; Udjo, 2008; Visagie & Posel, 2013). This 
more restricted, unidimensional view is adopted partly due to data availability and 
measurement issues, but also because people’s material welfare has generally been assumed 
to be highly correlated with other dimensions of social class, such as education or occupation 
(see Reeves, Guyot, & Krause, 2018).  
In theory, there should be an important overlap between the varying approaches to 
defining the middle class – both within and across disciplines. However, in practice, the 
chosen indicator(s) of social class will certainly make a clear difference not only with respect 
to the estimated size and growth of the middle class, but especially with regard to its 
characteristics, needs, and relationship to other economic or political outcomes (Burger et al. 
2015; Visagie & Posel 2013). Therefore, when studying the middle class, it is extremely 
important to think carefully about which definition appears the most appropriate in view of 
both the given country context and the main research objective, and be clear about the reasons 
that motivate this choice. The following review of alternative approaches, along with a 
discussion of their pros and cons, may provide some guidance in this regard.  
                                                          
6 Several studies have found a weak correlation between subjectively and objectively identified class measures, 
with a greater share of South Africans self-identifying themselves as standing on the middle rung of society’s 
ladder, when they are in fact at the top or the bottom (Seekings, 2007; Burger et al., 2015). This apparent 
mismatch could be explained by the reference-group hypothesis, according to which respondents allocate 
themselves in reference their own peer group instead of the entire population (Phadi & Ceruti, 2011).  
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2.4.1. Definitions of the middle class based on money metric measures 
While mainstream approaches in economics define the middle class based on money metric 
measures, alternative approaches have recently been suggested that build more closely on the 
sociological class literature. In what follows, we first review the most prominent definitions 
based on absolute or relative monetary thresholds. Alternative non-money metric measures 
will be discussed in Section 2.4.3. 
Relative thresholds 
The lowest common denominator in the debate on who constitutes the middle class is that its 
members should be “somewhere in the middle.” Proceeding from this assumption, relative 
definitions locate the middle class in the literal middle of the income distribution.  
Two different concepts can be distinguished in this regard. First, a range of studies 
locate the middle class according to particular segments of the cumulative income or 
consumption distribution. In this regard, for example, Alesina and Perotti (1996) use the third 
and fourth quintile (the 40th to 80th percentiles), Partridge (1997) uses only the third quintile 
(the 40th to 60th percentiles), Easterly (2001) and Foster and Wolfson (2009) refer to the 
three middle quintiles (the 20th to 80th percentiles), and Solimano (2008) uses the third to 
tenth decile (the 30th to 90th percentiles). For the specific case of South Africa, Finn et al. 
(2013b) and Levy et al. (2014) use income decile groups four to seven to define the middle 
class (the 40th to 70th percentiles), groups eight and nine to define the upper class and decile 
ten to identify the top income group. The main drawback of these purely relative approaches 
is that the population share of the middle class is held constant over time, which means that 
the relative share of the middle class will neither grow nor shrink in response to economic and 
social conditions, increased polarisation, or other distributional changes.   
Second, “central tendency” measures define the middle class in a specific symmetric 
range around the median of the income distribution. In this regard, for example, Birdsall, 
Graham, & Pettinato (2000) draw on a definition that was first proposed by Thurow (1987). 
They consider those individuals to be middle class, who have between 75 and 125 per cent of 
the per capita median income at their disposal. By comparison, other authors choose a wider 
range from 50 to 150 per cent (Visagie & Posel, 2013, based on Davis & Huston, 1992) or 
even from 60 to 225 per cent (Blackburn & Bloom, 1985) of the per capita median income.  
There are several reasons why one may be interested in the median earner of society 
and those households who fall within a specific range of the median: As Visagie (2013) 
argues in the South African context:  
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“First, evidence suggests that the relative growth of the share of total income 
of those in the actual middle of the income distribution leads to greater 
political stability, to a citizenry with higher levels of human development 
(including better education and health) and even to higher levels of economic 
growth (Perotti, 1996; Easterly, 2001, 2007). Secondly, changes in the middle 
income interval would help to assess whether growth has benefited the 
‘average South African’ in post‐1994 South Africa” (Visagie, 2013: 2).  
However, in developing economies typically characterised by a high concentration of 
the population at the lower end of the income distribution, this middle will likely still be poor 
in absolute terms and “is unlikely to be the middle class as either historically defined or 
understood” (Bhalla, 2007: 94). That is, while central tendency measures can be useful in 
assessing the degree of polarization or inequality in the income distribution, they do not 
adequately capture the actual welfare of the middle class. This is especially true in a high 
inequality country such as South Africa, where “thinking about what it means to be middle 
class is complicated by the low average and median levels of incomes in the country and the 
very wide distribution of income. Households who have achieved a modest standard of living 
are actually near the top of the national income ladder” (Visagie, 2013: 1).  
Absolute thresholds 
Alternatively, the middle class has commonly been identified according to an absolute income 
or expenditure range seen as adequate to be considered middle class. The main question that 
has been fuelling a heated debate on the definition of these thresholds is what it actually 
means to be middle class. In other words, where does poverty end and the middle class start, 
and when can somebody be considered rich? The important decision researchers are 
confronted with in this regard is whether those who move above the poverty line 
automatically enter the middle class, or whether there should be some intermediate group that 
separates those who can satisfy their most basic needs (but remain on the verge of falling into 
poverty) from a more economically stable middle class. 
Several scholars, such as Banerjee and Duflo (2008) and Ravallion (2010), in fact 
define the middle class in the developing world simply as those who are no longer poor by 
international standards, using the two-dollar-a-day poverty line as the relevant threshold. 
What this implies is that someone living on the equivalent of $1.99 a day (in 2005 purchasing 
power parities (PPPs)) would still be considered poor, while just one additional cent would 
push the same person into the middle class. The main argument for using this definition is that 
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despite being admittedly still very poor, those within this range are still much better off than 
the poorest in society, who live below the poverty line. However, as noted by Ravallion 
(2010), those falling into this classification still remain at a high risk of poverty.  
Picking up on this notion, other scholars have argued that the middle class should 
actually only comprise “those ‘comfortably’ clear of being at-risk-of-poverty” (Atkinson & 
Brandolini, 2013: 83). With this in mind, Rose (2016) defines the middle class in the United 
States (US) as families with incomes of at least 150 per cent of the national poverty line. In 
reference to recent polls conducted by the Pew Research Centre, in which 1 to 2 per cent of 
the US population self-identified as upper class, he defines an upper cut-off that excludes the 
top 1.8 per cent of income earners from being middle class. Alternatively, Sawhill and 
Haskins (2009) locate the US middle class in an income range from 100 to 700 per cent of the 
poverty line, subdivided into three groups: “lower middle” (100-299 per cent), “middle” (300-
499 per cent), and “upper middle” (500-699 per cent). 
Most prominently in the African context, the African Development Bank released a 
report in 2011, which – following a similar idea – suggests three subdivisions of the African 
middle class: “floating” ($2–$4), “lower middle” ($4–$10), and “upper middle” ($10–$20) (in 
2005 PPPs). Combining these three groups, the report estimates that 34.3 per cent of all 
Africans belonged to the middle class in 2010. However, when excluding the floating class, 
the size of the middle class shrinks by almost two-thirds to 13.4 of the African population (see 
Ncube et al., 2011). 
While appealing in their simplicity, a main limitation of these suggested approaches is 
that the boundaries that differentiate the “actual” middle class from the poor and the lower 
middle class are chosen arbitrarily. To address this shortcoming and derive a more robust and 
theoretically sound definition, López-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez (2014) pioneered an empirical 
strategy to defining the middle class anchored in the notion of economic security. Using panel 
data from Chile, Mexico, and Peru, households are ranked by their estimated probability of 
remaining in or falling into poverty within the next three to five years. In contrast to Banerjee 
and Duflo (2008), who cap the middle class at a maximum daily per capita income of $10, 
López-Calva and Oritz-Juarez (2014) argue that a minimum income level of $10 a day (in 
2005 PPPs) is required for being middle class. At this threshold, people are estimated to face a 
maximum chance of 10 per cent of falling into poverty in the near future, which they consider 
an acceptable degree of vulnerability for the middle class. The upper cut-off is (arbitrarily) 
fixed at $50 a day (in 2005 PPPs). 
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The derived lower threshold is consistent with Kharas’ definition of the global middle 
class, which he locates in a range of $10 to $100 a day (in 2005 PPPs) (Kharas, 2010; UNDP, 
2013).7 Similarly, combining absolute and relative measures, Birdsall (2010) defines the 
middle class in developing countries as those with a minimum income of $10 a day (in 2005 
PPPs), excluding the top 5 per cent of the national income distribution. While the absolute 
lower bound is meant to identify those individuals who are too poor to be middle class in any 
society, the upper threshold excludes those who are considered rich at least by their own 
country standards. 
Following a similar vein as López-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez’s (2014) ambition for a 
more theoretically founded class analysis, there are an increasing number of studies that use 
the ownership of tangible and intangible assets, employment status, occupation, education, or 
possibilities for upward social mobility as criteria for class identification (see Section 2.4.3). 
Among these, Visagie and Posel (2013) locate South Africa’s “affluent” middle class in an 
income range of R1,400 to R10,000 per person per month (in 2008 money terms), equivalent 
to about $8 to $58 a day (in 2005 PPPs). These thresholds correspond to the expected income 
interval for households in which the highest income earner is in an occupation that has 
typically been associated with the middle class.8 
2.4.2. The size of South Africa’s middle class under alternative money metric measures 
Before returning to this more “productionist” understanding of middle class, in what follows 
we aim to take stock of the definitions introduced up to this point (summarised in Figure 2.3) 
and assess their implications for the size and growth of the South African middle class from 
1993 to 2008 (see Table 2.2). 
As Figure 2.3 illustrates, depending on the chosen classification method, very different 
parts of the South African population are identified as middle class. Most evident, all 
definitions that identify the middle class either in relation to the actual middle (or median) of 
the national income distribution, or just above the international two-dollar-a-day poverty line, 
classify many South Africans as middle class, who would be considered poor by national 
standards. This implies that many of those who are assigned middle-class status under these 
                                                          
7 Trying to develop a global classification, Kharas (2010) defines the global middle class such that it excludes 
those who are poor in the poorest advanced European economies (average poverty line of Italy and Portugal) and 
those who are rich in the richest advanced European country (twice the median income of Luxembourg). 
8 Middle class occupations include white collar professions such as managers, senior officials, legislators, 
professionals (e.g. teachers and nurses), associate professionals, technicians and clerks; whereas working class 
occupations would include plant and machinery operators, craft and related trade workers, skilled agriculture and 
fishery workers, service and market sales workers and all elementary occupations (Visagie & Posel, 2013). 
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definitions still lack the financial means to afford even the most basic things in life. For 
example, Easterly’s (2001) definition of the three middle quintiles, frequently quoted in the 
development literature, includes in the middle class even some of those who cannot purchase 
enough food. As pointed out by Visagie and Posel (2013), there is very little overlap between 
those in the actual middle of the national income distribution, and a South African middle 
class defined by an absolute level of affluence and economic stability. By contrast, the 
vulnerability- and economic empowerment-based approaches suggested by López-Calva and 
Ortiz-Juarez (2014) and Visagie and Posel (2013) respectively closely overlap. 
Figure 2.3 Comparison of rival approaches to the definition of the middle class 
Note: Conversion between Int. $ and South African Rand uses the PPP conversion factor for private 
consumption (LCU per international $) provided by the World Bank. In 2005, Int. $1 (PPP) was equivalent to 
R4.57. All thresholds have been converted to constant prices of January 2015 using the Statistics South 
Africa Consumer Price Index. The red line indicates Stats SA’s UBPL fixed at R963. The grey line gives the 
kernel density distribution of monthly household expenditure per capita calculated from NIDS 2008 data.  
Given these discrepancies, the choice of definition will make an important difference 
when estimating the size and growth of South Africa’s middle class. As Table 2.2 illustrates, 
depending on the chosen classification method, its relative population share in 2008 can vary 
between 10 and 60 per cent. If we consider only those thresholds that were designed with 
specific reference to South Africa, the spread reduces to a still wide range of 22 to 38 per cent 
(see approaches by Finn et al., 2013a; Levy et al., 2014; Ncube et al., 2001 [excl. floating 
class]; Visagie & Posel, 2013 displayed in Table 2.2).9  
9 Note that the population shares we show here (based on our own calculations) are not necessarily the same as 
the ones produced by these authors themselves. 
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Furthermore, it is worth noting that by using different thresholds, researchers will 
identify opposing trends in the evolution of the size of the middle class. Holding the middle 
class share fixed by definition, approaches based on percentiles of the cumulative income or 
expenditure distribution are unsuitable to capture changes in class size over time. Since 
poverty has declined since the end of apartheid, those definitions that include the UBPL in the 
income interval used to identify the middle class – that is, which include an important share of 
the poor in their definition – show a decline in class size from 1993 to 2008. By contrast, 
those approaches that locate the middle class in a higher range with some distance to the 
poverty line show an increase in the middle-class share by about three to five percentage 
points over the same period (see Table 2.2). 
2.4.3. Definitions of the middle class based on non-money metric measures 
As indicated above, sociologists tend to define the middle class based on its functional role in 
society, typically captured by determinants of social power, such as work, occupation, wealth, 
and education.10 Against this background, more than a few scholars have criticised those 
definitions (dominant in the economics literature) that exclusively define the middle class 
with respect to its purchasing power. These “consumptionist” approaches are deemed “blind 
to the fact that the source, and not the sum, of revenue, determines life chances” (Torche & 
López-Calva, 2013: 413; for further discussion, see also Southall, 2016). 
 This concern is mitigated to some extent by those studies that – despite ultimately 
identifying the middle class in monetary terms – use a more “productionist” approach to 
derive the class thresholds. For example, this applies to the definition suggested by Visagie 
and Posel (2013), which is based on the expected income in “typical” middle-class 
occupations. López-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez’s (2014) vulnerability approach can also be 
considered “productionist” in the sense that the risk to poverty is estimated based on a set of 
observable household characteristics, including education and occupation of the head.  
Other studies, although not being strictly “productionist” in nature, have used asset 
indices to proxy for household wealth as a determinant of social power (see Udjo, 2008, for 
an application using categories from the South African Advertising Research Foundation’s 
Living Standard Measure). Exceptionally comprehensive in this regard is the study conducted 
                                                          
10 Most studies on South Africa following this vein use occupational categories (sometimes combined with a 
skill measure) to identify the middle class (see, for example, Crankshaw, 1997; Seekings & Nattrass, 2005; 
Southall, 2016). These definitions can be criticised for creating a very heterogeneous “residual” group of 
households – representing about one-third of the South African population – that comprises “unemployed people 
dependent upon government grants,” on the one hand, and “a relatively small number of people enjoying a 
prosperous retirement funded by pensions and investments,” on the other (Southall, 2016: 55). 
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by McEwan, Hughes, and Bek (2015), who employ a multidimensional indicator of social 
class that differentiates consumers into ten groups according to 29 indicators of living 
standards in South Africa (including asset ownership, race, and degree of urbanisation, 
amongst others). Despite providing a better understanding of the actual standard of living of 
the middle class, these approaches again remain silent on the sources of wealth. Especially 
when basic goods and services are governmentally provided, the derived measure is likely to 
overstate the social power and life chances of the thus-defined middle class.  
Picking up on the Weberian idea that members of the same class should share common 
life chances, Schotte (2016) has recently suggested another multidimensional approach that 
combines a living standard measure to approximate material welfare with a measure of self-
perceived chances for social upward mobility (see also Chapter 5).  
Thinking along similar lines, Burger et al. (2017) have suggested an approach to the 
definition of the middle class that builds on Sen’s capability approach.11 As opposed to 
relying on income or consumption measures alone, they propose a multidimensional approach 
combining four defined capabilities that they suggest to better capture the meaning of the 
middle class as “empowered, capacitated and economically secure individuals who are free to 
pursue their personal goals and aspirations” (Burger et al., 2017: 2). These four core 
capabilities include: (i) freedom from concern about survival and meeting basic needs, (ii) 
financial discretion and buying power, (iii) labour market power, and (iv) access to 
information and the ability to process information. Using these capabilities to identify the 
middle class, Burger et al. identify very strong growth in the middle class since 1993 – from 
27 per cent of the population to 35 per cent in 2008 and 48 per cent in 2012. 
While Burger et al.’s approach represents an important advance in the understanding 
of the middle class in the South African context, the four measurable “functionings” they 
choose as proxies of the four identified core capabilities (representing the outcomes of 
exercising capabilities) seem to be capturing very basic needs rather than a situation of 
economic empowerment (see Section 2.5.4 for further discussion).12 Consequently, much of 
the growth they observe in the middle class can likely be attributed to the considerable 
expansion of government service provision since 1993. Another disadvantage of the approach 
is that it does not lend itself to identify an elite, which would seem particularly relevant in the 
South African context marked by high income concentration at the top of the distribution.  
                                                          
11 Sen defines capabilities as “substantive freedoms [one] enjoys to lead the kind of life he or she has reason to 
value”, where income is only instrumentally valuable insofar as it expands capabilities (1999: 87). 
12 The four measures used include: (i) adequate sanitation and clean water, (ii) ownership of a stove and fridge, 
(iii) at least one employed member of the household, and (iv) TV and radio ownership, and literacy. 
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2.5. A vulnerability approach to defining the middle class in South Africa 
From the above discussion, López-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez’s (2014) vulnerability approach to 
defining the middle class seems well-suited to the South African context. It has been 
specifically designed to identify a “stable” middle class whose members are free from concern 
about meeting basic needs – both statically and dynamically.  
As discussed, we consider Stats SA’s UBPL as the absolute minimum consumption 
floor necessary for long-term physical well-being. In fact, this line closely coincides with the 
poverty line of $4 a day (in 2005 PPPs) used by López-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez (2014). 
Nevertheless, the derived vulnerability threshold that divides the “actual” or “stable” middle 
class from the group of the vulnerable (see Figure 2.4) may not be directly applicable to South 
Africa, given that it has been derived using a different set of countries. Therefore, in what 
follows, we replicate their original approach using South African panel data. In doing so, we 
also discuss a number of methodological choices that are critical for this approach. 
 
Figure 2.4 Four-tiered class stratification following a vulnerability-based approach  
2.5.1. Methodology  
Following López-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez (2014), the identification of the vulnerability 
threshold proceeds in three steps: First, we identify a number of characteristics associated 
with the probability of being poor in South Africa. Second, for each individual, we quantify 
the predicted risk of poverty, given these characteristics. Third, we use these predicted 
probabilities to find the income bands associated with a risk of poverty of 10 per cent. This is 
considered the maximum acceptable degree of vulnerability to be identified as middle class  
Importantly, in line with the original approach, the last step relies not on the observed 
but the predicted income (or rather expenditure) level (given initial household characteristics). 
This is because the latter is considered less volatile and can be assumed to better reflect the 
household’s income generation capacity. For details on the methodology, please refer to 
Appendix A.1. 
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In a last step, we calculate the upper threshold that divides the middle class from the 
elite. Here we depart from the original approach suggested by López-Calva and Oritz-Juarez 
(2014), who arbitrarily fix the upper bound at $50 (2005 PPP).13 Instead, we define the upper 
threshold as the average predicted per capita income (or expenditure) level of those in the 
bottom one percentile of the predicted poverty probability distribution.14 It thus identifies the 
elite as those who are the least likely to become poor over time.  
The poverty risk estimates are derived using NIDS panel data. We use 2008 as the 
base year and focus on the poverty transitions that occurred from 2008 to 2012 (waves 1 to 3). 
This time-frame is mainly chosen due to data concerns. First, attrition was lowest between 
these two survey waves (see Section 2.2). Second, the impacts of the 2008/2009 financial 
crisis led to an increase in poverty particularly up to 2010/11 (wave 2), which may be little 
generalizable to other periods. Third, the strong decline in poverty observed from 2012 to 
2014/15 in NIDS (waves 3 to 4) may raise doubts, given that it was not mirrored by any major 
event at the macro level and is not reflected in the official country statistics (see Section 2.2). 
The resulting four-year period from 2008 to 2012 furthermore closely coincides with the 
medium-term time horizon of three to five years studied by López-Calva and Oritz-Juarez 
(2014). A robustness check with regard to the chosen time-frame will be provided in Section 
2.5.3. 
2.5.2. Results  
As a preliminary step for the subsequent analysis, it is important to get a first glance of the 
extent of poverty transitions in South Africa during the period under study. As can be seen 
from Table 2.3, about 29.8 per cent of all South Africans who were non-poor in 2008 had 
fallen into poverty in 2012 (ca. 5.8 million people). By contrast, about 16.1 per cent (ca. 4.9 
million people) of those who were poor in 2008 had moved above the poverty line in 2012. A 
simple cross-sectional comparison, showing an increase in the poverty headcount by close to 
two percentage points (from 60.8 to 63 per cent) from 2008 to 2012, would mask these 
dynamics.  
 
                                                          
13 The definition of the upper or elite threshold is not the focus of this study. The size of the middle class can be 
expected to be relatively robust to minor variations in this threshold, given that it lies in the upper tail of the 
distribution. However, while we consider the exact cut-off point to be less of a concern, we believe the definition 
of an elite group to be particularly relevant in the South African context, which is marked by an outstanding 
concentration of wealth at the top of the distribution, particularly in the top quintile (see Chapter 3). 
14 We prefer this approach over specifying a probability cut-off to identify the elite due to the generally lower 
accuracy and high density of probit models towards the tails of the distribution. 
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Table 2.3 Poverty transition matrix, 2008 to 2012 
  Non-poor in 2012 Poor in 2012 Total 
Non-poor in 2008 % 70.16 29.84 100 
 Million 13.65 5.80 19.45 
Poor in 2008 % 16.12 83.88 100 
 Million 4.85 25.25 30.11 
 
Note: The total South African population in 2008 was 49.56 million (UN population statistics). 
Regression analysis 
To gain a better understanding of the characteristics that correlate with these observed 
dynamics, we draw on the modelling framework suggested by López-Calva and Oritz-Juarez 
(2014). We use a probit specification to regress respondents’ poverty status in 2012 on a set of 
initial household characteristics observed in 2008. Our explanatory variables in the base 
specification include household size and geographic location (area and province) in 2008, as 
well as a set of initial characteristics of the household head, including demographics (age, age 
squared, gender, and race), educational attainment, and labour market status or occupation. 
This model correctly predicts the poverty status for 78.6 per cent of all observations.  
As the results reported in Table 2.4 column (1) below indicate, race remains a strong 
predictor of poverty in South Africa, with Africans being at the highest risk of poverty, 
whereas whites are the least likely to be poor, even after controlling for differences in 
education and employment. Members of larger, female headed, or rural agricultural 
households also face a higher risk of poverty, as do those living in a household where the 
head is unemployed. By contrast, having more household members in employment and 
specifically having a higher educated household head who is working, ideally in a 
management position or other white-collar occupation, are strong predictors for lower 
vulnerability to poverty.15 By contrast, having a working household head in a low-skilled 
occupation has no significant risk-reducing effect. Casual (non-permanent/informal) forms of 
work are associated with a significantly elevated risk to poverty. 
Using the estimated coefficients reported in column (1), we predict, for every 
individual, the probability of being poor in 2012. In addition, we predict for each household 
the per capita income and expenditure level in the base period (2008) using the same 
explanatory variables (see Appendix A.3). The respective thresholds associated with a risk of 
poverty of 10 per cent are reported at the bottom of Table 2.4 column (1).  
                                                          
15 In line with Visagie and Posel’s (2013) division between middle-class and working-class professions, white-
collar occupations include managers, professionals, technicians and associate professionals, and clerks; whereas 
blue-collar class occupations include plant and machinery operators, craft and related trade workers, skilled 
agriculture and fishery workers, service and market sales workers and all elementary occupations. 
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In a next step, we construct an asset index (capturing initial housing conditions and 
ownership of consumer durables), which is added as an additional control to the model (see 
Table 2.4 column (2)).16 Following the line of reasoning presented by Carter and May (2001) 
and Carter and Barret (2006), we assume assets to be less sensitive to temporary fluctuations 
than the level of income or consumption observed in a single cross-section. In this sense, the 
asset controls can be understood as a proxy for initial household wealth, which is likely to 
determine the propensity to poverty in subsequent waves. As may be expected, we observe 
that the differences in poverty risks by race and (to a lesser extent) education groups are in 
part attributable to differences in initial household wealth. However, these differences remain 
large and significant even after asset controls have been added. 
Last, given that NIDS is a panel of individuals that may move between households, we 
account for shifts in household composition over time.17 Specifically, we add the (absolute) 
change in household size and in the number of employed household members between 2008 
and 2012 to our set of explanatory variables. This raises the number of correct classifications 
by the model to 83.9 per cent. Unsurprisingly, while an increase in the number of dependent 
household members goes in line with a higher risk to poverty, an increase in the number of 
working household members is associated with a lower likelihood of being poor at the end of 
the period (see Table 2.4 column (3)). Including these controls in the probit model reduces the 
estimated vulnerability threshold to below R3,000. Given that we are looking at a four-year 
time horizon which makes it unlikely to observe any fertility effect, this result is likely driven 
by household splits leading to lower household sizes.  
It is worth noting that after controlling for changes in the number of employed 
household members (including the household head), we estimate a negative and significant 
risk-reducing effect also for other forms of work of the household head, including wage 
employment in blue-collar occupations, self-employment, and personal agricultural work. 
From this we may conclude that having a household head who is working is generally 
associated with a lower risk of poverty. However, for this to be true, the employment 
relationship must be maintained over time. This implies that temporary and informal forms of 
work will often not suffice to reduce poverty risk in the medium run (see Chapters 3 and 4).  
                                                          
16 To construct the asset index, we use the responses to 11 questions that relate to the household’s housing 
conditions (dwelling type, water source, toilet facility), on the one hand, and ownership of durable assets 
(television, electric stove, fridge/freezer, DVD/Blu-ray player, microwave, washing machine, car, computer), on 
the other. In order to reduce these binary categorical variables into a single index with appropriate weighting, 
multiple correspondence analysis is used (for details on the methodology see, for example, Booysen, Van der 
Berg, Burger, Von Maltitz, & Du Rand, 2008; Shimeles & Ncube, 2015). The weights are estimated using NIDS 
2008 data (see Appendix A.2). 
17 Note that this is done only for the dynamic poverty model, not for the static income model. 
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Table 2.4 Probit estimates (average marginal effects) on probability of being poor in 2012 
 
Base 
As (1)  
with asset 
controls 
As (2)  
with controls  
for changes in HH 
composition 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Characteristics of the head of household (HoH) in wave 1    
HoH age -0.0059** -0.0011 -0.0017 
 
(0.0026) (0.0024) (0.0024) 
HoH age squared (x0.01) 0.0024 -0.0009 -0.0003 
 
(0.0024) (0.0022) (0.0023) 
HoH is female 0.0426*** 0.0429*** 0.0457*** 
 
(0.0146) (0.0144) (0.0127) 
HoH race group (base: African)    
Coloured -0.0254 0.0371 0.0404 
 (0.0465) (0.0485) (0.0373) 
Asian/Indian -0.3531*** -0.1844*** -0.1376*** 
 (0.0405) (0.0502) (0.0505) 
White -0.3255*** -0.2208*** -0.1963*** 
 (0.0571) (0.0534) (0.0603) 
HoH education (base: no schooling)    
Less than primary completed -0.0586** -0.0477** -0.0468** 
 (0.0242) (0.0233) (0.0212) 
Primary completed -0.0848*** -0.0587** -0.0802*** 
 (0.0272) (0.0290) (0.0278) 
Secondary not completed -0.1199*** -0.0720*** -0.0822*** 
 (0.0259) (0.0260) (0.0252) 
Secondary completed -0.2673*** -0.1847*** -0.1575*** 
 (0.0324) (0.0332) (0.0316) 
Tertiary -0.3971*** -0.2927*** -0.2692*** 
 (0.0352) (0.0390) (0.0341) 
HoH employment status (base: inactive) 
   
Unemployed (discouraged) 0.0504 0.0399 0.0118 
 
(0.0387) (0.0404) (0.0333) 
Unemployed (strict) 0.0504* 0.0495* 0.0441* 
 
(0.0283) (0.0272) (0.0257) 
Wage employment in white-collar occupation -0.0969*** -0.0539* -0.0873*** 
 
(0.0288) (0.0280) (0.0254) 
Wage employment in blue-collar occupation -0.0204 -0.0028 -0.0564*** 
 
(0.0220) (0.0235) (0.0215) 
Self-employment -0.0130 0.0144 -0.0505** 
 
(0.0270) (0.0274) (0.0257) 
Paid casual work 0.0712** 0.0573* -0.0141 
 
(0.0308) (0.0315) (0.0303) 
Personal agricultural worka 0.0294 0.0358 -0.0621** 
  (0.0334) (0.0334) (0.0312) 
Characteristics of the household (HH) in wave 1    
Composition of the HH    
No. of members in HH 0.0336*** 0.0359*** 0.0713*** 
 (0.0032) (0.0034) (0.0035) 
No. of workers in HH (excl. HoH) -0.0357*** -0.0257** -0.0743*** 
 (0.0115) (0.0103) (0.0108) 
Geographic location (base: traditional) b 
   
Urban -0.0727*** -0.0101 0.0047 
 
(0.0221) (0.0216) (0.0186) 
Farms 0.0149 0.0278 0.0659** 
 
(0.0319) (0.0337) (0.0332) 
Access to basic goods and services   
   
Asset index score (0 to 1) 
 
-0.3505*** -0.3489*** 
 
 
(0.0367) (0.0342) 
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Changes in the HH composition between waves 1 and 3 
  
 
Abs. change in no. of members in HH 
  
0.0651*** 
 
  
(0.0032) 
Abs. change in no. of workers in HH (incl. HoH) 
  
-0.0691*** 
   
  
(0.0085) 
Province fixed effects YES YES YES 
Observations 18,055 17,567 17,567 
R-squared 0.335 0.358 0.467 
Correctly classified (%) 78.55 80.12 83.93 
Threshold associated with a predicted 10% risk to poverty    
Expenditure cut-off (predicted) 3,408 3,274 2,794 
Income cut-off (predicted) 3,696 3,403 2,915 
Robust standard errors (adjusted for 400 survey clusters) in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Individuals are predicted to be poor if their predicted poverty propensity exceeds the average probability 
of being poor in the final year (that is, the 2012 poverty headcount). 
a  Personal agricultural work includes working on own plot or looking after livestock. 
b  In line with the 2011 census, three settlement types are distinguished in NIDS:Urban – A continuously built-up 
area that is established through cities, towns, townships’, small towns, and hamlets. Traditional – Communally 
owned land under the jurisdiction of traditional leaders. Settlements within these areas are villages. Farms – 
Land allocated for and used for commercial farming including the structures and infrastructure on it. 
Class thresholds 
Using the model specification reported in Table 2.4 column (3), we fix the vulnerability 
threshold at R2,779 per month (in January 2015 prices), equivalent to about $11.6 per day in 
2005 PPPs. This threshold corresponds to about three times the poverty line. A very similar 
threshold of R2,942 would have been obtained when using income instead of expenditure as 
the relevant welfare measure (see Table 2.4 above). The upper threshold that separates the 
middle class from the elite is set at R10,954 per month (in January 2015 prices), equivalent to 
$45.7 in 2005 PPPs. 
To evaluate the performance of our derived thresholds, we take a look at the share of 
individuals by initial class status that actually fell into poverty from 2008 to 2012. As reported 
in Table 2.5, almost every second person who was considered vulnerable in 2008 was 
observed to be poor in 2012. In comparison, the same was true for one in ten members of the 
middle class, indicating a reasonably low degree of vulnerability.18 
Using these thresholds, we identify a South African middle class that is only about 
half the size compared to previous studies (see Section 2.4.2). Moreover, this “stable” middle 
class has been growing sluggishly – from 12.4 per cent of the total population in 1993 to 15 
per cent in 2008. Despite this, there has been a considerable demographic transformation 
within the middle class, with Africans now outnumbering whites by a significant margin. 
                                                          
18 Surprisingly, also 4 per cent of those who were elite in 2008 reported an expenditure level below the poverty 
line in 2012. This finding may likely partly be driven by measurement error that is well known to be an issue, 
especially with regard to the rich in household survey data. For a further discussion, see Section 2.5.3 below. 
Defining the middle class in the Global South  43 
However, even though the share of Africans in the middle class has tripled since 1993, it still 
falls far short of demographic representativeness (see Table 2.6). 
Table 2.5 Movements in and out of poverty by initial class status, 2008 to 2012 
Population share by class in 2008 that Poor Vulnerable Middle Class Elite 
- was non-poor in 2012 16.12 54.11 91.12 95.95 
- was poor in 2012 83.88 45.89 8.88 4.05  
Expenditure bounds in January 2015 prices <963 963 – 2,794 2,794 – 10,954 10,954+ 
Expenditure bounds in 2005 Int. $ PPP <4.0 4.0 – 11.7 11.7 – 45.7 45.7+ 
 
  
Table 2.6 Relative class shares in South Africa, 1993 to 2014/15 
Population share (%) by class  Poor Vulnerable Middle Class Elite Total 
1993 Total  63.36 23.37 12.38 0.89 100 
 Share of Black African in Total 93.87 70.23 16.53 1.88 77.83 
2008 Total 60.75 20.95 15.00 3.30 100 
 Share of Black African in Total 92.19 78.43 40.12 15.21 78.95 
2010/11 Total 65.06 18.02 13.74 3.18 100 
 Share of Black African in Total 91.81 76.61 39.84 12.89 79.42 
2012 Total 63.00 21.40 12.64 2.97 100 
 Share of Black African in Total 91.86 71.61 50.17 17.45 80.05 
2014/15 Total 55.79 25.70 15.20 3.32 100 
 Share of Black African in Total 92.62 79.45 50.12 23.27 80.48 
 
2.5.3. Sensitivity analysis and caveats of the approach 
In this section, we assess the sensitivity of the calculated vulnerability threshold to some of 
the choices we made in deriving it, and discuss the main limitations of the approach. 
Sensitivity to the chosen time-frame and macroeconomic conditions  
While vulnerability to poverty is a forward looking concept, the measurement of vulnerability 
is necessarily backward looking (Cafiero & Vakis, 2006). Consequently, our analysis 
implicitly assumes that the economic conditions which determined vulnerability in the past 
remain unchanged in the present and the future. This may not be true if there were important 
changes in the macroeconomic and/or institutional environment affecting poverty risks. Thus, 
while the vulnerability threshold is absolute in the sense that the risk of being poor is fixed at 
10 per cent, the monetary value associated with it is likely to shift as conditions change.19 
                                                          
19 Similarly, to apply the vulnerability threshold to measuring the middle class in countries other than the country 
in which it was calculated is to assume that the macroeconomic conditions in both countries are the same, which 
may be even more problematic. For a discussion of approaches to defining and measuring the global middle 
class see Jayadev, Lahoti, and Reddy (2015). 
44  Chapter 2 
Nevertheless, as shown in Table 2.7, we find that the middle class as of 2008 remained 
relatively resilient to poverty over the three subsequent survey waves. Specifically, while 8.9 
per cent of the initial middle class were observed to be poor in 2012, a somewhat larger share 
of 9.4 per cent had fallen into poverty in 2010/11. The fact that this difference is relatively 
small – in spite of the effects of the 2008/2009 financial crisis that were probably felt 
strongest during this period – increases our confidence in the economic stability of the 
identified middle class. Furthermore, in line with the drop in poverty between NIDS waves 3 
and 4, only 7 per cent of the 2008 middle class were observed to be poor in 2014/15. 
Accordingly, if we had calculated the vulnerability threshold using 2008 to 2014/15 as the 
reference period, a substantially lower threshold of R2,379 would have been estimated. 
However, this difference may at least partly be attributable to sampling issues.   
Finally, it is worth noting that even those in the “stable” middle class can face a higher 
cumulative risk of poverty. In fact, 19.4 per cent of those who were middle class in 2008 had 
fallen into poverty in at least one out of three subsequent survey waves (see Table 2.7). 
However, they were very unlikely to remain poor persistently. That is, among the initial 
middle class, only 3.6 per cent were observed to be poor in all three following survey waves.   
Table 2.7 Population share falling into poverty by initial class status in 2008 
Class in 2008  Poor Vulnerable Middle Class Elite 
Poor in 2010/11 (%) 86.84 48.77 9.44 4.20  
Poor in 2012 (%) 83.88 45.89 8.88 4.05  
Poor in 2014/15 (%) 73.24 35.97 7.02 3.28 
Poor in 2010/11, 2012, OR 2014/15 (%) 96.99 67.07 19.43 7.87 
Poor in 2010/11, 2012, AND 2014/15 (%) 61.07 22.40 3.53 1.52  
 
Sensitivity to the choice of the probability cut-off 
The choice of the probability cut-off is clearly critical to our analysis. We follow López-Calva 
and Ortiz-Juarez (2014) in fixing the threshold at 10 per cent. However, it would have been in 
principle possible to make an argument for the use of any other probability threshold in a 
potential range of, for example, 5 to 20 per cent. 
Table 2.8 compares the calculated vulnerability line and the associated size of the 
middle class using a range of alternative cut-off points. We find a sharp drop in the derived 
vulnerability threshold particularly over the probability interval between 10 and 15 per cent – 
from R2,794 to R1,991. Using this latter threshold, the population share held by the middle 
class in 2008 would have been about six percentage points larger. 
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Table 2.8 Sensitivity of the vulnerability thresholds to the choice of the probability cut-off 
Allowed maximum predicted 
risk of falling into poverty 
Vulnerability 
Threshold (in January 
2015 prices) 
Middle class 
(%) in 1993 
Middle class 
(%) in 2008 
Middle class 
growth (ppts) 
5 per cent  3,250 10.42 12.96 2.54 
10 per cent 2,794 12.38 15.00 2.62 
15 per cent 1,991 17.31 20.95 3.64 
20 per cent 1,708 20.02 23.79 3.77 
 
Sensitivity to the choice of the poverty line 
Naturally, the estimated probability of being poor and the associated vulnerability cut-off will 
depend on where we set the poverty line. In order to investigate the sensitivity of our results 
to the choice of Stats SA’s UBPL (2015), we first replicate the same approach using the 
UBPL that was recently suggested by Budlender et al. (2015). The use of this slightly higher 
poverty line results in a somewhat higher vulnerability threshold of R3,053 per month ($12.7 
a day). While the population share held by the middle class is about one percentage point 
lower under this definition, its growth from 1993 to 2008 is very similar across specifications. 
Second, we replicate our analysis using Stats SA’s LBPL (2015). Using this lower 
poverty line, a substantially lower vulnerability threshold of R1,830 and upper threshold of 
R4,794 are estimated, equivalent to an approximate range of $7.6 to $20.0 a day (in 2005 
PPPs). Using these thresholds, the relative size of the middle class is surprisingly similar to 
the original specification using the UBPL. However, if we held the upper threshold fixed, then 
the share of the middle class would increase by close to 50 per cent under this specification 
(to 18.7 per cent in 1993 and 22.7 per cent in 2008). 
Table 2.9 Sensitivity of the vulnerability thresholds to the choice of the poverty line 
Poverty Line in January 
2015 prices 
Poverty 
line 
Vulnerability 
Threshold 
Upper 
Threshold 
Middle 
class (%) 
in 1993 
Middle 
class (%) 
in 2008 
Middle  
class growth 
(ppts) 
Stats SA UBPL (2015) 963 2,794 10,954 12.38 15.00 2.62 
Budlender et al. (2015) 1,283 3,053 11,157 11.27 13.83 2.56 
- holding upper bound fix 1,283 3,053 10,954 11.23 13.73 2.50 
Stats SA LBPL (2015) 629 1,830 4,794 13.17 14.89 1.72 
 - holding upper bound fix 629 1,830 10,954 18.74       22.69 3.95 
 
Certainly, it is important to keep in mind that the interpretation of the group that is 
identified using the LBPL is qualitatively different. As explained in Section 2.2, individuals 
with a per capita expenditure level equal to the LBPL will need to sacrifice some food 
consumption in order to fulfil their non-food needs. In consequence, despite being at low risk 
of falling under the minimum subsistence level, the middle class that we identify in reference 
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to the LBPL will still face an elevated risk of slipping into a precarious situation in the sense 
of not being able to purchase both adequate food and non-food items.  
Sample attrition and changes in the composition of households 
As in any panel data study, sample attrition is a concern. Despite using panel weights 
throughout the analysis, we cannot fully rule out the possibility that the derived vulnerability 
threshold could be affected by non-random attrition.  
 Out of 26,776 original sample members, 5,385 individuals (20.1 per cent) had left the 
sample in 2012. The attrition rate was lower among initially poor (16.8 per cent) than initially 
non-poor individuals (28.7 per cent) and was highest in the top decile of the expenditure 
distribution (43.4 per cent). Accordingly, if one suspects that those at higher risk of poverty 
were generally more likely to remain in the panel, our estimate of the vulnerability threshold 
could be upwardly biased.  
In an attempt to quantify this bias, we rerun the log-linearised per capita expenditure 
model with data from 2012 and use the estimated regression coefficients to impute values of 
per capita household expenditure level and poverty status for those in the baseline sample 
(2008), who could not be followed up at the end of the period (2012). Since we have no 
information on the change in the household size and number of employed household 
members, in a next step we rerun the probability estimation including these imputed 
observations using the model specification presented in Table 2.4 column (2).20 The predicted 
vulnerability threshold associated with a risk of poverty of 10 per cent including imputations 
is R3,198, as compared to R3,274 without imputations using the same model specification 
(see bottom of Table 2.4 column (2)). This suggests that our chosen lower middle class 
threshold may be upwardly biased by about R76 due to sample attrition, which would imply a 
minor underestimation of the size of the middle class by 0.5 percentage points. 
Moreover, NIDS is a panel study which follows individuals and not households. This 
means that individuals that belong to a particular household in wave 1 will not necessarily 
belong to the same household in subsequent waves. Our analysis nevertheless works on the 
assumption that household resources in wave 1 are relevant in determining poverty status in 
wave 3, adding a limited set of controls for changes in the household composition. 
Investigating to what extent dynamics of household formation as well as changes in the 
geographic location of households are driving mobility will be a worthwhile line of research 
for future investigation, which is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
                                                          
20 This increases the number of observation used in the probit estimation from 17,567 to 22,152. 
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Measurement error in income or expenditure data 
The presented vulnerability analysis essentially builds on investigating the correlates of 
movements into and out of poverty observed in the available panel data. However, if the 
expenditure variable that determines the poverty status of the household is measured with 
error, which will generally be the case in survey data, this noise in the data may lead us to 
overstate the actual degree of mobility and thus the actual risk of falling into poverty.  
While a number of studies investigate the degree of income or expenditure mobility 
and poverty transitions using panel data, relatively few have suggested ways to correct for 
error bias in these analyses (see Lee, Ridder, and Strauss, 2010). The most promising attempt 
using NIDS data has been presented by Burger, Klasen, and Zoch (2016). Their instrumental 
variables approach, however, is more concerned with understanding the extent of “true” 
overall income mobility in NIDS, but does not allow quantifying measurement error at the 
individual level. Their results suggest that up to 20 per cent of the variation in reported 
household income in the first three waves of NIDS is attributable to measurement error. 
Replicating the above analysis for a simulated “measurement-error free” data set 
would be a highly valuable but not straight-forward exercise, which unfortunately is beyond 
the scope of the analysis presented in this dissertation. 
2.5.4. Comparison to rival approaches 
Importantly, the applied vulnerability threshold does not impose any condition that would 
directly ensure that other capabilities or functionings associated with being middle class – 
going beyond our understanding of being free from poverty – are being met. Therefore, in this 
section, we define a set of six criteria to compare this approach to three alternative definitions 
that have been suggested in the South African literature. Our results suggest that being        
(in-)vulnerable to poverty is in fact a good proxy for the attainment of other capabilities. 
 The six selected criteria are displayed in Table 8 below. The column on the left 
indicates the criteria used for comparison and the column on the right specifies how these 
criteria are measured empirically. The first four conditions (and their operationalisations) 
closely resemble Burger et al.’s (2017) capability approach to defining the middle class (see 
Section 2.4.3). While Burger et al. understand “labour market power” as access to labour 
market income in general, we add an additional distinction that takes the type of employment 
into consideration. This is motivated by our analysis, which showed that poverty risks vary 
importantly with the stability of employment. It also aligns with Visagie and Posel’s (2013) 
understanding of middle-class versus working-class professions, which forms the basis for the 
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class thresholds that they derive (see Section 2.4.3). The last two conditions reflect freedom 
from poverty – both statically and dynamically. These are the key requirements for being 
middle class specified in this chapter. 
Table 2.10 Criteria for comparing approaches to defining the middle class in South Africa 
 CONDITION  EMPIRICAL IDENTIFICATION 
1 Access to basic services Access to clean water (piped water tap in the dwelling, 
on site or in the yard) and sanitation (either a flush or 
chemical toilet) 
2 Financial discretion and buying power Ownership of electric stove and fridge 
3 Access to information and literacy Ownership of a TV or radio, and at least one adult 
member (15+ years) has completed primary education 
4 Labour market power A) At least one household member in employment 
(excl. where all adult members are students or 
pensioners) 
B) At least one household member in employment in 
white-collar occupation (excl. where all adult members 
are students or pensioners) 
5 Capable to meet basic food and non-food needs P.c. expenditure above UBPL (R963) in 2008 
6 Financially secured against precarity P.c. expenditure above UBPL (R963) in 2008 & 2012 
 
Table 2.11 reports the results. First, we consider the relative approach to defining the 
middle class suggested by Finn et al. (2013a) and Levy et al. (2014). As expected (see 
Sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 above), those in in the “statistical middle” (the 40th-70th percentiles) 
of the expenditure distribution, are generally still too poor to meet the specified criteria. 
Following this approach, almost every second member of the middle class lacks access to 
clean water and adequate sanitation. Even though two-thirds live in households with access to 
income from the labour market, less than 10 per cent have a household member working in a 
white-collar occupation. Furthermore, two in three members cannot satisfy their basic food 
and non-food needs at present and only one in ten can sustain a living standard above 
subsistence over the medium term.  
Next, we use a capability approach similar to that developed by Burger et al. (2017). 
To this end, we define the middle class as those who meet the first four conditions. The class 
that is identified is similar in size but fares much better with respect to the specified criteria 
(for the first four criteria by definition).21 Its members have access to information, labour 
market income, and basic services (which may be governmentally provided); and are able to 
economise on other spending to afford some basic household appliances. Nonetheless, many 
in this class still have relatively low purchasing power. That is, they cannot afford adequate 
food and non-food items at the same time and remain at risk of slipping into poverty. 
                                                          
21 Note that the size of the middle class calculated by us is smaller than the class share (of 34.5 per cent in 2008) 
derived by Burger et al. (2017). This is likely due to methodological differences in the definition of the criteria.  
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Third, we look at the “affluent” middle class as defined by Visagie and Posel (2013). 
The lower middle class boundary under this definition (R1,995) is very close to the threshold 
that identifies those at a maximum risk of 15 per cent (R1,991) of falling below the UBPL. It 
is also not far from the threshold that identifies those at a maximum risk of 10 per cent of 
falling below the LBPL (1,830). Both the “affluent” middle class and the “stable” middle 
class as defined using the vulnerability approach fare similarly well with respect to the first 
four criteria. Interestingly, even though Visagie and Posel’s (2013) class thresholds 
correspond to the expected income interval for households in which the highest income earner 
is in a white-collar profession, only 43.4 per cent of the individuals in this class actually live 
in a household where at least one members works in a white-collar occupation. This share is 
almost identical to the equivalent share among the middle class that is identified using the 
capability approach and almost ten percentage points lower than the one among the middle 
class that is identified using the vulnerability approach. 
Table 2.11 Comparing rival approaches to defining the middle class in South Africa in 2008 
APPROACH 
Statistical 
middle  
(40-70th 
percentile) 
Capability 
approach 
 “Affluent” 
middle  
(R1,955 – 
R13,968) 
Vulnerability 
approach 
(R2,794 – 
R10,954) 
POOR 
(<R963) 
Population share in 2008 (%) 30 27.16 22.29 15.00 60.75 
Sh
ar
e 
(%
) 
th
at
 h
as
…
 
Access to basic services 54.62 100 
(by definition) 90.60 93.51 33.99 
Financial discretion and 
buying power 
51.35 100 
(by definition) 81.27 86.51 36.69 
Access to information 
and literacy 
82.62 100 
(by definition) 94.51 95.64 76.98 
Labour market power A 66.32 100 
(by definition) 81.58 84.49 57.03 
Labour market power B 9.94 43.59 43.48 52.32 4.57 
Capable to meet basic 
food & non-food needs 
30.80 75.50 100 
(by definition) 
100 
(by definition) 
0 
(by definition) 
Dynamically secured 
against precarity 
12.91 58.56 84.87 91.12 0 
(by definition) 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
This chapter set out to provide some guidance to those researchers who wish to study the 
middle class in the Global South. To this end, we discussed a broad range of alternative 
approaches to defining the middle class that have been suggested in the economics literature, 
along with their pros and cons, using South Africa as a case study.  
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Our analysis reveals that, depending on the chosen classification method, very 
different parts of society are identified as middle class, which can make up between 10 and 60 
per cent of the national population. While none of these definitions should be seen as right or 
wrong (Reeves et al., 2018), we argue that in country contexts marked by high levels of 
inequality along with widespread poverty – as in the case of South Africa – some definitions 
can be considered more suitable than others. In this regard, we highlight four main limitations 
of existing approaches that researchers should be aware of: 
First, in contexts where the median income earner falls below the poverty line, central 
tendency measures that locate the middle class in the literal middle of the income distribution 
will in fact capture a stratum of society that is still poor and deprived in basic needs (see also 
Visagie and Posel, 2013). 
Second, absolute income thresholds that enjoy particular popularity in the context of 
cross-country analyses often locate the middle class just above the poverty line (see, for 
example, Ravallion, 2010). This is to ignore that being able to afford a certain basket of goods 
at a given point in time does not give a sufficient indication as to whether the same will be 
true in the near future. Furthermore, these approaches are generally blind to how this income 
is acquired, and thus fail to provide any insight into the long-term sustainability of observed 
welfare levels. This is particularly problematic since a number of studies in the social sciences 
as well as in the psychology and health literature have shown that a situation of vulnerability 
and economic instability can be welfare reducing, even if poverty does not materialise 
(Dercon, 2006; Cafiero and Vakis, 2006).  
Third, a number of recent studies in the developing country context have come up with 
absolute income boundaries in order to differentiate the lower middle class that is still on the 
verge of poverty from a more economically secure “actual” middle class (see, for example, 
Ncube et al., 2011). While appealing in their simplicity, a main limitation of these suggested 
approaches is that the chosen class boundaries are often arbitrarily defined, lacking a clear 
theoretical underpinning. However, also those approaches where the applied class thresholds 
are grounded both on theoretical and empirical arguments – as in the case of López-Calva and 
Ortiz-Juarez’s (2014) vulnerability approach – should be interpreted with caution, keeping the 
impact of implicit modelling choices in mind. 
Lastly, bridging the gap between the sociological and economic class literature, there 
have been several attempts to define the middle class based on the notion of “empowerment”. 
These approaches either focus on labour market power exclusively or use a broader set of 
capabilities associated with middle-class status (see, for example, Burger et al., 2017). Despite 
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being conceptually compelling, it is important to note that the criteria used to operationalise 
the latter should be carefully selected. In our view, they should not only represent a measure 
of multidimensional deprivation, but be suitable to identify a middle class that can actually be 
considered “empowered” in the sense of being self-sufficient. This includes the requirement 
that individuals have the financial discretion to satisfy both their basic food and non-food 
needs, and are able to sustain this standard of living over time – even in the face of negative 
events. 
Under the above aspects, López-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez’s (2014) vulnerability 
approach to defining the middle class seems well-suited to country contexts where significant 
parts of the population are confronted with poverty risks. It has been designed specifically to 
allow the identification of a “stable” middle class whose members are free from concern 
about meeting basic needs – both statically and dynamically. Importantly, the class thresholds 
are derived based on an in-depth analysis of the household characteristics that grant a 
minimum degree of economic stability in the given country context. In this sense, the 
vulnerability threshold can be understood as an attempt at measuring the welfare level that 
corresponds to the ability of households to respond adequately to negative stochastic events. 
Just as the upper bound poverty line indicates an expenditure level at which individuals are 
typically able to satisfy their basic needs, the vulnerability line indicates the minimum 
monetary threshold above which individuals are typically able to afford the cost of insuring 
against the risk of falling into poverty. Depending on which degree of vulnerability 
researchers consider the maximum acceptable, our analysis suggests that – in the case of 
South Africa – a minimum per capita income of two to three times the poverty line is required 
for being stably middle class.   
Finally, at least two limitations of this approach deserve attention. First, the derived 
vulnerability threshold will generally be country and context-specific and cannot easily be 
transferred. Replications of this methodology thus critically rely on the availability of at least 
two waves of panel data. Second, calculating the vulnerability threshold requires a number of 
modelling choices that must be made transparent. Especially the choice of the probability cut-
off, which is arbitrarily fixed at 10 per cent, will crucially affect the size of the threshold that 
is derived. Moreover, the estimated probability of being poor and the associated vulnerability 
line will critically depend on where researchers set the poverty line.  
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A poverty dynamics approach to social stratification: 
The South African case 
Simone Schotte, Rocco Zizzamia, and Murray Leibbrandt
This chapter appeared as Schotte, S., Zizzamia, R., & Leibbrandt, M. (2018).     
A poverty dynamics approach to social stratification: The South African 
case. World Development, 110, 88-103. 
ABSTRACT 
In the economics literature, most scholars agree that being middle class entails being free 
from poverty, which means being able to afford the basic things in life – not only today, but 
also tomorrow. In consequence, there is an increasing tendency to define the middle class 
based on a lack of vulnerability to poverty. In this chapter, we strengthen and expand on these 
existing approaches in three ways: First, we incorporate the differentiation between the 
middle class and a (non-poor) vulnerable group into a broader social-stratification schema that 
additionally differentiates between transient and chronic poverty. Second, in estimating the 
risk of poverty, we employ a multivariate regression model that explicitly allows for possible 
feedback effects from past poverty experiences and accounts for the potential endogeneity of 
initial conditions, unobserved heterogeneity, and non-random panel attrition – four factors 
insufficiently addressed in existing studies. Third, we highlight the value of paying attention 
to these conceptual and modelling issues by showing that class divisions based on monetary 
thresholds inadequately capture a household’s chances of upward and downward mobility. 
We then apply our conceptual framework to the South African case. We find that only one in 
four South Africans can be considered stably middle class or elite. Access to stable labour 
market income is a key determinant of achieving economic stability. A lack of jobs as well as 
the prevalence of precarious forms of work drive high levels of vulnerability, which in turn 
constrains the development of an emergent middle class – not only in South Africa but likely 
also in other parts of the developing world that face similar labour market challenges.  
Acknowledgements: This chapter has been produced with financial assistance from the Programme to Support 
Pro-Poor Policy Development (PSPPD), located within the Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation 
(DPME), and from the World Bank Group, Poverty Global Practice Unit, Africa Region. We are grateful to 
Francois Bourguignon, Denis Cogneau, Arden Finn, Lena Giesbert, Kanishka Kacker, Stephan Klasen, Jann 
Lay, Nga Thi Viet Nguyen, Victor Sulla, Martin Wittenberg, Ingrid Woolard, Precious Zikhali, and three 
anonymous reviewers for helpful suggestions. Any remaining errors are our own. 
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Structural poverty dynamics in urban South Africa: 
A mixed method investigation 
Simone Schotte 
ABSTRACT 
This chapter applies a livelihoods framework to examine the extent and determinants of 
structural poverty dynamics in South Africa, with special attention given to the urban African 
population. Economic transition matrices based on panel data from the National Income 
Dynamics Study show considerable income mobility. Recognising that these transitions can 
represent distinctly different experiences, this chapter estimates how much of the observed 
poverty entries and exits is reflected in the depletion and accumulation of livelihood assets 
respectively, and conversely how much can be accounted for by stochastic factors. To gain a 
better understanding of the complex processes, livelihood strategies, and asset dynamics that 
condition movements into and out of structural poverty, these quantitative findings are 
combined with those of a qualitative case study integrating focus group discussions and life 
history interviews conducted between July and September 2017 in the township of 
Khayelitsha, Cape Town. Data visualisation methods in the form of asset pentagons and 
livelihood diagrams help illustrate the multidimensional deprivation and main risk factors that 
structurally poor urban households experience. Results emphasise meagre job opportunities 
for low-skilled labour, low schooling quality, and relationships of dependency as important 
dimensions. Lack of access to financial capital as well as the costs and risks associated with 
the geographic location of the urban poor, often residing in precarious areas that are spatially 
separated from the urban centres, further constrain opportunities.   
Acknowledgements: I am grateful to Jann Lay, Murray Leibbrandt, Stephan Klasen, Nic Spaull, Natalie Quinn, 
participants at the 2018 CSAE Conference in Oxford, and participants at the 2nd International Conference on 
Globalization and Development in Göttingen for helpful suggestions on earlier drafts. I am especially grateful to 
Rocco Zizzamia, who has been an inimitable partner in designing and running the field research in Khayelitsha. 
We are both also indebted to an exceptional team of fieldworkers, among whom Mzulungile Cabanga, Sibongile 
Mthini, Andiswa Mtini, and Amanda Moocha deserve special mention. Fieldwork was implemented with the 
financial and administrative support of the GIGA German Institute for Global and Area Studies, the Southern 
African Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU), and the Department of International Development 
at the University of Oxford. The views expressed here, and any remaining errors, are my own. 
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4.1. Introduction 
Throughout the developing world, increasing attention is being paid to the study of poverty 
dynamics. Going beyond cross-sectional comparisons of poor versus non-poor groups, the 
recent proliferation of panel surveys in developing countries has allowed researchers to 
separate and quantify the extent of chronic and transient poverty (for sub-Saharan Africa see, 
for example, Deininger & Okidi, 2003; Finn & Leibbrandt, 2017; Kedir & McKay, 2005; 
Mberu, Ciera, Elungata, & Ezeh, 2014; Schotte, Zizzamia, & Leibbrandt, 2018).  
The approach most often taken for these dynamic analyses focuses on investigating 
movements into and out of monetary poverty, driven by changes in income or consumption 
expenditure levels in relation to a specified poverty line. However, an important aspect often 
overlooked by such studies is that not all transitions are equal; for some, the descent into 
poverty may have been caused by a decline in productive assets or a reduction in their returns, 
brought on by changes in the broader economy (structural poverty descent), while others may 
have simply been unlucky in the present period (stochastic poverty descent). Analogously, for 
some of those exiting poverty, the escape may have been facilitated by an accumulation of 
productive assets or an increase in their returns (structural poverty escape), while others may 
have simply been lucky in the present period without any accompanying change in underlying 
income-generating processes and asset structure (stochastic poverty escape). These structural 
versus stochastic poverty transitions represent distinctly different experiences (Carter & 
Barrett, 2006; Radeny, Van den Berg, & Schipper, 2012) that are likely to result in dissimilar 
long-term livelihood trajectories.    
South Africa is among the few countries where the use of asset-based approaches to 
distinguish between structural and stochastic forms of poverty has a longstanding tradition 
(Carter & May, 1999, 2001). However, earlier work in this area has been confined to 
exploring poverty traps and transition pathways in predominantly rural settings (Adato, 
Carter, & May, 2006; Adato, Lund, & Mhlongo, 2007; Agüero, Carter, & May, 2007; Carter 
& May, 1999, 2001). As urban populations continue to grow, and poverty becomes an 
increasingly urban phenomenon (Rakodi, 2002), investigating the building blocks that either 
pave or bar the way for structural poverty escapes in urban contexts remains underexplored. 
Azomahou and Yitbarek (2014), Bigsten and Shimeles (2004), Faye, Islam, and Zulu (2011), 
Islam and Shimeles (2006), Kedir and McKay (2005), and Mberu et al. (2014) are among the 
relatively few studies that analyse poverty dynamics in urban Sub-Saharan Africa, but none of 
the above focus on South Africa, and none has made an attempt to differentiate between 
structural and stochastic mobility.  
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Recognizing this gap in the literature, in this chapter I aim to provide a nuanced 
understanding of the key factors that both facilitate and hinder structural poverty escapes and 
descents, focusing on the socioeconomically disadvantaged urban African population in South 
Africa. To this end, going beyond conventional monetary definitions and approaches to 
studying poverty dynamics, I adopt an asset-based approach that is based on the concept of 
sustainable livelihoods. My empirical approach, which I apply to panel data from the National 
Income Dynamics Study, is conceptually similar to the one recently suggested by Radeny et 
al. (2012), drawing on earlier works by Carter and May (1999, 2001) and Carter and Barrett 
(2006). However, instead of directly estimating the relationship between assets and household 
income, as a first step I use factor analysis to construct five asset indices. These are intended, 
in line with the adopted conceptual framework, to capture the income-generating processes 
and livelihood strategies available to a household, as approximated by its ownership of and 
access to human capital, financial capital, physical capital, social capital, and geographic 
capital. As a second step, I map these livelihood-asset scores to the household income or 
expenditure space and construct an asset poverty line that allows me to decompose monetary 
poverty into structural and stochastic components.  
This asset framework on its own, however, may be insufficient to identify the main 
determinants that explain transitions into and out of poverty (Radeny et al., 2012). Therefore, 
I triangulate my quantitative research findings with evidence from a qualitative case study. 
The primary data source for this qualitative research element consists of 30 life history 
interviews that I conducted, together with a local research team, between July and September 
2017 in the township of Khayelitsha, Cape Town. The qualitative research design was partly 
informed by the life-history interview techniques used by Davis and Baulch (2011) in rural 
Bangladesh and Adato et al.’s (2007) “household events mapping” technique used in rural 
KwaZulu-Natal, which I combined and adopted to the South African urban context. Using this 
mix of quantitative and qualitative research methods for poverty analysis, I attempt to provide 
a deeper understanding of the multidimensional causal mechanisms, processes and pathways 
that underpin welfare transitions (see also Barrett, 2005; De Weerdt, 2010; Kanbur, 2003; 
Kanbur & Saffner, 2007; Kedir, 2005; Radeny et al., 2012; White, 2002).  
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 briefly introduces 
the conceptual framework. Section 4.3 describes the panel survey data and the qualitative 
case-study design. Section 4.4 decomposes the transitions in monetary poverty into structural 
and stochastic components. Section 4.5 explores the main determinants of transition patterns 
using a mixed-methods approach. Section 4.6 discusses and concludes. 
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4.2. Sustainable livelihoods framework 
The analysis presented in this chapter is embedded in the sustainable livelihoods framework 
(SLF), which I adapt to the South African urban context. Drawing on Chambers and Conway 
(1992), a livelihood is defined as comprising “[…] the capabilities, assets (including both 
material and social resources) and activities required for a means of living” (Carney, 1998: 4). 
Coupled with this definition, a livelihood is regarded as sustainable “when it can cope with 
and recover from stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both 
now and in the future, while not undermining the natural resource base” (Carney, 1998: 4). 
Even though the latter element of environmental or ecological sustainability has important 
linkages to the process of urbanisation, given that cities consume increasing amounts of 
natural resources and produce most of the world’s waste and greenhouse gas emissions, this is 
not the main topic addressed here. In what follows, I focus my analysis on the first element of 
sustainability in the sense of lasting and sustained escapes from poverty. 
The main components of the livelihoods framework adopted here are depicted in 
Figure 3.1. Under this framework, households or individuals are assumed to operate in a 
context of vulnerability. This describes the external uncontrollable factors and sources of 
insecurity (trends, seasons, positive or negative shocks) to which poor people and their assets 
are vulnerable. The vulnerability context is influenced by and interacts with the economic, 
political and institutional, environmental, and social and cultural contexts. 
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Figure 4.1 Livelihoods framework  
Source: Developed from Rakodi (2002). 
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At the centre of the framework is the portfolio of assets on which households or 
individuals draw to generate a flow of income or other benefits. This portfolio, which is the 
focal point of this study, includes both tangible and intangible assets, grouped into five types 
of capital (human, financial, physical, social, and geographic), briefly defined in Box 4.1. 
As a visual analytical tool, a pentagon can be used to describe people’s access to each 
capital type, where the centre point represents zero access, and the outer perimeter represents 
maximum access to assets (Carney, 1998; Rakodi, 2002). To give an example, the dotted line 
in Figure 3.1 shows reasonable access to human, physical, and social capital but limited 
access to geographic and financial capital. While there may be trade-offs, the five capital 
types complement each other, and households or individuals will need to draw on all five to 
construct their living. That is, “it is the overall area of a pentagon […] that is important, rather 
than the absolute magnitude of access to any particular type of capital” (Carney, 1998: 8). 
Box 4.1 Livelihood assets 
 
H Human Capital comprises the quantity and quality of labour resources available to the 
household. The opportunities for economic activity are typically constrained by the 
number of household members in working age, their education, skills, experience, and 
health status, as well as their caregiving demands. Formal qualifications tend to be of 
higher relevance in urban than in rural labour markets (Rakodi, 2002). 
 
F Financial Capital includes regular financial flows (such as from private pensions, 
dividends or interest), savings, and access to credit and insurance. It is important to cope 
with shocks, smooth consumption, and facilitate investment. 
 
P Physical Capital here is understood in the narrow sense, comprising privately owned 
productive capital and household assets. It includes housing, which in the urban context 
can be a source of rental income and facilitate home-based business activities (Rakodi, 
2002), as well as durable goods and other productive assets. 
 
S Social Capital typically comprises relationships of trust, memberships of groups, social 
networks, and access to wider institutions in society. While urban living has generally 
been associated with a fragmentation of social relationships, this may apply less to the 
urban poor, who are embedded in township community networks and often maintain 
strong linkages with their rural kin (Du Toit and Neves, 2009). 
 
G Geographic Capital captures access to public infrastructure (such as transport, water 
and energy supply, sanitation, garbage collection, and street lighting). It enables people 
to access, and directly supports, income-generating activities. It replaces natural capital 
(such as land and water) included in the standard SLF, which is of higher relevance in 
rural than in urban settings. 
 
The ways people combine and use their available assets are described as livelihood 
strategies, and economic activities are at the core of these. In addition, migration movements, 
maintenance of and participation in social networks, and investment decisions (such as in 
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education or property) can present important components.35 The outcomes of these strategies 
are defined in terms of higher or lower welfare. Importantly, the greater the diversity of 
livelihood strategies available to a household, the less vulnerable it is to external risk factors 
(Rakodi, 2002). 
4.3. Data and methodology 
4.3.1. Panel data description and quantitative poverty measures 
The data for the quantitative analysis comes from the National Income Dynamics Study 
(NIDS) implemented by the Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit 
(SALDRU) at the University of Cape Town (SALDRU 2016a, b, c, d). NIDS is South 
Africa’s first national panel study, which started in 2008 with a nationally representative 
sample of over 28,000 individuals in 7,300 households. At present, there are four waves of 
data available, spaced approximately two years apart. For the dynamic analysis, individuals 
must be successfully tracked over at least two consecutive survey waves. Data from pairs of 
consecutive waves were pooled, such that transitions that occurred from wave 1 to 2, wave 2 
to 3, and wave 3 to 4 are treated identically in the analysis. The sample for the dynamic 
analysis contains 74,217 individual observations.36  
Monetary welfare measures 
There are three official poverty lines that have been defined by Statistics South Africa (Stats 
SA) in 2015 using a cost-of-basic-needs approach (Stats SA, 2015a). Each of these lines 
captures a different degree of poverty. The food poverty line (FPL) is the level of 
consumption below which individuals are unable to purchase sufficient food to fulfil their 
caloric requirements for good health (fixed at about 2,100 kilocalories a day), even if all 
expenditures are dedicated to food. The lower-bound poverty line (LBPL) allows for spending 
on non-food items but requires that individuals sacrifice some food consumption to fulfil their 
                                                          
35 The adopted conceptual framework treats the household as the relevant unit of analysis. In doing so, it ignores 
the internal household decision-making process, which underpins any “household livelihood strategy.” A further 
limitation of the adopted framework is that it tends to treat households as stable units. However, the household 
composition is not only a determinant of the capabilities, choices, and strategies available to the household, but 
may itself be the outcome of strategic decisions (Rakodi, 2002). 
36 Panel weights have been constructed to correct for panel attrition, following the approach suggested by Finn 
and Leibbrandt (2017). For each successive wave, a probit model was estimated with the dependent variable 
being a dummy indicating whether the individual stayed in the sample or not. Wave 1 to 2 panel members then 
received a new weight that was the product of the original wave 1 post-stratified survey weight and the inverse 
of the conditional probability of re-interview. The same process was applied to wave 2 to 3 and wave 3 to 4.  
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non-food needs. Only at the upper-bound poverty line (UBPL) can individuals purchase both 
adequate food and non-food items.  
Throughout this chapter, household expenditure is used as the relevant monetary 
welfare measure, which is assumed to provide a better approximation of permanent household 
income than reported income. Different to Stats SA’s usual practice, all monetary welfare 
measures are adjusted to account for the fact that large households require more resources 
than small households to reach a similar level of welfare, that adults need more food and other 
commodities than children, and that there are some economies of scale in household 
consumption. In addition, I recognise that school-age children in South Africa will generally 
require higher expenses (fees for schooling, materials, and transport, for example) than 
younger children. Using a simple scaling method (similar to May, Carter & Posel, 1995; 
Carter & May, 1999), I define the number of adult equivalences (E) in each household as: E = (N𝐴𝐴 + 0.5 N𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 + 0.75 N𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌)0.9  (4.1) 
where N𝐴𝐴 is the number of adult (age 16 years or older) household members, N𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌  is the 
number of young children (age 6 years or younger), N𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌  is the number of school-aged 
children (age 7 to 15 years), and 0.9 is the scaling parameter that captures modest economies 
of scale in household consumption (see Woolard & Leibbrandt, 2006, for a comparison of 
alternative equivalence scales suggested for South Africa).  
On this basis, Stats SA’s (2015a) three official poverty lines are rescaled using a 
reference household of five members, including three adults, one school-aged child, and one 
younger child (reflecting the median household composition of poor households in NIDS). 
Using this approach, the FPL, LBPL, and UBPL were respectively estimated at R585, R855, 
and R1,309 per adult equivalent per month, in January 2015 prices.37 
Asset-based poverty measures 
The asset-based approach used to differentiate between structural and stochastic poverty is 
conceptually similar to the one recently suggested by Radeny et al. (2012) in their study of 
rural poverty dynamics in Kenya, drawing on earlier works by Carter and May (1999, 2001) 
and Carter and Barrett (2006).  
A household, 𝑖𝑖, is classified as poor at time 𝑡𝑡 if its consumption expenditure in 
equivalence scales, cit, falls below the monetary poverty line, PL. That is,   
                                                          
37All monetary values used in this chapter are deflated to January 2015 prices using the Stats SA’s headline 
consumer price index (2015b). To adjust for inflation, for each line the food component (equal to the FPL) is 
inflated by using the food-specific Stats SA CPI and the non-food component (equal to the difference between 
the FPL and the LBPL or UBPL respectively) is inflated by using the non-food-specific Stats SA CPI. Using this 
approach, the FPL, LBPL, and UBPL were estimated at R430, R629, and R963 per-person-per-month. 
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cit < PL.  (4.2) 
Parallel to PL, an asset poverty line can be defined. Identification of this threshold 
requires estimation of the relationship between the per capita adult equivalent expenditure, cit, 
and the bundle of assets held by the household in period 𝑡𝑡, Ait.  
 To this end, in a first step, I use multiple correspondence analysis to construct five 
asset indices, normalised to a range between zero and one (for details on the methodology see 
Chapter 5 or check, for example, Booysen, Van der Berg, Burger, Von Maltitz, & Du Rand, 
2008; Shimeles & Ncube, 2015). These indices are intended to capture the income-generating 
processes and livelihood strategies available to a household, as approximated by its ownership 
of and access to human capital (Hit), financial capital (Fit), physical capital (Pit), social capital 
(Sit), and geographic capital (Git).38 The choice of variables was guided by the conceptual 
framework introduced in Section 4.2 and previous similar studies, taking data availability into 
account (see Table C.1 in Appendix C.1).  
 In a second step, I map the livelihood-asset scores to the household income or 
expenditure space, using a regression-based approach. Because the five specified capital types 
are unlikely to be completely independent of each other, multicollinearity may be a concern. 
An investigation of the correlation coefficients (𝜏𝜏) between the derived asset scores, however, 
only shows a weak (𝜏𝜏 < 0.2) to modest (𝜏𝜏 < 0.4) relationship across most capital types. The 
strongest but still moderate link (𝜏𝜏 = 0.46) is observed between physical capital and 
geographical assets (see Table C.2 in Appendix C.1). As a further check for multicollinearity, 
variance inflation factors (VIFs) and tolerance measures have been calculated using simple 
linear regression. The results strengthen my assumption that the five derived asset indices 
measure distinct concepts (see Table C.3 in Appendix C.1).  
 Endogeneity and reverse causality are another concern inherent to this method. On the 
one hand, assets play an important role in income-generating activities. On the other hand, 
assets are commonly accumulated through accumulating income, and negative income shocks 
can lead to a depletion of assets. I recognise the difficulties in addressing the econometric 
problems that arise from this circular relationship, but the interest of the subsequent analysis 
is less about identifying precise marginal returns on the five capital types that would warrant 
causal interpretations, and more about forming reliable expectations concerning the level of 
household income conditional on the available asset bundle (see Radeny et al., 2012).  
                                                          
38 Race and gender have been classified as social capital and not human capital indicators, because both variables 
gain their meaning and value through the prevailing social context. Recent studies show that social networks are 
typically segregated by race and gender, where access to these social capital resources, especially with regard to 
informal processes that govern job search and career opportunities, tends to be greatest for white males 
(McDonald & Day, 2010). Our field evidence emphasizes this connection in the South African context. 
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To account for the fact that the relationship between household assets and income or 
expenditure is very likely to be non-linear (Carter & May, 1999, 2001; Carter & Barrett, 
2006), I adopt a flexible parametric estimation approach similar to the one used by Radeny et 
al. (2012).39 Using a polynomial expansion, the employed functional form allows for 
diminishing (or increasing) returns to capital, as well as for interaction effects across capital 
types. The explicit model is specified as: ln(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) = 𝛼𝛼 + �𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗
𝑗𝑗
+ ��𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘
𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘
+ �𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗�𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗 �2
𝑗𝑗
+ �𝜑𝜑𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡
 (4.3) 
where X is a vector of asset indices, 𝑗𝑗, 𝑘𝑘, and 𝑙𝑙 denote the five capital types (with 𝑘𝑘 ∈ 𝑗𝑗, 𝑙𝑙 ∈ 𝑗𝑗, 
and 𝑘𝑘 ≠ 𝑙𝑙), 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 represents period-specific dummies (controlling for exogenous fluctuations), 
and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is an idiosyncratic error term.  
To account for unobserved heterogeneity across households, equation (4.3) is fitted to 
NIDS panel data using a random effects model.40 Clustered standard errors are used to allow 
for intragroup correlations across survey clusters (see Table C.4 in Appendix C.1). 
As a robustness check, a non-parametric (NP) kernel estimator has been used that 
allows 𝑔𝑔(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) to take on any functional form (Lybbert, Barrett, Desta, & Coppock, 2004)41: ln(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) = 𝑔𝑔(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝑔𝑔(H𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, F𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, P𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, S𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, G𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡. (4.4) 
Drawing on the regression results, the asset poverty line, 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡, simply denotes the combination 
of assets that yields an expected level of household welfare, c�(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡), equal to the money metric 
poverty line, PL, in the respective period. Accounting for measurement and other random 
errors in the estimation of c�(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡), a household is considered stochastically poor in any period 
𝑡𝑡 if its realised income or expenditure falls below PL, and yet I can reject the hypothesis that it 
is expected to be poor, given its assets (Carter & May, 2001). That is, 
if 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 < PL and reject 𝐻𝐻0: c�(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) < PL. (4.5) 
Analogously, a household is considered stochastically non-poor   
if 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ≥ PL and reject 𝐻𝐻0: c�(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) ≥ PL. (4.6) 
Following Radeny et al. (2012), I use the 95% confidence bands of c�(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) to account 
for imprecision in the estimation of c�(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡). A household with 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 < PL is stochastically poor if 
the lower bound estimate of c�(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) falls above PL (c�𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) ≥ PL), and structurally poor 
otherwise. Similarly, a household with 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ≥ PL is stochastically non-poor if the upper bound 
estimate of c�(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) falls below PL (c�𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) < 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃), and structurally non-poor otherwise.   
                                                          
39 Radeny et al. (2012) do not construct asset indices but directly use survey asset variables and demographic 
characteristics as explanatories of total household expenditure.  
40 I experimented with higher-degree polynomials in equation (4.3) with very similar results.  
41 The estimation is performed using the npregress kernel command in STATA 15.  
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4.3.2. Qualitative case-study design and description of study sites 
The primary data source for the qualitative research element consists of 30 semi-structured 
life-history interviews (LHIs) conducted between July and September 2017 in the township of 
Khayelitsha, situated about 30 kilometres south east of Cape Town’s city centre. 
Study sites 
Khayelitsha was selected as a study site because it closely resembles many of the context 
characteristics that typically condition the livelihoods of the urban poor in South Africa. On 
the one hand, service delivery, economic activity, and opportunities for employment are 
generally better in urban than in rural areas and continue to entice rural-to-urban migration 
(see Chapters 2 and 3). On the other hand, rapid urbanisation has left many on the fringes of 
society, resulting in a proliferation of informal settlements and increasingly densely populated 
townships, suffering from high un- and underemployment, socioeconomic insecurity, and 
crime (Visagie & Turok, forthcoming). 
This dynamic is clearly visible in Khayelitsha. Established in 1985 by the apartheid 
government as a site for relocations from other overcrowded African townships in Cape 
Town, it initially accommodated 30,000 people. Since then it has grown rapidly, driven by 
endogenous population growth and continuing rural-to-urban migration. According to the 
latest census information (see Table 4.1), in 2011 it comprised a population of 391,749 
inhabitants grouped into 118,809 households, making it South Africa’s second largest 
township after Soweto in Johannesburg. Roughly every second inhabitant is under 24 years 
old, and 55.8 per cent were born outside of the Western Cape, almost all of whom migrated 
from rural areas in the Eastern Cape. Culturally, the population structure is relatively 
homogenous in terms of race (98.6 per cent African) and language (90.5 per cent isiXhosa). 
The township comprises old formal areas built originally by the apartheid government, 
which are generally wealthier, and newer areas that contain a mix of informal settlements, 
government-provided housing, and informal backyard dwellings. Regardless of the important 
extent of variation in living standards, Khayelitsha overall has high levels of income poverty 
and faces serious challenges in terms of education, employment, housing, sanitation, and 
service delivery. Around 55.4 per cent of residents live in informal dwellings, 38.1 per cent 
need to walk 200 meters or further for clean water access, and 29.3 per cent are not connected 
to any sewage system. Only 35.6 per cent of residents above the age of 20 have completed 
high school and only 40.4 per cent of the labour force is employed, of which many work in 
temporary or informal employment relationships (see Table 4.1). 
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Table 4.1 Khayelitsha descriptive statistics, 2011 
2011 Census Suburb Khayelitsha 2011 
Population  391,749 
Households (HHs) 118,809 
Average HH size 3.30 
Share (%) of HHs living in informal dwellings (shack in/not in backyard) 55.4 
Share (%) of HHs with piped water access (inside dwelling/yard) 61.9 
Share (%) of HHs connected to sewerage system (flush toilet) 71.7 
Share (%) of HHs using electricity for lighting 80.8 
Share (%) of HHs where refuse is removed by local authority/private company at least once a week 80.9 
Share (%) of HHs with average monthly HH income of less than R3,200 73.7 
Share (%) of HHs with average monthly HH income of R3,201–R6,400 15.1 
Share (%) of HHs with average monthly HH income of R6,401–R12,800 7.2 
Share (%) of HHs with average monthly HH income of R12,801or more 4.1 
Share (%) of population under 24 years old 49.6 
Share (%) of population that is African 98.6 
Share (%) of population that speaks isiXhosa 90.5 
Share (%) of population that was born in the Eastern Cape  50.8 
Share (%) of adult population (aged 20+ years) with completed secondary of higher education 35.6 
Average labour force participation rate (%) among working age (15 to 64 years) population 65.1 
Average unemployment rate (%) among working age (15 to 64 years) population 38.0 
Average share (%) of working age (15 to 64 years) population that is employed 40.4 
 
Ideally, I would have liked to re-interview households from the NIDS panel to directly 
link the quantitative and qualitative analysis. However, this was impossible given the risk of 
this research influencing household responses and attrition in future survey waves. Therefore, 
data on the small area level from the 2011 Census have been used to ensure adequate 
coverage of different (i) area types, including formal settlements with low/high density of 
backyard shacks and informal settlements with low/high access to basic services (using type 
of toilet facility as a proxy); (ii) wealth levels, as approximated by the average poverty 
headcount and the share of households where the household head is employed; and (iii) 
settlement durations, including areas with a low/high share of households that settled in their 
present location after 2001 (see Appendix C.2). 
On this basis, in a first stage, 15 study areas were selected (see Figure 4.2), where a 
short sampling survey was administered to 300 households chosen using a random walk 
technique.42 The survey collected basic information on the households’ human, physical, and 
financial capital, allowing for a quick wealth assessment. While falling short of making 
claims of representativeness, this approach guarantees that selected interview participants 
show some degree of heterogeneity in terms of their asset base and livelihood strategies.  
                                                          
42 Survey questionnaires and interview guides are available from the author upon request. 
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Figure 4.2 Selected study areas  
Interview methods and analysis techniques 
Drawing on the sample collected in the first field-research stage, 30 respondents were selected 
for participation in the LHIs, covering different areas and welfare levels. Participants were 
asked to recount their individual life history, starting from their parental background and 
living conditions during childhood, and up to and including the present.43 As visual aids, all 
events reported during the interview were recorded on two sets of cards, where one colour 
was assigned to positive events and another colour to negative events (following Adato et 
al.’s, 2007, “household events mapping” technique). At the end of each interview, 
respondents were asked to rank their own welfare level at different points in time on a four-
point scale. With the help of the interviewee, the researcher would then map out the 
respondent’s life trajectory on a large sheet of blank paper (in line with the methodology 
suggested by Davis & Baulch, 2011), capturing the respondent’s welfare level at each stage in 
life and the events that had caused transitions within and between welfare categories (see 
Appendix C.3). 
As a preparatory step for this final exercise, four focus group discussions (FGDs) were 
conducted in advance, with participants from the local community (again drawing on the 
sample collected in the first field-research stage).44 The FGDs were designed to develop a 
scale capturing social and material welfare levels in the local context, which could be used 
                                                          
43 All interviews were conducted in isiXhosa by a moderator who was intensively trained during preparation for 
fieldwork. Following common practice among qualitative researchers in South Africa, the interviews were 
simultaneously translated by a second research assistant, and the translation was transcribed by the researcher, 
who was present during the interview (Du Toit & Neves, 2007, 2009, 2014; De la Hay & Beinart, 2017). 
Transcriptions and audio recordings were analysed and discussed with the moderator and translator in a post-
interview de-brief to ensure the accuracy of the translation and transcription and to analyse preliminary findings. 
44 FGDs ranged from between 3 to 10 participants. Two groups were single gender (male/female), and two were 
mixed. The FGDs were conducted by a trained moderator in isiXhosa and lasted approximately two hours each. 
In line with the technique used during the LHIs, the discussions were simultaneously translated by a trained 
research assistant and the translation was transcribed by the researcher, who was present during the discussion. 
Informal Settlement: Sample
Other Informal Settlement
Formal Settlement: Sample
Other Formal Settlement
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during the LHIs. This welfare scale was intended to be more subjectively meaningful than 
narrow, money-metric proxies of income and expenditure, while at the same time facilitating 
a degree of comparability between cases. To this end, visual aids in the form of four boxes 
representing different “levels” of society were used during the discussions.45 
For me, it was important to observe that all groups arrived quite easily and naturally at 
a common interpretation of what it meant for someone to be on level four (lowest) to one 
(highest) in the given context and that these perceptions were relatively consistent across 
groups. The most common characteristics of the various boxes that were converged upon in 
the FGDs are summarised in Box 4.2. Interestingly, there seemed to be a relatively large 
distance in terms of the satisfaction of basic needs between boxes one and two, on the one 
hand, and boxes three and four, on the other. For the subsequent analysis, boxes three and 
four are thus considered poor, with those in box four being considered food-poor.  
Box 4.2 Welfare levels 
  
Box 1 Those in box one are the economic success stories of the township. They are either 
successful entrepreneurs in the community, such as taxi or tavern owners, or are 
stably employed in permanent and well-paid work in the public or private sector. 
Their children are educated, employed and/or married, and live on their own.   
  
Box 2 Those in box two are neither poor nor wealthy. They are employed, usually in a 
lower-level white collar or higher-level blue-collar occupation. Compared to those 
in box one, they tend to face the need to support a larger number of dependents, 
which may also include members of the extended family. 
 Poverty     
Box 3 Those in box three have their most elementary needs such as food and electricity 
satisfied but still need to economise a lot. They cannot put any money to the side 
because all income is consumed. They tend to derive income from the labour 
market but are typically in jobs that are poorly paid, are of limited duration, are 
unregulated by labour legislation, or are subject to seasonal fluctuations. This box 
also includes smaller households with access to an old-age pension/disability grant. 
 Food Poverty     
Box 4 Those in box four have repeatedly been characterised as “going to sleep on an 
empty stomach.” They typically have no access to income from the labour market 
but survive on child-support grants and/or support from others in the community, 
including food donations by neighbours. Some engage in survivalist forms of self-
employment and/or do ad hoc piece jobs. These people live hand-to-mouth. They 
have few assets, live in informal dwellings, and lack access to basic services.  
  
                                                          
45 The boxes were introduced through vague definitions such as “those in box one are the most well-off, and 
those in box four are the least well-off,” while words with strong connotations such as “rich” or “poor” were 
strictly avoided by the moderator. On this basis, participants were prompted to discuss what it meant for 
someone to be in each respective box, along with the main determinants of movements between boxes. In both 
elements of the discussion – defining boxes and discussing dynamics – participants drew on their own 
experiences and the experiences of people known personally to them. During FGDs, key points were transcribed 
onto a blackboard, an exercise that helped to anchor the discussions and to gauge both disagreement and 
consensus for particular claims. 
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4.4. Magnitude of structural and stochastic poverty transitions 
In the first part of the analysis, I offer a quick quantitative assessment of the extent of 
movements into and out of monetary poverty in South Africa. Using the asset-based approach 
introduced above, I decompose these transitions into structural and stochastic components.  
4.4.1. Movements into and out of monetary poverty 
Apartheid imposed a rigid racialised system of unequal resource distribution on South Africa, 
resulting in an extremely polarised society. After two decades of democracy, its legacy 
persists in the country's economic conditions and continues to shape South African society 
along racial and geographic divides. Even though South Africa ranks as an upper-middle 
income country, close to two-thirds of its people – and close to three-quarters of the African 
population – are still living in moderate to extreme poverty. The incidence, depth, and 
severity of poverty are clearly higher in rural than in urban areas. Nevertheless, it should be 
emphasised that one in five urban dwellers cannot satisfy their food needs, and almost every 
second one is unable to purchase adequate food and non-food items (see Table 4.2). 
Table 4.2 Measured poverty rates (cumulative percentage shares) 
 
By area By race group 
TOTAL 
Urban Rural African Coloured Asian/Indian White 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 < FPL     22.1 54.7 41.6 16.1 1.4 0.5 34.7 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 < LBPL  35.1 71.5 58.0 31.5 3.2 1.1 49.2 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 < UBPL  49.9 84.3 72.8 49.9 14.9 3.9 63.3 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ≥ UBPL  50.1 15.8 27.2 50.1 85.1 96.1 36.8 
Share in total 
population 61.1 38.9 79.8 8.9 2.5 8.8 100 
 
Note: Average statistics for pooled NIDS sample, 2008 to 2014/15. The poverty profile is very similar to the one 
that would have been obtained if no adjustments were made to account for child costs and economies of scale. 
While there is an important overlap, this does not mean that exactly the same households are identified as poor. 
To illustrate the extent of mobility into and out of monetary poverty over time, Table 
4.3 presents a set of poverty transition matrices for the pooled sample of wave-to-wave 
transitions. To account for the depth of poverty, I define five welfare levels in terms of 
household expenditure per adult equivalent: cit < FPL, FPL ≤ cit < LBPL, LBPL ≤ cit <UBPL, UBPL ≤ cit < 2.5 UBPL, 2.5 UBPL ≤ cit. The values on the diagonal of the transition 
matrices indicate the share of individuals in each row who remain in the same welfare 
category between time periods 𝑡𝑡 and t + 1 (grey shaded area), whereas those below the 
diagonal are downwardly mobile, and those above the diagonal are upwardly mobile. 
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Table 4.3 Measured poverty transition matrix (per cent of row) 
 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+1 < FPL 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+1 < LBPL 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+1 < UBPL  𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+1 < 2.5 UBPL  2.5 UBPL ≤ 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+1  
 
 
Total population  
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 < FPL  61.2 17.1 11.5 8.3 1.9 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 < LBPL  40.0 20.7 19.0 16.5 3.8 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 < UBPL  24.9 19.5 23.7 25.5 6.5 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 < 2.5 UBPL  12.5 11.7 18.5 37.9 19.4 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ≥ 2.5 UBPL  2.6 1.6 4.5 20.8 70.5 
 
 
African population  
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 < FPL  61.9 17.0 11.2 8.1 1.9 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 < LBPL  42.0 20.5 17.9 15.9 3.8 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 < UBPL  27.7 19.8 22.8 23.7 6.1 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 < 2.5 UBPL  15.2 13.4 19.1 36.7 15.7 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ≥ 2.5 UBPL  6.6 4.0 9.1 30.3 50.0 
 
 
Urban population  
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 < FPL  52.3 19.7 14.7 11.0 2.3 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 < LBPL  33.0 20.0 21.7 20.8 4.6 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 < UBPL  20.3 20.2 24.6 27.0 8.0 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 < 2.5 UBPL  9.6 10.2 17.9 40.2 22.1 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ≥ 2.5 UBPL  1.2 1.4 3.9 20.1 73.4 
 
 
Urban African population  
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 < FPL  52.7 19.6 14.5 10.8 2.4 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 < LBPL  34.9 19.9 20.2 20.5 4.5 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 < UBPL  23.8 20.2 23.0 25.6 7.4 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 < 2.5 UBPL  11.8 11.6 19.1 40.0 17.6 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ≥ 2.5 UBPL  3.2 3.6 8.2 30.4 54.6 
 
 
Urban African population, including rural-to-urban migrants 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 < FPL  50.3 19.4 15.1 12.3 2.9 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 < LBPL  34.1 19.5 20.0 21.3 5.2 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 < UBPL  23.4 19.9 23.2 26.1 7.3 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 < 2.5 UBPL  11.7 11.6 19.1 40.0 17.6 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ≥ 2.5 UBPL  3.3 3.7 8.6 30.5 54.0 
 
Note: Rural-to-urban migrants are defined as those who stayed in rural areas in 𝑡𝑡 and urban areas in 𝑡𝑡 + 1. 
As the results presented in Table 4.3 indicate, persistence is highest at the lower and 
upper extreme of the income or expenditure distribution. At 61.2 per cent, those living below 
the FPL are the most likely to be trapped in extreme poverty. Their chance of moving above 
the UBPL is just above 10 per cent. At the same time, 70.5 per cent of the most well-off 
(2.5 UBPL ≤ cit) were able to maintain their income position. On average, they face an 
aggregate risk of 8.7 per cent of falling below the UBPL (in this sense, this group is 
comparable to the stable middle class that has been identified in Chapter 2). Those falling into 
one out of the three middle welfare classes (FPL ≤ cit < 2.5 UBPL) are substantially more 
mobile (here none of the main diagonal elements significantly exceeds 40 per cent).  
On average, downward mobility is higher among the African population compared to 
other race groups. Interestingly, the best-off group appears substantially less stable. Only 
every second person in this group could sustain this income position (2.5 UBPL ≤ cit) from 
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one survey wave to the next. Moreover, upward mobility is higher in urban than in rural areas, 
and rural-to-urban migrants face above-average chances of moving up the income ladder. 
Specifically, urban dwellers with incomes falling below the FPL are about ten percentage 
points less likely to be locked in extreme poverty, compared to the population average. 
Combining the two effects, there is a substantial extent of income mobility – in line with a 
low extent of stability and security – among the urban African population.  
4.4.2. Decomposing poverty transitions into structural and stochastic components 
The transition estimates presented in the previous section are likely to overestimate the actual 
extent of poverty dynamics in South Africa for two main reasons: First, the transition matrices 
presented in Table 4.3 do not distinguish between structural and stochastic mobility. Second, as 
Burger, Klasen, and Zoch (2016) show, measurement error in household income (or 
expenditure) tends to inflate transition estimates. Following the methodology outlined in 
Section 4.3.1, in what follows I therefore decompose poverty transitions into structural and 
stochastic components. The results are summarised in Table 4.4 below.  
The structure of Table 4.4 is a simplified version of Table 4.3 above, in which the various 
welfare levels have been collapsed into poor and non-poor groups, using the UBPL as the relevant 
poverty thresholds. Three out of four individuals did not change their poverty status between 
two subsequent waves of the NIDS data. Out of these, two are observed to be twice poor, and 
one is observed to be twice non-poor (see Table 4.4 upper panel).46 Only about 4 to 5 per cent 
of these immobile individuals experience what Carter and May (2001) call a dual entitlements 
failure. That is, their income level places them above (below) the money poverty line in both 
periods, even though they would (not) be expected to be poor given their asset holdings (see 
Table 4.4a+d). That is, they are stochastically non-poor (poor) in both periods.  
The upwardly mobile, who escape monetary poverty from one period to the next, 
comprise two very distinct groups of individuals. On the one hand, three-quarters emerge 
from a situation of structural poverty. Out of these, 44.8 per cent are considered structurally 
upwardly mobile, while the other 55.2 per cent are stochastically upwardly mobile. That is, 
more than half of these escapers would still be expected to be poor, given the assets they hold. 
For them, the observed rise in monetary outcomes may rather be driven by luck or 
measurement error and therefore must be considered less likely to be sustained through time.  
                                                          
46 All percentage shares refer to the total number of individuals in the pooled sample. As the NIDS is an 
individual-level panel, individuals can switch households between waves. This implies that members of the same 
initial household may take different poverty trajectories. Nevertheless, all explanatory variables entering the 
asset-poverty estimation are measured at the household level. 
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On the other hand, one quarter of the upwardly mobile emerge from a position of 
stochastic poverty. For them, the escape from poverty reflects a return to an expected non-
poor standard of living. The previous literature therefore subsumes this group by definition 
with the group of the stochastically upwardly mobile (Carter & May, 1999, 2001; Radeny et al., 
2012). Because my main research interest here is in the question of which movements into and 
out of monetary poverty will likely be sustained over time, this definition could lead to 
confusion. As may be expected, the initially stochastically poor who move out of poverty will 
generally have access to a stock of assets worth at least 𝐴𝐴 and therefore, in period 𝑡𝑡 + 1, more 
closely resemble the characteristics of the structurally upwardly mobile (see Table 4.4b). 
Clearly, these cases will be excluded from any further analysis of structural poverty escapes 
through the successful accumulation of assets, presented in the next section. 
A similar argumentation applies to the downwardly mobile, who move into monetary 
poverty from one period to the next. About half of this group is made up of initially 
stochastically non-poor individuals, for whom the descent into poverty presents a regression 
to their expected level of livelihood. Conversely, the other half initially dispose of asset 
holdings sufficient to be considered structurally non-poor. For at least every second person 
(51.3 per cent) in this group, the descent into poverty is structural. That is, it is accompanied 
by a decline in the asset base that causes the person to slip below the asset poverty line.  
Table 4.4 Decomposing poverty transitions (per cent of individuals) 
 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+1 < PL 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+1 ≥ PL 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 < PL a) Twice poor: 54.44 b) Upwardly mobile: 11.17 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ≥ PL c) Downwardly mobile: 8.67 d) Twice non-poor: 25.72 
Total 63.11 36.89 
       
       
Poor in 𝒕𝒕 a) Twice poor b) Upwardly mobile 
 Structural Stochastic 
Total 
Stochastic  Structural 
Total 
 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+1 < 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+1 ≥ 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+1 < 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+1 ≥ 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1 
𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 < 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 85.50 6.94 92.45 41.01 33.30 74.31 
𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ≥ 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 3.51 4.04 7.55 3.77 21.92 25.69 
Total 
89.01 
(NP: 87.28) 
10.99 
(NP: 12.72) 100 
44.78 
(NP: 44.02) 
55.22 
(NP: 55.98) 100 
       
       
Non-poor in 𝒕𝒕 c) Downwardly mobile d) Twice non-poor 
 Structural  Stochastic   Stochastic Structural  
 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+1 < 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+1 ≥ 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1 Total 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+1 < 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+1 ≥ 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1 Total 
𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 < 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 46.07 5.97 52.04 5.25 6.51 11.76 
𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ≥ 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 24.60 23.36 47.96 5.86 82.38 88.24 
Total 
70.67 
(NP: 68.91) 
29.33 
(NP: 31.09) 100 
11.10 
(NP: 10.74) 
88.90 
(NP: 89.26) 100 
 
Note: Numbers in parenthesis refer to the decomposition results from the non-parametric (NP) kernel estimation, 
performed as a robustness check. Differences in cell shares are in a range of one to two percentage points.  
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The extent of structural upward mobility tends to be higher, and the share of structural 
downward mobility tends to be lower in urban compared to rural areas. Nonetheless when 
restricting the sample to urban African respondents, still 54.7 per cent of the descents into 
poverty and only 49.6 per cent of the escapes from poverty are structural (see Figure 4.3).  
   Poor in 𝑡𝑡 + 1 Non-poor in 𝑡𝑡 + 1    Total 
  
 
 
Average 
Struct. poor in 𝑡𝑡  58.3% 
Struct. non-poor in 𝑡𝑡  27.2% 
African 
Struct. poor in 𝑡𝑡:  68.4% 
Struct. non-poor in 𝑡𝑡 16.6% 
Urban 
Struct. poor in 𝑡𝑡  42.2% 
Struct. non-poor in 𝑡𝑡  40.8% 
Urban  Struct. poor in 𝑡𝑡  53.2% 
African Struct. non-poor in 𝑡𝑡  27.6% 
                     Structural  Stochastic    Stochastic  Structural  
Figure 4.3 Decomposing poverty transitions 
It is worth noting that the differentiation between structural and stochastic transitions 
only gives an indication that a movement into or out of poverty is more or less likely to be 
sustained over time. Clearly, also those who experience structural upward mobility remain 
vulnerable to a number of risk factors that threaten their asset base, as discussed in more detail 
the next section. In fact, two thirds of the stochastically upwardly mobile and one third of the 
structurally upwardly mobile urban African population, classified based on the mobility 
patterns observed between 𝑡𝑡 and 𝑡𝑡 + 1, had slipped back into poverty in 𝑡𝑡 + 2 (see Table 4.5). 
Conversely, for those who experience a structural descent into poverty, the asset base 
provides little reason to expect any re-escape from poverty in the near future. However, 
poverty tends to be self-perpetuating (see Chapter 3) and even for those who hold assets 
above the asset poverty line, a descent into monetary poverty may manifest in a gradual 
dissolution of the asset base. In fact, only about half of the stochastically downwardly mobile 
had moved out of poverty two years later (see Table 4.5). 
Table 4.5 Transition patterns, urban African population 
 Poverty status in t + 2 
Transition pattern between periods t and t + 1 cit+2 < PL cit+2 ≥ PL 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 < PL Twice poor 78.80 21.20 Stochastically upwardly mobile 67.05 32.95 
Structurally upwardly mobile 32.66 67.34 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ≥ PL Structurally downwardly mobile 69.41 30.59 Stochastically downwardly mobile 47.77 52.23 
Twice non-poor 15.62 84.38 
 
Note: Sample restricted to African population living in urban areas in period 𝑡𝑡. 
60 45 30 15 0 15 30 45
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4.5. Drivers of structural poverty escapes and descents 
In this second part of the analysis, I combine quantitative and qualitative research methods to 
gain a more comprehensive understanding of the multidimensional causal processes and 
pathways that condition poverty escapes and descents. To this end, each life history diagram 
was examined and placed into one out of ten categories defined in Table 2.4 below (following 
a similar approach as Davis & Baulch, 2011, and Hulme & Shephard, 2003). The first 
important distinguishing criterion is whether the respondent started off structurally poor or 
structurally non-poor (based on the schema of social stratification introduced in Box 4.2). 
Second, in line with the analysis presented in Section 4.4, patterns of upward and downward 
mobility are explored, distinguishing between structural and stochastic movements. 
Table 4.6 Livelihood trajectory patterns and poverty dynamics (LHIs) 
Starting Poor Starting Non-Poor 
Trajectory Pattern Depiction Cases 
(migrant) Trajectory Pattern Depiction 
Cases 
(migrant) 
Structurally poor  
(generally with 
fluctuation into and out 
of food poverty) 
 
10 (6) Structurally non-
poor and upwardly 
mobile 
(stably non-poor and 
further accumulation of 
livelihood assets) 
 
2 (0) 
Stochastically 
upwardly mobile 
(structurally poor with 
one single short-lived 
poverty escape not 
accompanied by change 
in asset base)  
4 (4) Structurally non-
poor and stable 
(stably structurally non-poor 
but contraction of livelihood 
assets towards old age) 
 
3 (1) 
Churners 
(livelihood assets above 
typical structurally poor 
level, but always just at 
the edge to poverty) 
 
2 (1) Structurally 
downwardly mobile  
(one-step) 
(dissolution of assets caused 
by single shock or series of 
co-occurring shocks) 
 
2 (2) 
Structurally 
upwardly mobile 
(reverted) 
(structural poverty 
escape during working 
life, reverted in old age) 
 
4 (4) Structurally 
downwardly mobile  
(multiple steps) 
(gradual dissolution of 
livelihood assets interrupted 
by short periods of recovery) 
 
2 (0) 
Structurally 
upwardly mobile 
(non-reverted) 
(structural poverty 
escape that is not 
reverted) 
 
0 (0) U-shaped  
(prolonged period of 
difficulty, but sufficient 
asset base to prevent a fall 
into deep poverty) 
 
  
1 (0) 
 
Note: Numbers in brackets indicate cases in which respondents migrated from a rural area in the Eastern Cape.  
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4.5.1. Starting poor 
Markers of structural poverty 
In line with the livelihoods framework introduced in Section 4.2, the quantitative (see Figure 
4.4) and qualitative (see Table 4.6) evidence concordantly suggest that those classified as 
structurally poor will generally be deprived in all five livelihood dimensions. 
   
a) Average b) Rural c) Urban 
Figure 4.4 Asset pentagons, urban versus rural areas (NIDS) 
Two thirds of the LHI respondents (20 out of 30) started off in a situation of structural 
poverty (boxes three or four), and half of these never ascended to boxes two or one (see the 
example of Lindelwa in Appendix C.3). These structurally poor respondents were typically 
born into families with no or little livestock and/or other physical assets, often but not always 
in a rural context. Also, they reported having been deprived in terms of human and social 
capital. They often grew up with a single parent or were raised by other relatives, following 
the death or separation of their biological parents. In many cases, they dropped out of school 
with at most primary education complete, due to a lack of money and the need to support the 
family, or other events such as pregnancy. As a consequence, during later life they were 
constrained to relying primarily on temporary (piece) jobs in unqualified occupations with 
low pay, which were rarely kept for more than two years. They generally faced a combination 
of different constraints (affecting either them directly or their close family members), 
including sickness or disability, alcohol and/or substance abuse, crime, and domestic violence. 
These were intensified by an unstable family network, a large number of dependents, and a 
lack of financial and physical capital to (re-)start business activities.  
According to the quantitative evidence, the key criterion that distinguishes the urban 
poor from those located in rural areas is the overall better access to public infrastructure 
(compare Figure 4.4b and Figure 4.4c). During the LHIs, respondents who had migrated from 
rural areas confirmed this picture to the extent that they typically rated their living and 
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housing conditions in Khayelitsha higher than before migration. Nevertheless, the quality and 
delivery of public services was often perceived as poor. This was evident in issues such as 
leaking roofs and pipes in government-provided housing, frequent electricity cuts, high 
transport costs for work, and overcrowded township schools confronted with challenges such 
as youth gangsterism and poorly trained teachers.  
Stochastic versus structural poverty escapes 
Overall, there is much overlap between the key factors that explain structural poverty escapes 
in the quantitative and qualitative data. However, the data from life histories provide a more 
nuanced understanding of the role played by human capital accumulation in this regard. They 
also suggest that not all social networks provide stability and support. These complexities 
cannot adequately be captured by the available quantitative data (compare Figure 4.5).  
All four LHI respondents who experienced structural upward mobility were born in 
rural areas in the Eastern Cape. In contrast, those who remained structurally poor were 
integrated into better-functioning family networks and were more successful in seizing 
opportunities to enhance their human capital. They were more effective and strategic in their 
job search after arriving in Cape Town and experienced an important gradual improvement in 
their standard of living, often facilitated by successful job-to-job transitions, with only brief 
spells of unemployment in between. Importantly, at least some of these jobs were kept for 
prolonged periods of time of 10 to 20 years.  
In the other four cases in which respondents experienced stochastic upward mobility, 
these short-lived poverty escapes were also made possible when individuals found 
employment in better paying jobs. In these cases, what made this upward mobility temporary 
was the fact that employment in these jobs could not be maintained over the longer term, due 
to issues such as contract expiration, business closure, or health issues. In addition, the time 
period during which these individuals benefitted from higher wage income was too brief to 
build up financial, physical, or human capital which could have pushed these individuals onto 
a path of sustained upward mobility (compare Figure 4.6). 
Based on the small number of cases, it is difficult to trace the factors that facilitate 
structural as opposed to stochastic poverty escapes. To some extent, the timing of migration 
and the type and duration of the first job taken on after migrating seem to have played a role. 
Compared to the structurally upwardly mobile group, those who experienced a short-lived 
stochastic poverty escape tended to be younger and, on average, came to Cape Town at a later 
point in time when pass laws, which until 1987 under apartheid restricted the movement of 
the non-white population to urban centres, had been abolished, and competition for jobs was 
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picking up. However, this does not hold in all cases. Furthermore, those migrating to places 
where they already had contacts that could facilitate acquiring employment were more 
successful. Among those who had more difficulty in finding a permanent job at the start, 
gaining additional qualifications was decisive. This is, while these individuals were not 
necessarily more educated than the structurally poor at the outset, their success in acquiring 
work experience and supplementary training consequentially improved their fortunes in the 
labour market (see the example of Mcingini in Appendix C.3).  
  
a) Rural-to-urban migrants b) Urban born 
Figure 4.5 Asset pentagons, structurally poor versus structurally upwardly mobile (NIDS) 
  
a) Rural-to-urban migrants b) Urban born 
Figure 4.6 Asset pentagons, stochastically versus structurally upwardly mobile (NIDS) 
In contrast, for those who were stochastically upwardly mobile, finding a better job 
(which facilitated the temporary escape from poverty) was often considered a “lucky” event, 
which was not accompanied by a change in other livelihood assets or entitlements. In this 
regard, the rise in human capital among rural-to-urban migrants classified as stochastically 
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upwardly mobile tends to be overestimated in the empirical analysis (see Figure 4.6). This rise 
can mainly be attributed to a change in the household composition, as single persons leave 
their rural family homes to migrate to the cities. This, however, does not adequately account 
for the fact that most rural-to-urban migrants maintain strong linkages with their rural kin, 
generally supporting a large number of dependents through regular remittance flows. 
Importantly, none of the structural poverty escapes observed in the life histories was 
sustained beyond retirement. This is mainly due to a decline in human capital, as health and 
the capacity to work deteriorate toward old age. This implies that even those among the poor 
who were structurally upwardly mobile failed to accumulate sufficient financial capital over 
their working lives to provide for old age. This is what differentiates them from the group of 
individuals classified as initially structurally non-poor and upwardly mobile (see discussion 
below). Concordantly, shocks to human capital (and their interlinkages) were the most 
frequently reported source of both upward and downward mobility, as Figure 4.7 illustrates.  
 
Figure 4.7 Trigger events associated with a rise/fall in human capital (LHIs)  
Note: In total, 786 events had been reported during the LHIs, grouped into 35 event categories.  
Each event was manually coded and transformed into numerical information.  
Based on the interview transcript and the life-history diagram, four effect sizes are distinguished:  
large negative (--), small negative (-), no effect (0), small positive (+), and large positive (++).  
Churners 
Last, two LHI respondents are classified as churners because they remained very close to the 
edge of poverty for most of their life cycle – in one of the two cases with frequent fluctuations 
between boxes two and three. These churners grew up in households with reasonable but 
declining and/or unstable access to livelihood assets. This unsecure position was attributable 
to the presence of only one main breadwinner working at low or unstable pay, often without a 
Illness
Drinking problem
Drug problem
Accident
School dropout
Matric/Certificate
Find (new) job
Lose job
Quit job
Business start
Business collapse
FM start/switch work
FM quit/lose work
Death Child birth
1
2
5
10
20
50
10
0
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
-- - o + ++
Effect Size
Health Education Labour Market Family Composition Other
110  Chapter 4 
permanent work contract, who kept the close and extended family (generally a large number 
of dependents) with their heads just above water.  
4.5.2. Starting non-poor 
Socioeconomic security and structural upward mobility 
One third of the LHI respondents (10 out of 30) were not affected by poverty early in their 
lives. That is, they were born into a household that had access to a reasonable asset base 
(compare Figure 4.4 above) and where basic needs were being met. These individuals 
generally reported growing up with both parents, of whom at least one was working.  
However, only two out of the ten respondents were able to sustain and to improve their 
livelihood outcomes; that is, they were structurally non-poor and upwardly mobile. Both are 
female and were born and raised in Cape Town, and both were successful in developing and 
drawing on all five capital types to construct their living. Despite using two relatively different 
strategies to enhance their livelihood opportunities, both life histories emphasise the role 
played by labour market success (see Figure 4.7 above) and access to financial capital (see 
Figure 4.8 below) in facilitating upward mobility. In one of the cases, a combination of 
inherited physical, acquired human, pursued social, and borrowed financial capital was key. 
After dropping out of high school, the respondent took a course in hairdressing and decided to 
go into business with her father, who had a barber shop. After his death, she inherited the 
barber shop, joined a business organisation – through which she gained access to credit – and 
gradually expanded the business, such that today she rents out different working stations in 
the community. In the second example, the individual seized the opportunities offered by the 
changing political environment at the end of apartheid, relying on a combination of human 
capital accumulation, contacts, and access to financial capital. After finishing high school, she 
started working at a medical aid establishment as an administrator – she was the first African 
to work for that company. She then got a bursary to go to college, studied to become a 
teacher, and then completed two additional diplomas to move to higher positions. In both of 
these cases, insurance types (funeral policies, burial societies, and life insurance) played an 
important role in buffering negative events. Furthermore, both respondents used their access 
to finance, through credit and cashed-in pension funds, to build flats at the back of their 
houses, which they rented out as a form of additional income and provision for retirement. 
This old-age provision through accumulation of property and/or other financial assets 
is the main criterion that distinguishes the two described cases from the three respondents 
who were also stably structurally non-poor but experienced a dip in livelihood outcomes 
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towards the age of retirement, leaving them on the brink of poverty. Throughout their working 
lives, these respondents relied on a combination of relatively stable employment relationships 
(sometimes interrupted by short periods of unemployment), formal insurance schemes, and 
informal support networks (cost sharing and support by family members in employment) to 
secure their livelihoods (see the example of Vivian in Appendix C.3).47 Similar to the 
discussion above regarding the reversal of structural escapes from poverty, the contraction in 
livelihood assets towards old age generally resulted from a depletion of human and physical 
capital due to business closure, job loss or retirement, sometimes in combination with other 
negative events (such as sickness). Moreover, given their higher access to financial capital, 
most respondents in the structurally non-poor group took on substantial debt in the form of 
bonds and loans during their working lives. In one of the cases, this debt became a heavy 
burden after income from the labour market had dried up. 
 
Figure 4.8 Trigger events associated with a rise/fall in other capital types (LHIs)  
Note: In total, 786 events had been reported during the LHIs, grouped into 35 event categories.  
Each event was manually coded and transformed into numerical information.  
Based on the interview transcript and the life-history diagram, four effect sizes are distinguished:  
large negative (--), small negative (-), no effect (0), small positive (+), and large positive (++).  
Structural descents into poverty 
Four out of the ten respondents who started off their lives structurally non-poor (box one or 
top of box two) had fallen into deep structural poverty over time (box four). In two cases, the 
impoverishment occurred within a narrow time frame (single step), caused by a major external 
shock that irrevocably destroyed human (Figure 4.7) or physical (Figure 4.8) capital. For one 
                                                          
47 The life history of Vivian (see Appendix C.3) is exceptional in the sense that she managed to sustain a high 
degree of stability throughout her life despite being in a low-skilled occupation. 
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of them, who had been self-employed running a spaza shop out of his home, his whole 
economic base was wiped away by one key event, in his case a natural disaster in form of a 
fire. The fire destroyed his house, the shop and his savings, which he guarded at home. After 
this, no successful recovery had been possible particularly due to a lack of access to financial 
capital to restart the business. In the other case, the descent was caused by a combination of 
events that occurred simultaneously. This respondent paid a high bride price (lobola) for his 
wife, giving away the livestock that he had inherited from his father. He then lost his job and 
since then has only been able to find irregular piece jobs in construction. Currently, neither he 
nor his wife are working. In addition, their son fell sick and requires regular treatment. Even 
though the public hospital provides the treatment free of charge, large expenses are required 
for transport (to the hospital) and for traditional healers, whom they consult in addition.  
In the other two cases, the impoverishment occurred rather gradually, in multiple 
linked steps. Individuals in this group commonly started their lives growing up with both 
parents. Conditions then began to worsen as one parent fell sick, died, or left the family due to 
separation. Respondents further experienced an accumulation of several negative and often 
interrelated events, which included job loss, sickness, being a victim of crime, experiencing 
the destruction of household property, domestic violence, and alcohol or drug abuse (see 
Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8). The lack of a functioning family network to buffer these events is 
an important criterion distinguishing these cases from those who were able to maintain a 
stable and economically secure position (see Figure 4.9). Importantly, those who experienced 
gradual structural downward mobility reported trying to get back on their feet several times, 
which became increasingly difficult with every additional shock that occurred. Moreover, in 
both cases discussed above, another family member (husband, father) intentionally and 
repeatedly negatively interfered with the person’s business or employment opportunities. 
 
Figure 4.9 Asset pentagons, structurally downwardly mobile (NIDS) 
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4.6. Conclusion 
Combining quantitative and qualitative data and methods, this chapter makes an effort to 
understand the multidimensional causal pathways that condition structural transitions into or 
out of poverty in South Africa, with special attention given to the urban African population. 
The urban focus and differentiation between structural and stochastic movements distinguish 
this research from previous mixed-method investigations of poverty dynamics in sub-Saharan 
Africa, which – to my knowledge – either focus on rural settings or do not separate between 
stochastic and structural mobility patterns.  
Using economic transition matrices based on NIDS panel data, I find considerable 
mobility across income groups, except for the most and the least well-off (this observation 
matches the findings by Finn, Leibbrandt, & Ranchhod, 2017, on patterns of intergenerational 
mobility). Analysing households’ access to, and holdings of, livelihood assets in terms of 
human, financial, physical, social, and geographic capital, I estimate how much of the 
observed patterns in income mobility can be accounted for by structural as opposed to 
stochastic factors. My findings suggest that for about half of the individuals who begin in a 
situation of structural poverty and who experience upward mobility in incomes, the escape 
from poverty must be considered stochastic, suggesting a limited accumulation of assets that 
could help facilitate successful long-run escapes from poverty. Conversely, close to 70 per 
cent of the non-poor who experience downward mobility fall into a situation of structural 
poverty. One third of this group is made up of initially stochastically non-poor individuals, for 
whom the descent into structural poverty presents a regression to their expected level of 
livelihood. The other two-thirds initially dispose of asset holdings sufficient to be considered 
structurally non-poor. For them, the descent into poverty is accompanied by a dissolution of 
assets that places them below the asset poverty line.  
Using data visualisation methods in form of asset pentagons and livelihood trajectory 
diagrams, this chapter then combines evidence from quantitative and qualitative data to 
illustrate the multidimensional deprivation and main risk factors that structurally poor 
households experience. Four interrelated dimensions characterising urban poverty in South 
Africa can be extracted from the analysis: First, because work is generally the most important 
source of household income, transitions into or out of employment and job-to-job transitions 
are among the main trigger events associated with both poverty entries and exits (this 
reconfirms the results from Chapters 2 and 3). 
 Second, given the low returns and high job volatility associated with low-skilled 
labour, people require additional physical and social assets to achieve and sustain a position of 
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economic security (compare Carter & May, 1999, for rural South Africa). In this regard, 
family networks and dependency relationships may play a dual role – both enabling and 
constraining upward mobility. Going beyond the simply mechanical effect that household size 
has on per-capita incomes in most quantitative assessments (see, for example, Finn et al., 
2017), this chapter emphasises that the quality of the network is an important criterion that 
needs to be taken into consideration. 
Third, as is well-established in the literature, higher levels of education constitute an 
important enabling factor for upward social mobility (see, for example, Adato et al., 2006). 
Nonetheless, today’s youth struggle to enter the labour market and have particular difficulties 
in finding stable employment, this despite often having completed secondary schooling. This 
may be related to the poor quality of education as well as to a lack of work experience and the 
nonexistence of a social network that could facilitate contacts with potential employers (see 
Spaull, 2015, for further discussion). In line with the previous evidence on intergenerational 
mobility (Finn et al., 2017), I find that both advantage and disadvantage are being passed on, 
be it in form of inherited physical capital, the importance parents attach to schooling and their 
ability to pay for high-quality education, or work contacts. 
Fourth, reconfirming the findings by Carter and May (1999) for rural South Africa, 
poverty is not only a matter of few assets, but also of constraints to effectively using these 
assets. A specific constraint in this regard concerns the lack of access to financial capital, 
which especially affects people preparing for retirement. While access to credit generally 
presents an important enabling factor, my findings also suggest that accumulated debt can 
easily turn into a curse. Another constraint concerns the environmental or geographic context 
confronted by the urban poor, who are obliged to live in cheap, high-density locations that are 
spatially separated from the urban centres. This not only places a cost burden of commuting 
for work and job search, but is also associated with a higher exposure to risk factors from 
natural hazards and crime that threaten life and property. 
Along all four dimensions, the qualitative data provide more depth of information and 
offer a more nuanced and differentiated understanding of the processes that condition poverty 
dynamics, than could be obtained when relying on the available quantitative data alone. A 
major limitation of this research is that the causal chains of events that lead to poverty entries 
or exits rely on subjectively perceived information. However, cross-checks with the dynamics 
observed in NIDS data show that the key drivers of poverty escapes and descents identified 
above are consistent between the quantitative and qualitative evidence. 
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The Anxious and the Climbers:  
Ambivalent Attitudes towards Democracy among 
South Africa’s Middle Class 
Simone Schotte
An earlier version of this chapter appeared as Schotte, S. (2017). 
The Anxious and the Climbers: Ambivalent Attitudes towards Democracy among 
South Africa’s Middle Class. GIGA Working Paper, 304.
ABSTRACT 
Albeit middle-class citizens have generally been assumed to support democracy, studies 
investigating this class’s political attitudes using survey data have produced mixed results. 
This chapter argues that one reason for these ambiguities is that the middle class may not be a 
homogenous group. Specifically, I explore how diverging perceptions of social mobility tend 
to condition political attitudes toward democracy within different social strata, particularly 
within the middle class. Drawing upon data from the South African Social Attitudes Survey, 
the chapter finds that it is not primarily differences in material well-being but in perceived 
chances of upward social mobility that account for significant variations in people’s political 
attitudes. Specifically, the “climbers”, who perceive themselves as upwardly mobile under the 
present system, display the strongest generic support for democratic governance and believe 
in voting as an effective tool to influence political outcomes, while the “anxious”, who see 
threats of downward mobility, show signs of political resignation. At the same time, however, 
the same “climbers” are also more likely to tolerate government constraints on civil liberties 
and are less likely to oppose corruption. These empirical findings demonstrate the limits to 
understanding people’s political attitudes in relation to their current standard of living alone.   
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5.1. Introduction 
Over the past decade, the emergence of a growing middle class has become an increasingly 
popular way to characterise and explain socioeconomic change in developing countries (see, 
among others, Bhalla, 2007; Cárdenas, Kharas, & Henao, 2015), and high expectations have 
been placed on this class’s transformative potential (Giesbert & Schotte, 2016). Beyond the 
hopes that Africa’s new middle class will trigger further economic growth by shifting the 
composition of consumer demand, this class has been expected to foster political stability and 
democratic consolidation (Birdsall, Graham, & Pettinato, 2000). Middle-class citizens have 
been assumed to support democracy, good governance, the rule of law, and the fight against 
corruption (Birdsall, 2015), as well as to promote public investment in health and education 
(Loayza, Rigolini, & Llorente, 2012) and infrastructure (Bhalla, 2007). 
However, empirical studies that explore the political values, attitudes and behaviours 
of the middle class at the micro-level only partly support these claims. While most of these 
studies find no strong evidence of a middle-class particularism in political attitudes and 
behaviours (Banerjee & Duflo, 2008, Lopez-Calva, Rigolini, & Torche, 2012, Resnick, 2015), 
some confirm that the middle class is significantly more likely to take part in political 
activities than the upper and lower classes (Amoranto, Chun, & Deolalikar, 2011) and holds 
more pro-democratic attitudes (Cheeseman, 2015). Contradicting these findings, other 
researchers have concluded that the middle class is less likely than the poor to vote or 
demonstrate (Resnick, 2015) and more likely to opt out of the democratic process (Mattes, 
2015). 
One potential shortcoming that may partly explain these empirical ambiguities is that, 
to my knowledge, none of the previous studies on the political attitudes of the middle class 
has made an attempt to account for heterogeneity within that class. To address this gap, this 
chapter aims to investigate how diverging perceptions of social mobility condition political 
attitudes toward democracy within different social strata, particularly within the middle class. 
The analysis draws on a long-standing tradition in the sociological and political psychology 
literature of investigating the interplay between social mobility, class and attitudes toward the 
political system (Lipset & Bendix, 1959; Jackman, 1972, Janowitz, 1970 [1956], Weakliem, 
1992) which has recently gained new impetus (see Acemoglu, Egorov, & Sonin, 2018). 
This chapter uses South Africa as a case study. This focus has been chosen for three 
main reasons: First, South Africa has been identified as one of the countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa with a relatively large and growing middle class (Ncube, Lufumpa, & Kayizzi-
Mugerwa, 2011). Second, past research has pointed to the importance of accounting for 
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upward and downward social mobility when investigating patterns of social stratification in 
the South African context (see Chapters 2 and 3). Third, the South African Social Attitudes 
Survey (SASAS), on which the empirical analysis presented here is based, is among the few 
opinion polls that collect detailed household-level information on housing conditions and 
asset ownership.  
The chapter employs this information to construct a proxy measure of permanent 
incomes, which is used to distinguish between the poor, the middle class, and the elite. I then 
combine this information with a measure of self-perceived prospects for upward social 
mobility to differentiate those who experience poverty as a persistent state from the upwardly 
mobile poor, who I term the “escapers”. Furthermore, I differentiate the “anxious” middle 
class, who sees threats of downward mobility, from those in the middle class who perceive 
themselves as being upwardly mobile, the “climbers”. 
The chapter then studies the correlation between the five identified class categories 
and people’s democratic attitudes, civic values, and political preferences. The analysis 
suggests that the starkest differences are not to be found between the poor, the middle class 
and the elite, but rather between the upwardly and downwardly mobile strata within these 
categories. While the upwardly mobile “climbers” show the strongest generic support for 
democratic institutions and tend to believe in voting as an effective tool to influence political 
outcomes, “the anxious” middle-class members show signs of political resignation. At the 
same time, however, the same “climbers” are also more likely to tolerate government 
constraints on civil liberties and are less likely to oppose corruption. These empirical findings 
may help explain the previous ambiguous evidence and demonstrate the limits to 
understanding people’s political attitudes in relation to their current standard of living alone. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 briefly reviews the relevant 
theoretical literature linking class attitudes and democracy. Section 5.3 describes the data and 
methodology. Section 5.4 presents the key results. Section 5.5 discusses and concludes the 
chapter. 
5.2. Literature 
The modernisation literature provides a rich theoretical framework regarding the channels 
through which the emergence of a larger middle class is likely to support democratisation 
from a micro-sociological or behavioural perspective. In this tradition, the process of 
modernisation is expected to enhance people’s capabilities and loosen constraints on 
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autonomous human choice in three important ways (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005a, 2010):  
1) by raising incomes, which makes people more materially independent (see, for 
example, Moore, 1966);  
2) by increasing formal education and access to information through mass media, which 
makes people intellectually more independent (see Lipset, 1959);  
3) and by diversifying human interaction and allowing people to connect and disconnect 
more freely, which makes them socially more independent.  
This increased material, intellectual, and social independence can be assumed to 
nurture a sense of existential security and autonomy that leads people to become more 
articulate, prioritise self-expression values, and demand institutions that allow them to 
participate in decision-making. Thus, while the interests of the poor are presumably 
dominated by survival values, which subordinate human freedoms to the satisfaction of basic 
needs, the modernisation process has been associated with the emergence of a larger, more 
affluent, and better-educated middle class. Inglehart and Welzel (2005a, 2010) argue that, as 
the middle class expands in a non-democratic regime, repressing these liberty aspirations 
would become increasingly costly for the ruling elite.   
However, two main arguments challenge this perspective: 
First, scholars continue to stumble over the question of whether economic security 
enables or deters middle-class demands for democracy and good governance. In this regard, a 
number of studies argue that particularly the upper middle class’s desire for stability and 
securing obtained privileges opposes attempts to overturn the status quo (see, for example, 
Fukuyama, 2014; Wietzke & Sumner, 2014). Relatedly, re-evaluating the link between social 
mobility and the dynamics of political institutions, Acemoglu et al. (2018) show that greater 
social mobility can both enhance and undermine the stability of democracy. Their theoretical 
analysis suggests that if members of the middle class expect to move up the social ladder in 
the future, they are more likely to align their interests with the elite. In this context, they also 
argue that the middle class will generally oppose social mobility at the bottom; that is, they 
have an incentive to prevent the poor from entering the ranks of the middle class.  
Second, classic models of middle class development regard the financial independence 
of the middle class from the state as an important prerequisite for the middle class to place 
checks on government performance.48 In many late-developing countries, however, growth 
                                                          
48 Historically, Barrington Moore’s (1966) well-known formula “no bourgeoisie, no democracy” rests primarily 
on  the ability of the middle class to act independently of the state, specifically to form political coalitions that 
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has been state-led and accompanied by a large, patronage-based public sector (Rosenfeld, 
2017). Accordingly, several authors have argued that the resulting financial dependence of the 
middle class on the state tends to undermine this class’s responsiveness to politicians’ non- or 
misperformance and reduce its incentives to promote political change (see Handley, 2015, for 
a discussion on the African context). For the specific case of South Africa, Southall (2016) 
has argued that certain policy tools such as affirmative action, black economic empowerment, 
and state development contracts may have drawn large parts of the new black middle class 
into a partisan “state-party-class coalition.” 
5.3. Data and Methods 
5.3.1. Data sources 
The main data source for the empirical analysis presented in this chapter is the 2012 wave of 
the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS), which has been conducted annually since 
2003 by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC, 2012a, 2012b). Each data round is 
designed to yield a nationally representative sample of the adult population (16 years and 
older). Respondents are drawn from 500 enumeration areas, stratified by province, geographical 
subtype, and majority population group.  
Following its usual practice, the SASAS used a split-sample design for the 2012 wave. 
That is, there are two alternative questionnaire versions, each of which was administered to 
approximately 2,500 respondents. For the empirical analysis, where possible, observations 
from both questionnaires were pooled. However, some questions relevant to the analysis were 
only included in the democracy and governance module of the first questionnaire. The direction 
of the estimated effects presented in Section 5.4 below is robust to restricting the sample to 
questionnaire-one respondents, but the precision of the coefficient estimates is higher when the 
larger sample is used (results are available from the author upon request). In addition, the 
robustness of results was tested by replicating the analysis with data from the 2006 wave 
(HSRC, 2006a, 2006b), with largely similar findings (see Appendix D.5).  
The SASAS has been chosen for this study because of the detailed information it 
collects, not only on a variety of democratic attitudes and civic values but also on respondents’ 
housing conditions and asset ownership. The latter will allow me to construct a measure of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
keep the land elite’s hegemonic ambitions in check. Accordingly, he suggests that only societies with a 
sufficiently strong bourgeoisie would become democratic, whereas societies where the land-owning elite is so 
strong that the emerging bourgeoisie has no other option but to enter into an alliance with them would turn into 
dictatorships (Acemoglu & Robinson 2005). 
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respondents’ permanent income (see Section 5.3.2). To do so, I match the information on 
living standards provided in the SASAS with data from a larger dataset – namely, the 2012 
wave of the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS), implemented by the Southern Africa 
Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU) at the University of Cape Town 
(SALDRU, 2016). A comparison between the two data sources reveals that while the 
weighted SASAS sample is representative with regard to the geographic and racial spread of 
the South African population, SASAS respondents tend to be disproportionally better off than 
the average population (see Appendix D.1). For this reason, I use the distributional information 
from NIDS to construct the class categories, which are then applied to the SASAS (see below). 
5.3.2. Class categories 
The main explanatory variable used in the analysis refers to the respondents’ class position. 
Following an approach similar to the one adopted in Chapter 3, I derive the class groupings 
using a two-step procedure. First, a measure of permanent income is constructed, which is 
then used to differentiate between the poor, the middle class, and the elite. Second, an 
indicator capturing respondents’ (perception of) upward social mobility is used to differentiate 
between a stagnant or downwardly mobile stratum and an upwardly mobile stratum within the 
group of the poor and the middle class. This leads to the fivefold classification schema 
presented in Table 5.1 below.49  
Table 5.1 Class categories based on living standards and perceptions of social mobility 
 
Self-perceived social mobility 
Stagnant or downwardly mobile ↓ Upwardly mobile ↑ 
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 Poor 
Persistently Poor  
(“Persistent”) 
Escaping Poor  
(“Escapers”) 
Middle Class 
Anxious Middle Class 
(“Anxious”) 
Climbing Middle Class  
(“Climbers”)  
Elite Elite 
 
Researchers face two alternatives when constructing a measure of living standards in 
the SASAS. First, there is information available on total household income by income 
bracket. Second, an asset index can be constructed. I consider the latter preferable for the 
purpose of this study for two reasons. First, the income information is missing for a 
                                                          
49 To avoid confusion, I on purpose did not use the labelling of the class-sublayers suggested in Chapter 3. The 
reason lies in an important difference between the two approaches. The classification schema presented in 
Chapter 3 is based on people’s predicted chances of upward and downward social mobility. These are estimated 
using a dynamic model of observed poverty transitions. By contrast, the focus in this chapter is on people’s 
perception of their chances of upward and downward social mobility. 
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disproportionate share of respondents that would be considered better-off according to the 
asset module. Second, assets are considered to provide a better measure of respondents’ 
permanent income, understood as the long-term level of economic well-being (see Lopez-
Calva et al., 2011; Udjo, 2008). However, the robustness of results was tested by replicating the 
analysis using income-based class categories, with very similar findings (see Appendix D.4).  
To construct the asset index, I use the responses to 13 questions that relate to the 
following items: housing conditions (dwelling type, water source, toilet facility), ownership of 
basic durable goods (television, electric stove, fridge/freezer, DVD/Blu-ray player, 
microwave), and access to high-end consumer durables and services (washing machine, car, 
pay television, computer, domestic worker). In order to reduce these binary categorical 
variables into a single index with appropriate weighting, multiple correspondence analysis 
(MCA) is used (for details on the methodology see, for example, Booysen, Van der Berg, 
Burger, Von Maltitz, & Du Rand, 2008; Shimeles & Ncube, 2015).  
Formally, the asset index score of respondent 𝑖𝑖 can be written as 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = �𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=1
 (5.7) 
where 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 denotes the weight of category 𝑗𝑗 and 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 is the answer of respondent 𝑖𝑖 to category 𝑗𝑗. 
The weights to calculate the asset index scores are estimated using NIDS data and then 
applied to the SASAS (see Appendix D.2).  
I normalise the index between zero and one using the following formula: 
𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 = 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 − min (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴)max(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴) − min (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴) . (5.8) 
Next, I need to define index cut-off values that differentiate the poor from the middle 
class and the middle class from the elite. The cut-off values are defined using NIDS data and 
then applied to the SASAS. The index cut-off values are chosen such that the relative 
population shares of the poor, the middle class, and the elite resemble the shares computed in 
Schotte et al. (2018) adjusted for differences in sampling.50  
                                                          
50 As the SASAS collects information on the South African adult population, all target shares have been 
calculated reducing the NIDS sample to all individuals aged 16 years and above. Following the approach 
suggested in Chapter 3, I calculate the poverty headcount as the share of individuals with monthly per capita 
household expenditures below the upper-bound poverty line set at R834 in 2012 prices (Stats SA, 2017). [As 
argued in Chapter 3, I choose expenditure as the relevant welfare measure because it is generally assumed to 
provide a better approximation of permanent household income than the reported income.] Following this 
definition, 58 per cent of the NIDS adult population can be classified as poor. The index cut-off, which 
accordingly renders the bottom 58 per cent of the individuals in the asset-index distribution as poor, is set at a 
value of 0.53. [Note that this cut-off value is almost identical to the one that would have been obtained if the 
threshold value was calculated as the average asset index score of households falling in a R10 band around the 
poverty line]. Analogously, following the approach suggested in Chapter 3, the elite threshold is set arbitrarily at 
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The resulting fivefold class division is displayed in Table 5.2 below. Clearly, the 
relative size of the poor, the middle class, and the elite in the SASAS must be treated with 
caution, as the group of the poor tends to be underrepresented, while the middle class and the 
elite tend to be overrepresented in the data. The apparent oversampling of the elite in the 
SASAS, however, has the advantage that the coefficient estimates for this group can be 
estimated with higher precision (given the larger number of observations for this group). 
Table 5.2 Class shares in NIDS and SASAS data 
  Poor Middle Class Elite TOTAL 
NIDS 58.1 37.9 4.0 100 
SASAS 45.5 46.4 8.1 100 
 
Note: Analysis based on SASAS 2012 Q1+Q2 and NIDS 2012, Wave 3. 
Next, taking on a dynamic perspective, I introduce two further sublayers based on the 
respondents’ perception of chances of upward social mobility (see Table 5.1 above). 
Perceptions of social mobility are captured by two questions in the SASAS (using a three-
point Likert scale): “In the last 5 years, has life improved, stayed the same or gotten worse for 
people like you?” and “Do you think that life will improve, stay the same or get worse in the 
next 5 years for people like you?” From these, I construct a binary indicator of upward social 
mobility that takes on a value of one if respondents think that their life (i) improved over the 
past five years and will stay the same over the next five years, or (ii) stayed the same over the 
past five years and will improve over the next five years, or (iii) improved over the past five 
years and will continue to improve over the next five years. In all other cases, it takes on a 
value of zero. 
Using this binary mobility indicator, I am able to distinguish two sublayers within the 
group of the poor – namely, the persistently poor and the escaping poor (“escapers”). The 
latter refers to those respondents classified as poor by their asset index score who perceive 
themselves as being upwardly mobile. Analogously, I use the same indicator to distinguish the 
downwardly mobile stratum of the middle class, whom I call the “anxious” given their self-
reported fears of not being able to sustain their position in society, from the upwardly mobile 
stratum of the middle class, whom I call the “climbers” given their strong aspirations to move 
up the social ladder. This leads to the fivefold class division presented in Table 5.3below. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
two standard deviations above the mean per capita household expenditure. Following this definition, 4 per cent 
of the NIDS adult population can be classified as elite. The index cut-off, which accordingly renders the top 4 
per cent of the individuals in the asset-index distribution as elite, is set at a value of 0.93.  
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Table 5.3 Class characteristics in SASAS, 2012 
 Poor Middle Class Elite TOTAL   Persistent Escapers Anxious Climbers 
Population Share 21.2 23.1 24.1 22.9 8.7 100 
LSM       
Average asset index score 0.28 0.31 0.75 0.72 0.99 0.56 
Gender             
Male 44.3 49.4 48.3 49.1 52.0 48.2 
Female 55.7 50.6 51.7 51.0 48.0 51.8 
Geographical subtype             
Urban 45.9 39.8 86.4 80.8 94.7 66.5 
Rural 54.1 60.2 13.6 19.3 5.3 33.5 
Ethnicity             
Black African 91.3 96.1 53.7 80.8 21.6 74.8 
Coloured 7.6 3.6 16.9 11.8 9.0 10.0 
Indian Or Asian 0.7 0.0 5.3 2.2 12.6 3.0 
White 0.5 0.3 24.0 5.2 56.9 12.1 
Level of Education             
Primary or less 29.5 22.8 9.9 12.8 1.5 17.0 
Secondary, excl. matric 45.2 48.3 35.9 32.9 14.1 38.2 
Matric or equivalent 22.8 26.7 36.4 41.3 39.0 32.6 
Tertiary education 2.6 2.1 17.7 13.1 45.4 12.2 
Employment Status             
Employed full time 12.9 15.1 28.6 25.4 54.5 23.6 
Employed part time or less 10.1 8.3 6.7 7.2 7.2 8.0 
Unemployed 43.9 41.7 30.3 32.2 6.4 34.2 
Inactive 33.2 34.9 34.5 35.2 31.9 34.2 
 
Note: Analysis based on SASAS 2012 Q1+Q2 and NIDS 2012, Wave 3. 
It is important to note that the upwardly and downwardly mobile sublayers within the 
poor and the middle class are relatively similar in terms of their current living standards and 
average individual characteristics (see Table 5.3). Nevertheless, in the regression design, 
controls will be added for the respondent’s level of education, employment status, 
demographic characteristics (age, age squared, gender, race), and geographic location. 
Last, it should be noted that the derived mobility indicator is likely to reflect not only 
the respondent’s perceived chances of moving up or down the social ladder, but also the 
person’s general attitude (optimism or pessimism) towards life. In order to disentangle these 
two effects, I additionally derive an indicator that captures respondents’ overall life 
satisfaction. To this end, I draw on a question that asks: “Taking all things together, how 
satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?” I summarise the answer possibilities 
such that the options “very satisfied” and “satisfied” are coded as one, and zero is used for 
“neither satisfied nor dissatisfied,” “dissatisfied,” and “very dissatisfied.” 
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5.3.3. Political attitudes 
The outcomes of interest, my dependent variables, are the individual-level political attitudes 
that can be considered relevant for the functioning of a democratic system. Drawing on 
Inglehart and Welzel (2005a, 2005b), I broadly base my variable selection on three rival 
approaches developed within the political culture school to theorise the link between people’s 
attitudes or value orientations and the performance and stability of democratic institutions 
(see Table 5.4).51  
Table 5.4 Political culture approaches on the link between attitudes and democracy 
Common Premise: 
There is a population-system linkage, such that mass tendencies in individual-level attitudes and 
value orientations impact on the performance and stability of democratic institutions at the 
system level. 
“Civics” Camp: 
Attitudes and value orientations of a broader 
social concern impact most on the stability and 
performance of democratic institutions. 
“Legitimacy” Camp: 
Legitimacy assigned to political objects 
impacts most on the stability and performance of 
democratic institutions. 
“Human Development” 
Approach: 
Self-expression values 
based on liberty 
aspirations and liberty 
tolerance have the 
strongest impact. 
“Communitarian” 
Approach: 
Voluntary activity in 
associations, 
interpersonal trust 
and norm obedience 
have the strongest 
impact. 
“System Support” Approach: 
Mass confidence in public institutions, 
satisfaction with system performance and 
system preferences for democracy have the 
strongest impact. 
 
Source: Inglehart and Welzel (2005b: 5). 
My focus here lies on the channels or “types of attitudes” that each of the three 
approaches believes essential to ensuring the quality and stability of democracy. It is important 
to note that it is not my main concern, and it would be beyond the scope of this dissertation to 
evaluate or compare the three approaches’ relative importance for system performance (see 
Inglehart & Welzel, 2005a, 2005b for an empirical assessment). However, I am willing to 
assume that, in a democratic system, legitimacy and system support as well as support for core 
civic values are likely relevant for the process of democratic consolidation.  
Accordingly, in the following, I first assess the association between class and levels of 
generalised democratic support (the “legitimacy” camp), including three aspects: (i) support 
for democracy as the preferred system of governance, (ii) trust in the adherent public 
institutions, and (iii) satisfaction with system performance and service delivery.  
                                                          
51 The premise common to these approaches is that mass tendencies in individual-level attitudes have some 
relevance at the system level.   
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In a second step, given that system support alone is unlikely to suffice for a democracy 
to flourish, in the second part of the analysis I investigate class differences in attitudes and 
value orientations of a broader social concern (the “civics” camp). Here I focus on: (i) 
participation in democratic life in terms of attitudes toward voting, (ii) support for civil 
liberties and condemnation of corruption, and (iii) priorities for public policy. 
For a detailed variable description, please refer to Appendix D.3. 
5.4. Results 
5.4.1. System support and the legitimacy assigned to democratic institutions 
System preferences for democracy 
The first aspect I focus on is people’s general approval of a democratic system. In the SASAS, 
this system-level support is captured by a question that asks which of the following three 
statements is closest to the respondents’ own opinion: (a) “Democracy is preferable to any 
other kind of government”; (b) “In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be 
preferable”; or (c) “For someone like me, it doesn’t matter what kind of government we 
have.” Following Cheeseman (2015), I treat these three answer possibilities as a scale of 
commitment to democracy and fit an ordered probit regression model to investigate the 
characteristics that closely associate with people’s general attitudes toward democracy. Table 
5.5 displays the average marginal effects estimated for answer option (a) “Democracy is 
preferable to any other kind of government.” On average, 44 per cent of all persistently poor 
respondents prefer democracy to any other kind of government. Everything else equal, those 
of the poor who perceive themselves as upwardly mobile, the “escapers,” are on average 
about 13 percentage points more likely to prefer democracy. A similar, though less 
pronounced difference is observed between the downwardly and upwardly mobile strata of 
the middle class. On average, the “anxious” show a 9 percentage points higher likelihood to 
favour a democratic government, compared to the “climbers” with 12 percentage points.  
These estimated class effects remain relatively robust when controls for education and 
occupation are added to the model. However, the effect estimated for the elite is sensitive to 
the inclusion of education.52 Without controlling for educational differences, support for 
democracy appears to be approximately 13 percentage points higher among the elite 
compared to the persistently poor. However, this conditional difference is partly attributable to 
the high share of tertiary educated among this group, who are significantly more pro-
                                                          
52 Lower levels of education had no significant effects.  
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democracy than those with lower levels of education. After controlling for educational 
differences, the average marginal effect for the elite drops to about 10 percentage points.53 
Table 5.5 Relationship between class and support for democracy 
Ordered PROBIT regression 
Average marginal effect for: “Democracy is  
preferable to any other kind of government” (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Class (Base: Persistently Poor)     
Escapers 0.1344*** 0.1372*** 0.1307*** 0.1354*** 
 
(0.0313) (0.0322) (0.0318) (0.0327) 
Anxious 0.0886** 0.0847** 0.0926** 0.0873** 
 
(0.0353) (0.0362) (0.0363) (0.0370) 
Climbers 0.1222*** 0.1268*** 0.1142*** 0.1207*** 
 
(0.0343) (0.0352) (0.0354) (0.0362) 
Elite 0.1282*** 0.1022** 0.1221** 0.0967* 
 
(0.0471) (0.0490) (0.0494) (0.0510) 
    
Tertiary education  0.0842**  0.0858** 
 
 (0.0343)  (0.0356) 
Employment (Base: full-time)     
Part-time or less   0.0227 0.0277 
 
  (0.0439) (0.0447) 
Unemployed   -0.0708** -0.0650** 
 
  (0.0309) (0.0315) 
Inactive   -0.0530* -0.0424 
 
  (0.0322) (0.0331) 
Race (Base: Black African)     
Coloured 0.0166 0.0299 0.0169 0.0311 
 
(0.0341) (0.0346) (0.0344) (0.0349) 
Indian or Asian -0.0789* -0.0716 -0.0762 -0.0703 
 
(0.0449) (0.0451) (0.0464) (0.0465) 
White 0.1076*** 0.1007** 0.1073*** 0.1011** 
 
(0.0401) (0.0409) (0.0416) (0.0423) 
    
Demographic controls a YES YES YES YES 
Geographical subtype fixed effects b YES YES YES YES 
Province fixed effects c YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,917 1,844 1,847 1,779 
R-squared 0.0293 0.0306 0.0302 0.0322 
Standard errors in parentheses.     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
 
Note: Analysis based on SASAS 2012 Q1.  
See Table D.7 in the Appendix D.6 for the coefficient estimates from the ordered probit regression. 
a Demographic controls include respondent’s age in completed years, age squared, and gender. 
b Geographical sub-type fixed effects cover four types (urban formal, urban informal, tribal, and rural formal).  
c Province fixed effects cover South Africa’s nine provinces. 
  
                                                          
53 Considering the occupational status, I furthermore find a significant difference between those in full-time 
employment and the unemployed, with the latter being significantly less likely to favour democratic rule. 
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Last, similar to Cheeseman’s (2015) findings with respect to the Kenyan middle class, 
the data suggest that class is an at least as important correlate of support for democracy in 
South Africa as race. While I find no significant difference between black African, coloured, 
and Indian or Asian respondents, white respondents are on average 10 percentage points more 
likely to prefer a democratic government.  
Table 5.6 Determinants of the relationship between class and support for democracy 
Ordered PROBIT regression 
Average marginal effect for: “Democracy is  
preferable to any other kind of government” (1) (2) (3) 
 Indicators of social class 
   LSM 0.4401*** 0.4080*** 0.3891** 
 
(0.1509) (0.1550) (0.1553) 
LSM squared -0.2676* -0.2407* -0.2446* 
 
(0.1425) (0.1459) (0.1459) 
Upward social mobility  0.0697*** 0.0512** 
  (0.0225) (0.0233) 
Life satisfaction   0.0694*** 
   (0.0237) 
    
Tertiary education 0.0681* 0.0751** 0.0718** 
 
(0.0351) (0.0361) (0.0361) 
Employment (Base: full-time)    
Part-time or less 0.0234 0.0324 0.0376 
 
(0.0436) (0.0448) (0.0449) 
Unemployed -0.0658** -0.0624** -0.0524 
 
(0.0310) (0.0318) (0.0321) 
Inactive -0.0438 -0.0425 -0.0410 
 
(0.0323) (0.0331) (0.0331) 
Race (Base: Black African)    
Coloured -0.0009 0.0124 0.0170 
 
(0.0331) (0.0340) (0.0354) 
Indian or Asian -0.0838* -0.0731 -0.0819* 
 
(0.0444) (0.0460) (0.0476) 
White 0.0902** 0.0867** 0.0905** 
 
(0.0406) (0.0426) (0.0442) 
   
Demographic controls a YES YES YES 
Geographical subtype fixed effects b YES YES YES 
Province fixed effects c YES YES YES 
Observations 1,896 1,774 1,768 
R-squared 0.0278 0.0341 0.0358 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
 
Note: Analysis based on SASAS 2012 Q1.  
See Table D.8 in the Appendix D.6 for the coefficient estimates from the ordered probit regression. 
a Demographic controls include respondent’s age in completed years, age squared, and gender. 
b Geographical sub-type fixed effects cover four types (urban formal, urban informal, tribal, and rural formal).  
c Province fixed effects cover South Africa’s nine provinces. 
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As a robustness check and in order to further disentangle the factors that may be 
driving the observed class-attitude associations, a second set of regressions is estimated. Here 
I directly explore the relationship between respondents’ preference for democracy and the 
derived asset index, the binary indicator for perceived upward social mobility, and the binary 
indicator for overall life satisfaction.  
The results are reported in Table 5.6 above. I find a hump-shaped relationship between 
household wealth and pro-democratic views, which is robust across specifications. In 
addition, the results confirm a positive association between the self-perception of being 
upwardly mobile and a preference for democracy. This effect is only partly explained by 
overall higher levels of satisfaction among those who perceive themselves as being upwardly 
mobile. The estimated effect remains positive and significant after the satisfaction dummy is 
added to the model. 
Trust in public institutions 
Next, I look into class differences with regard to trust in public institutions. The SASAS 
names a number of institutions and asks respondents to indicate their level of trust on a five-
point scale. From these, I select eight that I believe to be of particular relevance for the 
functioning of democracy: (a) the national government, (b) the local government, (c) political 
parties, (d) courts, (e) the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), (f) the parliament, (g) the 
police, and (h) the defence force. For each of these dimensions, I summarise the answer 
possibilities such that the options “strongly trust” and “trust” are coded as one, and zero is 
used for “neither trust nor distrust,” “distrust,” and “strongly distrust.” I then regress each of 
these binary trust variables on the set of class indicators and controls using a probit 
regression.  
Figure 5.1 shows the estimated average marginal effects. Everything else being equal, 
the upwardly mobile escapers tend to have significantly higher trust in public institutions than 
their persistently poor peers. Similarly, the climbers are, on average, much more trustful of 
public institutions than those in the downwardly mobile anxious middle class, who overall 
show the lowest levels of institutional confidence. For example, approximately 45 per cent of 
the persistently poor either trust or strongly trust the national government. This share is, on 
average, 19 percentage points higher among the escapers and 16 percentage points higher 
among the climbers, but 6 percentage points lower among the anxious. Moreover, if class is 
held fixed, black South Africans generally report higher trust in the selected institutions than 
respondents of other race groups.  
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Figure 5.1 Relationship between class and trust in public institutions 
Note: Analysis based on SASAS 2012 Q1+Q2. Question on IEC was only included in Q1. Each point shows the 
estimated marginal effect of class membership, with “Persistently Poor” being the base category. The dashed 
lines show the 95 per cent confidence intervals. For the full regression results, see Table D.10 in Appendix D.6.  
Satisfaction with system performance 
In this subsection, I first investigate people’s general satisfaction with the performance of 
democracy. This analysis is based on a SASAS question that asks respondents how satisfied 
they are with “the way that democracy is working in South Africa.” I subsume the five answer 
options into a binary indicator variable – equal to one if the respondent is “very satisfied” or 
“satisfied,” and zero otherwise – and fit a probit regression model to investigate the 
relationship with social class. The results are reported in Figure 5.2 panel a). The patterns are 
similar to the class differences observed above with respect to people’s trust in public 
institutions. Everything else equal, the escapers and the climbers tend to be the most satisfied 
with the way democracy is working in South Africa. On the contrary, the persistently poor and 
the downwardly mobile stratum of the middle class tend to be the least satisfied.  
Going beyond this more general question, I additionally assess people’s satisfaction 
with the provision of public goods and services, as two specific aspects of governmental 
performance not directly linked to being a democracy. I use MCA to construct two separate 
indicators. The first captures respondents’ satisfaction with the provision of public 
infrastructure, including supply of water and sanitation, provision of electricity, and affordable 
housing. The second captures respondents’ satisfaction with the provision of other public 
goods and social services, including access to healthcare, treatment for sexually transmitted 
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infections (including HIV/AIDS), provision of social grants (such as child support grant or 
old age pension), and education. Both indicators are normalised to a range between zero and 
one, where higher values indicate higher levels of satisfaction. 
The results reported in Figure 5.2  b) and c) suggest that those who experience poverty 
as a more persistent state are significantly less satisfied with the provision of public 
infrastructure than the rest. However, the wealthiest people are not the most satisfied. Indeed, 
I find evidence of a non-linear but hump-shaped relationship between household wealth and 
average levels of satisfaction with the provision of basic public goods, which also expands to 
basic social services. This estimated relationship remains significant even after controlling for 
overall life satisfaction (see Table D.12 in the Appendix D.6).  
Figure 5.2 Relationship between class and satisfaction with governmental performance 
Note: Analysis based on SASAS 2012 Q1+Q2. Each point shows the estimated marginal effect of class 
membership, with “Persistently Poor” being the base category. The dashed lines show the 95 per cent confidence 
intervals. For the full regression results, see Table D.12 in the Appendix D.6. 
5.4.2. Attitudes and Value Orientations of a Broader Social Concern 
Attitudes toward voting 
In this section, I explore class differences in attitudes toward voting. This assessment is based 
on the respondents degree of agreement or disagreement (scale 1–5) with the following four 
statements: (a) “Whether I vote or not makes no difference”; (b) “After being elected all 
parties are the same, so voting is pointless”; (c) “It is the duty of all citizens to vote”; and (d) 
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“Voting is meaningless because no politician can be trusted.” For statements (a), (b), and (c), I 
subsume the five answer options into a binary indicator variable, which takes on a value of 
one if the respondent disagrees or strongly disagrees with the statement, and zero otherwise. 
For statement (c), I analogously construct a binary indicator variable, which takes on a value 
of one if the respondent agrees or strongly agrees with the statement, and zero otherwise. For 
all four indicators, a value of one thus implies positive attitudes toward voting. The 
association between class and the four indicators is estimated using probit regression. 
The average marginal effects for the five class categories are reported in Figure 5.3 
below. The upwardly mobile strata and the elite display the firmest beliefs in voting as a 
meaningful tool to influence political processes. By contrast, the anxious – albeit comparable 
to the climbers in terms of standard of living, education, and employment – are closest in their 
attitudes the persistently poor. 
Figure 5.3 Relationship between class and attitudes toward voting 
Note: Analysis based on SASAS 2012 Q1. Each point shows the estimated marginal effect of class membership, 
with “Persistently Poor” being the base category. The dashed lines show the 95 per cent confidence intervals. For 
the full regression results, see Table D.13 in the Appendix D.6. 
The detected patterns are confirmed when looking at the indicators individually (see 
Table D.14 in the Appendix D.6). The estimates show that especially upward social mobility, 
and to a lesser extent overall life satisfaction, are significantly positively correlated with a 
stronger belief in voting as an effective instrument to influence politics. Moreover, better 
educated respondents tend to show more positive attitudes toward voting. 
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Support for civil liberties  
I now look at people’s tolerance for government constraints on their rights as citizens, a 
critical limitation to the exercise of “effective democracy.”  
The analysis builds on a set of five statements included in the SASAS questionnaire. 
Respondents are asked to state their level of agreement with various views on how the country 
should be governed. The first four statements capture respondents’ support for civil liberties, 
while the fifth captures attitudes towards corruption. All five variables are measured on a five-
point Likert scale recoded such that higher values indicate higher support for civil rights. For 
a detailed variable description, please refer to Appendix D.3.  
Figure 5.4 reports the average marginal effects estimated for the five class categories. I 
find that those who perceive themselves as upwardly mobile tend to be less opposed to 
government constraints placed on the freedom of opinion and freedom of the press and media, 
and to be less likely to demand the immediate dismissal of corrupt politicians (see also Table 
D.16 in the Appendix D.6). When investigating the direct link between people’s civic values 
and the derived asset index, I furthermore find some support for a hump-shaped relationship 
between living standards and support for the freedom of association and freedom to protest 
(see Table D.16 in the Appendix D.6). 
Figure 5.4 Relationship between class and civic values 
Note: Analysis based on SASAS 2012 Q1. Each point shows the estimated marginal effect of class membership, 
with “Persistently Poor” being the base category. The dashed lines show the 95 per cent confidence intervals. For 
the full regression results, see Table D.15 in the Appendix D.6. 
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In line with the theoretical argument on partisanship discussed in Section 5.2, there are 
reasons to suspect that the detected negative association between people’s perceptions of social 
mobility and support for the freedom of opinion, freedom of the press and media, and the 
dismissal of corrupt politicians may be driven by an affiliation of the upwardly mobile with 
the national government. In fact, I observe that the two upwardly mobile strata tend to feel 
closest to the governing African National Congress (ANC).54 Table D.17 in the Appendix D.6 
investigates this channel. When controlling for this self-rated closeness, the negative 
association between upward mobility and support for the freedom of opinion and freedom of 
the press and media remains significant, but the estimated effect size decreases by about 3 
percentage points. Furthermore, the negative effect on support for the dismissal of corrupt 
politicians turns insignificant. 
Priorities for public policy 
In this final part of my analysis, I assess the association between class and different public 
policy priorities. Specifically, I focus on a SASAS question that asks respondents to select the 
three most important challenges facing South Africa today from a list of 18 policy areas. I 
limit the analysis to the seven top challenges named by at least 10 per cent of all respondents: 
(a) unemployment, (b) crime and safety, (c) poverty, (d) HIV/AIDS, (e) corruption, (f) service 
provision/delivery, and (g) education. 
Figure 5.5 shows the results. Approximately three-quarters of all respondents select 
unemployment among the top three challenges. Class does not seem to have any impact on 
this choice. Naturally, those looking for a job place greater emphasis on this challenge. Crime 
and safety are most of a concern among the downwardly mobile anxious middle class, 
followed by the climbers. Poverty tends to be less of a concern among the better-off and the 
upwardly mobile. Interestingly, I find that the climbers are least likely to rank poverty among 
the most important challenges that South Africa is facing. The most relevant factors that relate 
to the selection of HIV/AIDS among the top three challenges are race and geography.55 
Interestingly, those with tertiary education are less likely to prioritise HIV/AIDS as a main 
concern (see Table D.19 in the Appendix D.6). In line with the findings presented in the 
previous section, I find a strong and significant negative association between mobility and 
                                                          
54 In fact, 62 per cent of the escapers and 54 per cent of the climbers report feeling “very close” or “quite close” 
to the ANC, while the same is true for 49 per cent of the persistently poor, 31 per cent of the anxious and 13 per 
cent of the elite. 
55 Due to considerably lower infection rates, white and coloured South Africans are found to be significantly less 
concerned with HIV/AIDS. While prevalence remains high among the general population, it infection rates vary 
markedly between regions.  
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prioritising corruption (see Table D.19 in the Appendix D.6). Last, I observe that materially 
better-off South Africans tend to prioritise education, and are less likely to prioritise basic 
service provision. 
Figure 5.5 Relationship between class and priorities for public policy 
Note: Analysis based on SASAS 2012 Q1+Q2. Each point shows the estimated marginal effect of class 
membership, with “Persistently Poor” being the base category. The dashed lines show the 95 per cent confidence 
intervals. For the full regression results, see Table D.18 in the Appendix D.6. 
5.5. Conclusion 
The positive relationship between the size of the middle class and democracy found in macro 
cross-country analyses has frequently been linked to this class’s pro-democratic attitudes (see, 
for example, Barro, 1999; Chun, Hasan, & Ulubasoglu, 2011; Easterly, 2001; Josten, 2013; 
Loayza et al., 2012; Solimano, 2008). However, micro studies on the political values, attitudes 
and behaviours of the middle class find mixed results. While some studies find suggestive 
evidence consistent with pro-democratic civic and political engagement on the part of the 
middle class (see, for example, Cheeseman, 2015), others have, quite to the contrary, 
concluded that this class appears rather “apathetic” in terms of their political participation 
(Resnick, 2015).  
This study helps to reconcile these two opposing views by allowing for heterogeneity 
within the groups of the poor and the middle class. I show how asymmetries in perceived 
chances of upward social mobility of different groups condition their political attitudes. 
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Specifically, I find that the two upwardly mobile strata – the “escapers” and the “climbers” – 
show the strongest generic support for democratic rule. They also display the highest levels of 
trust in public institutions and inherit the firmest beliefs that voting is an effective tool to 
influence political processes in the country. By contrast, the downwardly mobile “anxious” 
middle class – despite being comparable to the climbers in terms of their standard of living, 
levels of education, and employment – shows signs of political resignation. To this effect, 
their political attitudes are closest to the attitudes displayed by the persistently poor.  
Some important messages emerge from these findings for the South African case. 
Since the transition from apartheid to democracy, concerns about the quality of democracy 
have become increasingly central to political discourse in South Africa. In particular, the 
ANC’s dominant character and the lack of a system of opposition institutions, which are 
essential for the healthy functioning of democracy (Jung and Shapiro, 1995), have been 
exposed as the main threats to democratic consolidation and accountability (see also Giliomee 
& Simkins, 1999). These concerns have intensified over the past decade, particularly due to 
several corruption scandals involving officeholders and increased government interference in 
the work of the media. This has resulted in the downgrading of South Africa’s press freedom 
status to “partly free” (Freedom House, 2010). Against this background, some commentators 
have placed high expectations on South Africa’s emerging (black) middle class to become a 
key agent in demanding greater political accountability and placing checks on government 
performance (Everatt, 2013, 2014). My findings caution against these expectations.  
 The results presented in this chapter imply that governmental performance is likely to 
be perceived differently by members of different social strata, who may be affected differently 
by government policies (see also Newton & Norris, 2000). Particularly those people who 
perceive themselves as upwardly mobile may have earned some of their privileges through the 
existing political system and therefore, on average, are less likely to take on a more critical or 
demanding stance in politics.  That is, those who are doing well under the current government 
and expect to do even better in the future are more likely to tolerate government constraints 
on the freedom of opinion and freedom of the press and media and less likely to advocate for 
the immediate dismissal of corrupt politicians. In contrast, those who perceive themselves as 
being stuck or downwardly mobile are much less trusting of public institutions and less 
satisfied with governance performance. However, instead of raising their concerns, I find that 
those who have been cut off from opportunities to ascend the social ladder show signs of 
disillusionment about the influence of their vote on politics in the country and are thus more 
likely to opt out of the political process. 
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A. Appendix 
APPENDIX A 
A.1. Vulnerability approach to defining the middle class 
In the first step, we model the probability of being poor in time 𝑡𝑡′, given the household 
characteristics observed in the base year 𝑡𝑡, where 𝑡𝑡′ > 𝑡𝑡. We assume that individuals can be 
characterised by a latent poverty propensity 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡′
∗  and an observed poverty status 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡′ of the 
following form: 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡′
∗ = 𝜷𝜷𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖′   and    𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡′ = 𝐼𝐼(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡′∗ > 0)  (A1) 
where 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑁𝑁 indexes individuals, 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is a set of explanatory variables describing 
individual 𝑖𝑖 in her household in terms of base year values, 𝜷𝜷 is a vector of parameters to be 
estimated, and the error term 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡′ follows the standard normal distribution (𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡′~𝑁𝑁(0,1)). 
𝐼𝐼(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+1∗ > 0) denotes an indicator function which takes on the value of 1 if the corresponding 
latent variable exceeds some observed threshold (which can be set equal to 0 without loss of 
generality) and 0 otherwise.   
In the second step, for each individual 𝑖𝑖 we predict the probability of being poor in 
period 𝑡𝑡′, based on the coefficient estimates from equation (A2) and base year characteristics 
(that is, ?̂?𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡′
∗ = 𝜷𝜷�𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡). 
Third, using the same time-fix predictor variables as in the probability model, we use a 
linear regression model to estimate a cross-sectional income equation (using expenditure as a 
proxy for permanent income) for the base year 𝑡𝑡 at the household level as: ln𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 =𝜸𝜸𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 (A2) 
where ln𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the household per capita income (or expenditure) in logarithmic scale in 
the initial point in time 𝑡𝑡. For each individual 𝑖𝑖 we then predict the per capita income (or 
expenditure) in 𝑡𝑡 associated to each probability, using the coefficient estimates from equation 
(A2) and initial household characteristics.  
To derive the vulnerability threshold, we calculate the predicted average per capita 
income (or expenditure) level associated with a predicted poverty propensity in 𝑡𝑡′ of 10 per 
cent. To reduce the sensitivity of the calculated threshold to the 10 per cent cut-off point and 
to have enough observations to get a more robust estimate of the mean income (or 
expenditure) level associated with this probability estimate, we calculate the vulnerability 
threshold as the mean predicted per capita income (or expenditure) in 𝑡𝑡 for all individuals 
with a predicted poverty propensity in 𝑡𝑡′ of 8 to 12 per cent. 
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A.2. Derivation of the asset index 
Index based on characteristics of the main dwelling the household occupies and the set of 
assets present in the household (in working order). 
Table A.1 Variables included in and weights obtained from MCA analysis  
Variable Categories Weights 
H
O
U
SI
N
G
 
Dwelling Type House, cluster, townhouse 0.581 
 Other -1.003 
Water source Tap water in house/on plot 0.715 
 
Other -1.290 
Toilet facility Flush toilet in/outside house 1.001 
 
Other -1.064 
C
O
N
SU
M
ER
 D
U
R
A
B
L
ES
 
TV set Yes – Owns a TV set 0.783 
 No -1.321 
Electric stove Yes – Owns an electric stove 0.793 
 No -1.188 
Fridge/freezer combination Yes – Owns a fridge/freezer combination 0.981 
 No -1.194 
DVD player/Blu-ray player Yes – Owns a DVD player/Blu-ray player 1.575 
 No -0.685 
Microwave oven Yes – Owns a microwave oven 1.629 
 
No -0.770 
Washing machine Yes – Owns a washing machine 2.000 
 No -0.626 
Motor vehicle Yes – Owns a motor vehicle 2.092 
 No -0.461 
Computer (desktop or laptop) Yes – Owns a computer (desktop or laptop) 2.443 
 No -0.301 
 
Note: Analysis based on NIDS 2008 (wave 1). 6,655 observations at the household level.  
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A.3. Derivation of expected household income or expenditure in 2008 
Table A.2 Linear model of household income or expenditure in 2008 
 
Real log p.c. HH 
monthly expenditure 
Real log p.c. HH 
monthly income 
 
Base 
With asset 
controls 
Base 
With asset 
controls 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Characteristics of the head of household (HoH) in 
wave 1   
 
 
HoH age 0.0144** -0.0054 0.0073 -0.0053 
 
(0.0059) (0.0061) (0.0077) (0.0079) 
HoH age squared (x0.01) -0.0030 0.0115** 0.0087 0.0175** 
 
(0.0057) (0.0058) (0.0073) (0.0075) 
HoH is female -0.1576*** -0.1528*** -0.1980*** -0.2047*** 
 
(0.0342) (0.0304) (0.0414) (0.0411) 
HoH race group (base: African)     
Coloured 0.3961*** 0.1269* 0.2435*** 0.0600 
 (0.0857) (0.0714) (0.0855) (0.0828) 
Asian/Indian 0.9455*** 0.4297*** 0.7193*** 0.4901*** 
 (0.1157) (0.1488) (0.1635) (0.1674) 
White 1.1055*** 0.6923*** 0.9883*** 0.7224*** 
 (0.0910) (0.0871) (0.0961) (0.0970) 
HoH education (base: no schooling)     
Less than primary completed 0.0996* 0.0514 0.0661 0.0302 
 (0.0594) (0.0536) (0.0484) (0.0484) 
Primary completed 0.2445*** 0.0998* 0.0413 -0.0507 
 (0.0563) (0.0541) (0.0801) (0.0851) 
Secondary not completed 0.4813*** 0.2752*** 0.3048*** 0.1787*** 
 (0.0556) (0.0544) (0.0617) (0.0640) 
Secondary completed 0.9061*** 0.5705*** 0.7293*** 0.5049*** 
 (0.0730) (0.0688) (0.0793) (0.0797) 
Tertiary 1.3358*** 0.8686*** 1.2210*** 0.9090*** 
 (0.0795) (0.0821) (0.0851) (0.0941) 
HoH employment status (base: inactive)     
Unemployed (discouraged) -0.1357 -0.1266 -0.3304*** -0.3154*** 
 
(0.1001) (0.0866) (0.0904) (0.0815) 
Unemployed (strict) -0.1330** -0.0942 -0.4058*** -0.4000*** 
 
(0.0634) (0.0641) (0.0985) (0.1002) 
Wage employment in white-collar occupation 0.4769*** 0.3485*** 0.8816*** 0.7705*** 
 
(0.0647) (0.0569) (0.0771) (0.0762) 
Wage employment in blue-collar occupation 0.1814*** 0.1633*** 0.6748*** 0.6468*** 
 
(0.0491) (0.0492) (0.0595) (0.0611) 
Self-employment 0.2428*** 0.1814*** 0.3820*** 0.3242*** 
 
(0.0683) (0.0618) (0.0812) (0.0842) 
Paid casual work -0.1289 -0.0505 0.1276* 0.1573** 
 
(0.0856) (0.0867) (0.0724) (0.0750) 
Personal agricultural worka 0.0007 -0.0073 -0.1300 -0.1131 
  (0.0916) (0.0787) (0.0916) (0.0737) 
Characteristics of the household (HH) in wave 1     
Composition of the HH     
No. of members in HH -0.1211*** -0.1278*** -0.1104*** -0.1145*** 
 (0.0105) (0.0102) (0.0082) (0.0091) 
No. of workers in HH (excl. HoH) 0.1377*** 0.0969*** 0.3290*** 0.3004*** 
 (0.0228) (0.0202) (0.0264) (0.0239) 
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Geographic location (base: traditional) b     
Urban 0.2665*** -0.0037 0.3253*** 0.1581*** 
 
(0.0774) (0.0757) (0.0526) (0.0523) 
Farms -0.0630 -0.1117 0.1239* 0.1285* 
 
(0.0826) (0.0774) (0.0702) (0.0707) 
Access to basic goods and services       
Asset index score (0 to 1)  1.5196***  0.9967*** 
  (0.0877)  (0.0956) 
Constant 5.7549*** 6.1598*** 5.5262*** 5.8112*** 
 (0.1758) (0.1782) (0.2133) (0.2125) 
Province fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Observations 6,070 5,886 5,957 5,779 
R-squared 0.6707 0.7222 0.6311 0.6479 
Robust standard errors (adjusted for 400 survey clusters) in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Individuals are predicted to be poor if their predicted poverty propensity exceeds the average probability 
of being poor in the final year (that is, the 2012 poverty headcount). 
a  Personal agricultural work includes working on own plot or looking after livestock. 
b  In line with the 2011 census, three settlement types are distinguished in NIDS:Urban – A continuously built-up 
area that is established through cities, towns, townships, small towns, and hamlets. Traditional – Communally 
owned land under the jurisdiction of traditional leaders. Settlements within these areas are villages. Farms – 
Land allocated for and used for commercial farming including the structures and infrastructure on it. 
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APPENDIX C 
C.1. Developing an asset-based poverty measure 
Table C.1 Variables included in and weights obtained from MCA analysis 
LIVELIHOOD ASSET EMPIRICAL IDENTIFICATION WEIGHT 
SHARE 
(%) of 
HHs 
Human capital (𝐇𝐇𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢) 
Characteristics of the head of household (HoH) 
Age HoH age < 30 years 1.294 17.51 
HoH age 30 – 39 years 0.796 24.92 
HoH age 40 – 49 years 0.227 22.67 
HoH age 50 – 59 years -0.251 17.23 
HoH age 60+ years -1.971 17.67 
  Educational attainment Tertiary 1.347 17.43 
Secondary completed 1.217 15.77 
Secondary not completed 0.423 36.02 
Primary completed -0.429 6.59 
Less than primary completed -0.824 14.31 
No schooling -1.573 9.88 
Work experience Ever worked for pay or profit or helped 
in a household business 0.945 56.77 
Never worked -0.943 43.23 
Characteristics of the household (HH) 
Work capacity ratio < 0.25 -1.552 13.14 
 (no. of members who can theoretically work / 0.25 – 0.50 -1.001 19.87 
   no. of HH members) 0.50 – 1 0.000 33.72 
1 1.977 33.26 
 Child dependency ratio 0 1.163 47.59 
 (no. of members aged between 0 and 14 years / 0 – 1 -0.532 26.94 
   no. of members aged between 15 and 59 years) 1 – 2 -0.649 19.40 
2 – 3 -1.287 4.13 
3+ -1.719 1.95 
    Average perceived health status of all members Excellent 0.895 42.07 
Good 0.253 16.88 
Fair to Poor -0.766 41.05 
Financial Capital (𝐅𝐅𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢) 
Characteristics of the head of household (HoH) 
Access to credit and saving schemes Yes – Has a bank account 1.516 59.09 
No -1.482 40.91 
Yes – Has a personal loan from a bank 4.952 8.65 
No -0.361 91.35 
Yes – Member of a stokvel 2.435 7.61 
No -0.213 92.39 
Characteristics of the HH 
Access to insurance Yes – Funeral policies or burial societies 1.087 44.37 
No -1.042 55.63 
Regular financial flows Yes – Income from private pensions, 
dividends or interest 
1.273 4.99 
No -0.055 95.01 
Yes – Received rental income 2.302 6.55 
No -0.105 93.45 
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Physical Capital (𝐏𝐏𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢)       
Characteristics of the HH 
   
Dwelling Type House, cluster, townhouse 0.682 63.68 
 Other -1.292 36.32 
  
 
 
Buying power Yes – Owns an electric stove  0.765 75.89 
 No -2.006 24.11 
 Yes – Owns a fridge/freezer combination 1.062 68.78 
 No -2.021 31.22 
 Yes – Owns a microwave oven 1.879 45.22 
 No -1.210 54.78 
 Yes – Owns a washing machine 2.412 32.37 
 No -0.871 67.63 
  
 
 
Access to information and communication Yes – Owns a TV set or radio 0.422 87.37 
 No -2.485 12.63 
 Yes – Owns at least one computer 2.991 19.51 
 No -0.440 80.49 
 Yes – Cellular telephone available 0.238 86.27 
 No -1.124 13.73 
  
 
 
Transport and mobility Yes – Owns at least one private or 
commercial motor vehicle 
2.801 24.21 
 No -0.571 75.79 
 Yes – Owns at least one bicycle 2.529 8.35 
 No -0.188 91.65 
  
 
 
Inputs for agricultural production Yes – Owns at least one plough 0.134 1.78 
 No -0.004 98.22 
 Yes – Owns at least one tractor 2.351 0.70 
 No -0.024 99.30 
 Yes – Owns at least one wheelbarrow 0.912 20.65 
 No -0.280 79.35 
 Yes – Owns at least one grinding mill 1.952 0.97 
 No -0.022 99.03 
    
Social Capital (𝐆𝐆𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢)       
Characteristics of the head of household (HoH)  
   
Gender HoH is female -1.172 45.85 
 HoH is male 1.593 54.15 
  
 
 
Race African -0.387 77.54 
 Coloured 1.213 8.21 
 Asian/Indian 2.248 2.33 
 White 3.082 11.92 
  
 
 
Marital status Married 1.715 36.46 
 Living with partner 1.309 7.71 
 Widow/Widower -2.000 12.78 
 Divorced/Separated -0.186 5.62 
 Never Married -0.822 37.42 
  
 
 
Relationships of trust: Believe in likeliness of  Very likely 0.502 14.94 
neighbour returning wallet containing R200  Somewhat likely 0.385 17.67 
 Not likely -0.191 67.39 
  
 
 
Characteristics of the HH  
 
 
Frequency of theft and burglary in neighbourhood Never happens 0.619 17.77 
 Very rare 0.341 23.10 
 Fairly common -0.121 33.83 
 Very common -0.647 25.30 
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Geographic Capital (𝐆𝐆𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢)       
Characteristics of the HH    
Access to water Tap water in house/on plot 0.609 79.19 
 Public tap in less than 100m -1.112 7.79 
 Public tap in 100 – 200m -1.299 3.77 
 Public tap in more than 200m -1.425 2.97 
 Other water source in less than 100m -1.502 1.90 
 Other water source in 100 – 200m -1.720 1.69 
 Other water source in more than 200m -1.808 2.68 
    
Connected to sewage system Yes – Flush toilet in/outside house 1.050 64.42 
 No -1.186 35.58 
    
Access to electricity Yes 0.251 85.27 
 No -1.149 14.73 
    
Rubbish gets removed at least once a week Yes 1.087 63.31 
 No -1.118 36.69 
    
Public street lighting in area of residence Yes – Currently in working condition 1.097 51.77 
 Yes – Not currently in working condition 0.756 6.36 
 No -0.908 41.87 
    
Geographical subtype  Urban 0.992 68.35 
 Traditional -1.385 26.56 
 Farms -0.298 5.09 
    
Province Western Cape 1.375 10.90 
 Eastern Cape -0.617 11.60 
 Northern Cape 0.609 2.64 
 Free State 1.074 5.65 
 KwaZulu-Natal -1.011 16.76 
 North West -0.190 5.51 
 Gauteng 1.182 30.30 
 Mpumalanga -0.135 8.15 
 Limpopo -1.098 8.48 
District dummies have been added.    
 
 
Table C.2 Checking for multicollinearity: Correlation matrix  
 Hit Fit Pit Sit Git 
Human capital index (Hit) 1.0000     
Financial capital index (Fit) 0.1863 1.0000    
Physical capital index (Pit) 0.1064 0.3802 1.0000   
Social capital index (Sit) 0.1857 0.1105 0.2932 1.0000  
Geographic capital index (Git) 0.3017 0.2343 0.4646 0.2456 1.0000 
 
  
Table C.3 Checking for multicollinearity: Variance inflation factor (VIF) 
Dependent variable:  2008 2010/11 2012 2014/15 
Log HH expenditure in adult equivalences VIF 1/VIF   VIF 1/VIF   VIF 1/VIF   VIF 1/VIF   
Human capital index (Hit) 1.70 0.59 1.52 0.66 1.42 0.70 1.41 0.71 
Financial capital index (Fit) 1.47 0.68 1.43 0.70 1.39 0.72 1.35 0.74 
Physical capital index (Pit) 1.28 0.78 1.16 0.86 1.15 0.87 1.21 0.82 
Social capital index (Sit) 1.23 0.82 1.14 0.87 1.13 0.89 1.18 0.84 
Geographic capital index (Git) 1.13 0.89 1.13 0.89 1.12 0.89 1.11 0.90 
Average 1.36  1.28  1.24  1.25  
 
Note: Tolerance, defined as 1/VIF, is used to check on the degree of collinearity. A tolerance value lower than 
0.1 suggests that the variable could be considered as a linear combination of other independent variables. 
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Table C.4 Parametric regression: Average marginal effects 
 2008 2010/11 2012 2014/15 Panel 
Mean      
Log household expenditure  7.001*** 6.813*** 6.916*** 7.075*** 6.959*** 
per adult equivalent (ln (𝑐𝑐it)) (0.045) (0.051) (0.041) (0.036) (0.029) 
Effect      
Human capital index (Hit) 1.265*** 1.311*** 1.439*** 1.472*** 1.337*** 
 (0.057) (0.062) (0.053) (0.045) (0.033) 
Financial capital index (Fit) 1.557*** 1.666*** 1.214*** 1.058*** 1.239*** 
 (0.093) (0.112) (0.082) (0.065) (0.043) 
Physical capital index (Pit) 2.113*** 1.587*** 2.039*** 2.016*** 1.811*** 
 (0.087) (0.089) (0.072) (0.067) (0.048) 
Social capital index (Sit) 0.104* 0.251*** 0.209*** 0.219*** 0.231*** 
 (0.062) (0.081) (0.067) (0.064) (0.044) 
Geographic capital index (Git) 0.553*** 0.499*** 0.659*** 0.639*** 0.646*** 
 (0.058) (0.061) (0.053) (0.045) (0.039) 
Time fixed effects      
2010/11     -0.137*** 
     (0.016) 
2012     -0.147*** 
     (0.015) 
2014/15     -0.080*** 
     (0.015) 
Observations 7,277 6,765 8,025 9,610 31,677 
R-squared 0.6092 0.4597 0.5304 0.5153 0.5308 
Within     0.1058 
Between      0.5927 
Standard errors (adjusted for 400 survey clusters) in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
Table C.5 Non-parametric regression: Average marginal effects 
 2008 2010/11 2012 2014/15 
Mean     
Log household expenditure  7.040*** 6.845*** 6.990*** 7.117*** 
per adult equivalent (ln (𝑐𝑐it)) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.011) 
Effect     
Human capital index (Hit) 1.352*** 1.328*** 1.493*** 1.471*** 
 (0.051) (0.056) (0.046) (0.045) 
Financial capital index (Fit) 1.347*** 1.475*** 1.135*** 1.032*** 
 (0.062) (0.084) (0.064) (0.058) 
Physical capital index (Pit) 2.319*** 1.708*** 2.060*** 1.988*** 
 (0.063) (0.073) (0.063) (0.057) 
Social capital index (Sit) 0.131** 0.249*** 0.338*** 0.195*** 
 (0.038) (0.081) (0.057) (0.045) 
Geographic capital index (Git) 0.464*** 0.439*** 0.595*** 0.650*** 
 (0.056) (0.040) (0.039) (0.033) 
Observations 7,277 6,765 8,025 9,610 
R-squared 0.6436 0.4973 0.5451 0.5340 
Bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications) in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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C.2. Sample selection 
a) Formal versus informal settlements  
Total Selected Sample 
  
b) Poverty status based on approximated mean per capita income 
Total Selected Sample 
  
Note: 
c) Share of households with household head in employment 
Total Selected Sample 
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d) Formal settlements: Share of households living in backyard shack 
Total Selected Sample 
  
e) Informal settlements: Share of households without access to toilet facility (flush, 
chemical, or pit toilet) 
Total Selected Sample 
 
 
f) Share of households that moved to location after 2001 
Total Selected Sample 
  
Figure C.1 Sample selection 
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C.3. Life-history examples 
Box C.1 Survivalist entrepreneur 
  
Lindelwa was born in 1959 in the Eastern Cape. It was a poor home, and there were no animals in the kraal. 
After the birth of her younger sister, the parents separated and in 1965 her mother moved to Cape Town, 
where she started working as a domestic worker. The children stayed behind and were living at other people’s 
houses. At the age of 9, Lindelwa moved in with her aunt, who sent her to school. Two years later, she was 
staying at her teacher’s house. After school, she had to work in the household until late at night. At age 13, 
she moved back in with her aunt; she was doing housework and dropped out of school (grade 6). In 1976 she 
got married, but in 1985, by the time the second child was born, she and her husband separated, and her 
former husband cut off all financial support for her and her children. By that time, she started to teach herself 
how to sew, using a machine that her mother had bought long time back. Her mother would send material 
from Cape Town, and in 1987 Lindelwa moved to Cape Town herself. When her sewing business was not 
going well, she started selling grilled intestines to support herself.  
 
In 1993 she started sewing for various churches, 
and this way had regular orders. However, in 2011, 
she got an order from her own church, and different 
to her usual business practice, she did not ask for an 
advance payment. She bought the material using 
her own money and sewed five church attires worth 
R1750 (approx. 130 USD) in total, but never 
received the money.  After this, her business went 
down and collapsed in 2013. Now, she is again 
supporting herself selling intestines in the street, but 
the business is very weather dependent. One of her 
children is doing piece jobs as a domestic worker, 
and the other one is unemployed. 
Figure C.2 Lindelwa’s life history 
  
 
Box C.2 Escape from poverty during working life and re-impoverishment at old age 
  
Mcingini was born in 1948 in the Eastern Cape. He grew up with both his parents and seven siblings in a 
simple stone house in the mountains. They had a kraal, but the number of cattle fluctuated as a result of 
droughts and veterinary infections. At the age of 17, he left school (grade 8) and moved to Cape Town in 
search of work. He found a job as a fisher and was sending money home. The contract ended after six months, 
and he started moving from one temporary job to the next working in different low-skilled occupations. In 
1969 he got a job as a driver at a factory; he says he taught himself how to drive. He worked there for almost 
20 years. During this time, he got married, and his wife opened a crèche at their home, such that there were 
two incomes. In 1988 Mcingini fell sick and had to leave his job and move back to the Eastern Cape.  
 
He was supported by his older brother for three 
years, until he got better and moved back to Cape 
Town. He then was working at a construction site 
for a year. The contract ended, and after another 
short period of unemployment, he found a job as a 
mechanic. In 1997 he lost this job. After that, he 
was only able to find piece work as a gardener but 
retired from this in 2006 because he would get no 
more jobs (people told him he was too old). Since 
2008 he has been receiving the state old-age 
pension. His wife still works as a nanny, but the 
number of children has decreased as a result to the 
expansion of public crèches. In 2017, they were 
robbed at their house.    Figure C.3 Mcingini’s life history 
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Box C.3 High stability from long-term employment and family networks 
  
Vivian is an elderly domestic worker living with her sister and niece in Makhaza, Khayelitsha. She was born 
in 1958 in a smaller town in the Western Cape, where she grew up with both parents and five siblings. Her 
father was working, and they were living in a formal house. They were not suffering at all when she grew up. 
At the age of 14 she became pregnant and dropped out of school (grade 5). In 1975 when her child was 2 
years old, she moved to Cape Town, leaving the child with her family. She started working as a domestic 
worker. After three years, she switched jobs and started working for a couple, for whom she still works today. 
She has been working for this family for almost 40 years. They always treated her well, and her salary 
increased whenever the couple got a pay rise. Vivian’s household has experienced several traumatic deaths in 
the last 20 years. Between 1997 and 1999, both her parents and her brother died in short succession. More 
recently two nephews were murdered, and her daughter died from sickness.  
 
Several factors helped to maintain the household as 
financially stable: 1) Vivian is the breadwinner of 
the household, and her income was unaffected; 2) 
Membership of burial schemes minimised the 
immediate cost of funeral expenses; and 3), the 
extended family united in solidarity to ensure that 
costs were shared. However, things became 
difficult in the last years. For health reasons, Vivian 
now can only work three days a week and thus 
earns less. In addition, she is paying for the living 
expenses of her granddaughter, who is the first one 
in the family who is attending university (which 
makes Vivian very proud). 
Figure C.4 Vivian’s life history 
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APPENDIX D 
D.1. Comparison between SASAS and NIDS data 
Table D.1 Descriptive statistics in SASAS vs. NIDS, 2012 
  NIDS SASAS Difference 
Gender       
Male 47.8 47.5 -0.3 
Female 52.2 52.5 0.3 
Geographical subtype       
Urban 63.0 66.0 3.1 
Rural 37.1 34.0 -3.1 
Ethnicity       
Black African 76.8 73.4 -3.4 
Coloured 9.5 11.1 1.6 
Indian Or Asian 2.9 3.5 0.7 
White 10.8 12.0 1.2 
Provinces       
Western Cape 11.7 12.0 0.4 
Eastern Cape 11.8 12.0 0.1 
Northern Cape 2.5 2.2 -0.4 
Free State 5.6 4.9 -0.6 
KwaZulu-Natal 19.4 19.5 0.1 
North West 5.3 6.6 1.3 
Gauteng 26.4 25.1 -1.3 
Mpumalanga 8.5 7.7 -0.7 
Limpopo 8.9 10.0 1.1 
Age groups       
16-19 years 12.5 8.9 -3.6 
20-29 years 27.7 21.7 -6.1 
30-39 years 21.4 19.0 -2.4 
40-49 years 15.9 18.0 2.1 
50-59 years 11.3 14.7 3.3 
60-69 years 7.0 10.8 3.9 
70+ years 4.2 7.0 2.8 
Assets       
House, cluster, town house 66.3 74.0 7.7 
Tap water in house/on plot 78.3 73.4 -5.0 
Flush toilet in/outside house 61.1 61.1 -0.1 
TV set 77.6 82.3 4.8 
Electric stove 73.8 77.1 3.3 
Fridge/freezer combination 69.7 76.7 7.0 
DVD player/Blu-ray player 44.7 65.9 21.2 
Microwave oven (in working order) 43.4 59.4 15.9 
Washing machine 33.3 40.5 7.2 
Motor vehicle 21.3 34.6 13.4 
Subscription-based private satellite TV 19.3 34.7 15.4 
Computer (desktop or laptop) 17.1 29.5 12.4 
Asset index score       
Mean  0.50 0.56 0.06 
Median  0.49 0.58 0.08 
Per capita household expenditure/income*       
Mean  R 1,918 R 2,002 R 84 
Median  R 800 R 680 R 120 
 
Note: Analysis based on SASAS 2012 Q1+Q2 and NIDS 2012, Wave 3.  
*In NIDS, monthly per capita household expenditure is used as the relevant welfare measure. In the SASAS, 
expenditure is approximated using information on total household income by income bracket. I calculate the 
per capita value by dividing the median value of the income bracket by the number of household members. 
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D.2. Derivation of the Living Standards Measure (LSM) 
Index based on characteristics of the main dwelling the household occupies and the set of 
assets present in the household (in working order). 
Table D.2 Variables included in and weights obtained from MCA analysis  
Variable Categories Weights 
H
O
U
SI
N
G
 
Dwelling Type House, cluster, townhouse 0.472 
 Other -0.978 
Water source Tap water in house/on plot 0.646 
 
Other -1.488 
Toilet facility Flush toilet in/outside house 0.953 
 
Other -1.089 
BA
SI
C
 
TV set Yes – Owns a TV set 0.592 
 No -1.907 
Electric stove Yes – Owns an electric stove 0.572 
 No -1.803 
Fridge/freezer combination Yes – Owns a fridge/freezer combination 0.770 
 No -1.720 
DVD player/Blu-ray player Yes – Owns a DVD player/Blu-ray player 1.096 
 No -0.799 
Microwave oven Yes – Owns a microwave oven 1.463 
 
No -1.063 
LU
X
U
R
Y
 
Washing machine Yes – Owns a washing machine 1.929 
 No -0.719 
Motor vehicle Yes – Owns a motor vehicle 2.320 
 No -0.411 
Subscription-based private satellite TV Yes – Has a subscription-based private satellite TV 2.051 
 
No -0.532 
Computer (desktop or laptop) Yes – Owns a computer (desktop or laptop) 2.288 
 
No -0.358 
Domestic worker (live-in/part-time) Yes – Has a domestic worker (live-in/part-time) 2.940 
 
No -0.127 
 
Note: Analysis based on NIDS 2012 (wave 3). 7,768 observations at the household level. 
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D.3. Description of value indicators 
1. Support for democracy: Answer to the question about which of the following three 
statements is closest to the respondent’s own opinion. 
a) Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government. 
b) In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable. 
c) For someone like me, it doesn’t matter what kind of government we have. 
2. Trust in public institutions: Index based on the extent of trust (scale 1–5) respondents 
have in the following public institutions in South Africa: (a) the national government,     
(b) the local government, (c) political parties, (d) courts, (e) the Independent Electoral 
Commission (IEC), (f) the parliament, (g) the police and (h) the defence force. 
3. Satisfaction with provision of public infrastructure: Index based on how satisfied or 
dissatisfied (scale 1–5) respondents are with the way that the government is handling the 
following matters: (a) supplying water and sanitation; (b) providing electricity; and (c) 
ensuring affordable housing. 
4. Satisfaction with provision of public services: Index based on how satisfied or 
dissatisfied (scale 1–5) respondents are with the way that the government is handling the 
following matters: (a) access to healthcare; (b) treatment for sexually transmitted 
infections (STIs) incl. HIV/AIDS; (c) social grants (such as child support grants, old-age 
pensions, etc.); and (d) education. 
5. Voting: Degree of agreement or disagreement (scale 1–5) with the following statements 
[Note: (a), (b), and (d) recoded in reverse order such that higher values indicate more 
positive attitudes toward voting/democracy]: 
a) Whether I vote or not makes no difference. 
b) After being elected all parties are the same, so voting is pointless. 
c) It is the duty of all citizens to vote. 
d) Voting is meaningless because no politician can be trusted.  
6. Support for fundamental freedoms: Degree of agreement or disagreement (scale 1–5) 
with the following statements.  
6.1. Freedom of opinion: The government should have the authority to prevent citizens 
from criticising it. [Note: recoded in reverse order such that higher values indicate 
more liberal/democratic views.] 
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6.2. Freedom of association: Citizens should have the right to form or join organisations 
freely, such as political parties, business associations, trade unions and other interest 
groups. 
6.3. Freedom of the press and media: The government should be in control of what 
information is given to the public. [Note: recoded in reverse order such that higher 
values indicate more liberal/ democratic views.] 
6.4. Freedom to protest: Mass action is an acceptable way for people to express their 
views in a democracy. 
6.5. Combatting fraud and corruption: Politicians found guilty of bribery or corruption 
should resign from public office immediately. 
7. Most important challenges: The three most important challenges facing South Africa 
today chosen from a list of 18 policy areas below [plus other (specify) and do not know]. I 
focus on the top seven challenges that at least 10 per cent of all respondents selected from 
the list. 
Table D.3 Three most important challenges facing South Africa today 
 Policy Area Share of respondents who chose this 
policy area among three most important 
challenges (%) 
1) Unemployment 76.2   
2) Crime and safety 46.5 
3) Poverty 33.6 
4) HIV/AIDS 32.5 
5) Corruption 25.4 
6) Service provision/delivery 16.5 
7) Education 13.4 
8) Affordable housing 9.4 
9) Economic and financial issues 5.9 
10) Xenophobia 4.7 
11) Racism 4.4 
12) Political issues 4.4 
13) Environmental issues 3.0 
14) Work-related issues 3.0 
15) Human rights 2.8 
16) Land reform issues 2.4 
17) Family and youth issues 2.3 
18) Religion and culture issues 0.8 
    
Note: Analysis based on SASAS 2012 Q1+Q2. 
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D.4. Robustness check using monthly per capita household income instead 
of LSM to differentiate between poor, middle class, and elite 
Table D.4 Class division based on LSM vs. per capita income, 2012 
Poor Middle Class Elite Missing TOTAL 
LSM 45.49 46.39 8.12 . 100 
Per capita income 54.12 41.65 4.23 . 100 
LSM 42.51 43.35 7.59 6.55 100 
Per capita income 41.26 31.75 3.22 23.76 100 
Note: Analysis based on SASAS 2012 Q1+Q2. The SASAS contains information on total household income by 
income bracket. I calculate the per capita value by dividing the median value of the income bracket by the 
number of household members.  
Table D.5 Overlap of class divisions based on LSM vs. per capita income, 2012 
Per capita income 
Poor Middle Class Elite Missing TOTAL 
L
SM
 Poor 61.07 25.74 0.06 13.13 100 
Middle Class 24.66 41.46 2.75 31.13 100 
Elite 0.12 27.6 26.39 45.89 100 
Note: Analysis based on SASAS 2012 Q1+Q2. 
Figure D.1 Relationship between class and trust in public institutions 
Note: Analysis based on SASAS 2012 Q1+Q2.Question on IEC was only included in Q1. Each point shows the 
estimated marginal effect of class membership in 2012, with “Persistently Poor” being the base category. The 
dashed lines show the 95 per cent confidence intervals. For comparative purposes, each × shows the estimated 
marginal effect of class membership when divisions are based in per capita income. 
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Figure D.2 Relationship between class and satisfaction with governmental performance 
Note: Analysis based on SASAS 2012 Q1+Q2. Each point shows the estimated marginal effect of class 
membership in 2012, with “Persistently Poor” being the base category. The dashed lines show the 95 per cent 
confidence intervals. For comparative purposes, each × shows the estimated marginal effect of class 
membership when divisions are based in per capita income. 
Figure D.3 Relationship between class and attitudes toward voting 
Note: Analysis based on SASAS 2012 Q1. Each point shows the estimated marginal effect of class membership 
in 2012, with “Persistently Poor” being the base category. The dashed lines show the 95 per cent confidence 
intervals. For comparative purposes, each × shows the estimated marginal effect of class membership when 
divisions are based in per capita income. 
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Figure D.4 Relationship between class and civic values 
Note: Analysis based on SASAS 2012 Q1. Each point shows the estimated marginal effect of class membership 
in 2012, with “Persistently Poor” being the base category. The dashed lines show the 95 per cent confidence 
intervals. For comparative purposes, each × shows the estimated marginal effect of class membership when 
divisions are based in per capita income. 
Figure D.5 Relationship between class and priorities for public policy 
Note: Analysis based on SASAS 2012 Q1+Q2. Each point shows the estimated marginal effect of class 
membership in 2012, with “Persistently Poor” being the base category. The dashed lines show the 95 per cent 
confidence intervals. For comparative purposes, each × shows the estimated marginal effect of class 
membership when divisions are based in per capita income. 
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D.5. Robustness check using the 2006 SASAS wave 
Note: Jacob Zuma was elected as President of the ANC in the end of 2007 and became 
president of South Africa in May 2009 following the general election. For comparative 
purposes, I here contrast the regression results obtained using the 2012 SASAS wave (three 
years after the election of Zuma as president) to the ones obtained when the 2006 SASAS 
wave (three years before the election of Zuma as president) is used. 
Table D.6 Descriptive class statistics, 2006 vs. 2012 
2006 2012 Difference 
Asset index score 
Mean  0.43 0.56 0.13 
Median  0.39 0.58 0.19 
Class shares (%) 
Persistently Poor 28.6 21.2 -7.4 
Escapers 35.4 23.1 -12.3 
Anxious 15.0 24.1 9.1 
Climbers 15.1 22.9 7.8 
Elite 5.9 8.7 2.8 
Note: Analysis based on SASAS 2006 Q1+Q2 and SASAS 2012 Q1+Q2. 
Figure D.6 Relationship between class and trust in public institutions 
Note: Analysis based on SASAS 2006 Q1+Q2 and SASAS 2012 Q1+Q2. Question on IEC was only included in 
Q1. Each point shows the estimated marginal effect of class membership in 2012, with “Persistently Poor” being 
the base category. The dashed lines show the 95 per cent confidence intervals. For comparative purposes, each × 
shows the estimated marginal effect of class membership using the 2006 survey wave. 
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Figure D.7 Relationship between class and satisfaction with governmental performance 
Note: Analysis based on SASAS 2006 Q1+Q2 and SASAS 2012 Q1+Q2. Each point shows the estimated 
marginal effect of class membership in 2012, with “Persistently Poor” being the base category. The dashed lines 
show the 95 per cent confidence intervals. For comparative purposes, each × shows the estimated marginal 
effect of class membership using the 2006 survey wave. 
Figure D.8 Relationship between class and attitudes toward voting 
Note: Analysis based on SASAS 2006 Q1 and SASAS 2012 Q1. Each point shows the estimated marginal effect 
of class membership in 2012, with “Persistently Poor” being the base category. The dashed lines show the 95 per 
cent confidence intervals. For comparative purposes, each × shows the estimated marginal effect of class 
membership using the 2006 survey wave. 
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Figure D.9 Relationship between class and civic values 
Note: Analysis based on SASAS 2006 Q1 and SASAS 2012 Q1. Each point shows the estimated marginal effect 
of class membership in 2012, with “Persistently Poor” being the base category. The dashed lines show the 95 per 
cent confidence intervals. For comparative purposes, each × shows the estimated marginal effect of class 
membership using the 2006 survey wave. 
Figure D.10 Relationship between class and priorities for public policy 
Note: Analysis based on SASAS 2006 Q1+Q2 and SASAS 2012 Q1+Q2.Each point shows the estimated 
marginal effect of class membership in 2012, with “Persistently Poor” being the base category. The dashed lines 
show the 95 per cent confidence intervals. For comparative purposes, each × shows the estimated marginal 
effect of class membership using the 2006 survey wave. 
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D.6. Regression tables, LSM-based class divisions, SASAS 2012 
Table D.7 Relationship between class and support for democracy 
Ordered PROBIT regression (coefficients) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Class (Base: Persistently Poor) 
Escapers 0.3521*** 0.3606*** 0.3430*** 0.3564*** 
 
(0.0830) (0.0858) (0.0845) (0.0872) 
Anxious 0.2322** 0.2225** 0.2431** 0.2299** 
(0.0930) (0.0955) (0.0956) (0.0979) 
Climbers 0.3204*** 0.3333*** 0.2996*** 0.3179*** 
 
(0.0907) (0.0933) (0.0936) (0.0960) 
Elite 0.3361*** 0.2684** 0.3205** 0.2547* 
(0.1239) (0.1291) (0.1303) (0.1347) 
Tertiary Education 0.2213** 0.2258** 
 
(0.0905) (0.0940) 
Employment (Base: full-time) 
Part-time or less 0.0597 0.0731 
 
(0.1153) (0.1179) 
Unemployed -0.1857** -0.1712** 
(0.0815) (0.0832) 
Inactive -0.1391 -0.1116 
 
(0.0847) (0.0873) 
Race (Base: Black African) 
Coloured 0.0434 0.0786 0.0442 0.0819 
(0.0895) (0.0911) (0.0903) (0.0920) 
Indian or Asian -0.2069* -0.1881 -0.2000 -0.1851 
(0.1179) (0.1187) (0.1219) (0.1228) 
White 0.2819*** 0.2645** 0.2817** 0.2661** 
(0.1057) (0.1080) (0.1097) (0.1119) 
 Demographic controls a YES YES YES YES 
Geographical sub-type fixed effects b YES YES YES YES 
Province fixed effects c YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,917 1,844 1,847 1,779 
R-squared 0.0293 0.0306 0.0302 0.0322 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Analysis based on SASAS 2012 Q1. 
Estimated constant effects at cut-off values have been omitted from the regression table.  
a Demographic controls include respondent’s age in completed years, age squared, and gender. 
b Geographical sub-type fixed effects cover four types (urban formal, urban informal, tribal, and rural formal). 
c Province fixed effects cover South Africa’s nine provinces. 
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Table D.8 Determinants of the relationship between class and support for democracy 
Ordered PROBIT regression (coefficients) (1) (2) (3) 
     Indicators of social class 
   LSM 1.1516*** 1.0770*** 1.0298** 
 (0.3973) (0.4110) (0.4129) 
LSM squared -0.7003* -0.6353* -0.6472* 
 (0.3737) (0.3858) (0.3870) 
Upward social mobility 
 
0.1840*** 0.1355** 
 
 
(0.0598) (0.0619) 
Life satisfaction   0.1838*** 
   (0.0631) 
    
Tertiary Education 0.1781* 0.1982** 0.1901** 
 
(0.0922) (0.0957) (0.0958) 
Employment (base: full-time) 
   Part-time or less 0.0612 0.0854 0.0995 
 
(0.1141) (0.1184) (0.1188) 
Unemployed -0.1722** -0.1648* -0.1387 
 
(0.0813) (0.0842) (0.0851) 
Inactive -0.1147 -0.1121 -0.1085 
 
(0.0846) (0.0875) (0.0876) 
Race (base: Black African) 
   Coloured 0.0324 0.0786 0.0449 
 
(0.0890) (0.0929) (0.0936) 
Indian or Asian -0.1914 -0.1980 -0.2166* 
 
(0.1205) (0.1260) (0.1264) 
White 0.2268** 0.2625** 0.2396** 
 
(0.1117) (0.1167) (0.1172) 
    Demographic controls YES YES YES 
Geographical sub-type fixed effects YES YES YES 
Province fixed effects YES YES YES 
    
Observations 1,896 1,774 1,768 
R-squared 0.0278 0.0341 0.0358 
Standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
 
Note: Analysis based on SASAS 2012 Q1. 
Estimated constant effects at cut-off values have been omitted from the regression table.   
Appendix D  181 
 
Table D.9 Robustness check for the relationship between class and support for democracy 
Multinomial PROBIT regression (average marginal effect) 
Base: Democracy is preferable 
to any other kind of 
government 
For someone like me, it doesn’t matter 
what kind of government we have 
In some circumstances, a non-democratic 
government can be preferable 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
              
Measures of social class 
      
LSM -0.3886*** -0.3614*** -0.3478** 0.0223 0.0343 0.0409 
 
(0.1361) (0.1390) (0.1394) (0.1370) (0.1418) (0.1423) 
LSM squared 0.2350* 0.2110 0.2128 -0.0074 -0.0121 -0.0114 
 
(0.1310) (0.1339) (0.1339) (0.1271) (0.1312) (0.1315) 
Upward social mobility 
 
-0.0644*** -0.0525**  -0.0017 0.0409 
  
(0.0207) (0.0214)  (0.0202) (0.1423) 
Life satisfaction   -0.0423*   -0.0321 
   (0.0218)   (0.0214) 
  
    
 
Tertiary Education -0.0778** -0.0836** -0.0816** 0.0124 0.0048 0.0057 
 
(0.0349) (0.0362) (0.0361) (0.0302) (0.0313) (0.0313) 
Employment (base: full-time) 
 
    
 
Part-time or less -0.0013 -0.0058 -0.0084 -0.0228 -0.0287 -0.0331 
 
(0.0399) (0.0411) (0.0411) (0.0394) (0.0408) (0.0410) 
Unemployed 0.0355 0.0365 0.0304 0.0446 0.0350 0.0299 
 
(0.0286) (0.0293) (0.0295) (0.0276) (0.0286) (0.0289) 
Inactive 0.0277 0.0300 0.0291 0.0253 0.0219 0.0208 
 
(0.0300) (0.0308) (0.0307) (0.0286) (0.0295) (0.0296) 
Race (base: Black African) 
 
    
 
Coloured -0.0333 -0.0438 -0.0367 0.0408 0.0307 0.0364 
 
(0.0306) (0.0316) (0.0317) (0.0307) (0.0320) (0.0322) 
Indian or Asian 0.0297 0.0290 0.0328 0.0740* 0.0750* 0.0801* 
 
(0.0444) (0.0461) (0.0460) (0.0394) (0.0411) (0.0413) 
White -0.1534*** -0.1662*** -0.1601*** 0.0984*** 0.0949** 0.1000*** 
 
(0.0424) (0.0443) (0.0442) (0.0367) (0.0383) (0.0385) 
  
    
 
Demographic controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Geographical sub-type fixed eff. YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Province fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
Observations 1,896 1,774 1,768 1,896 1,774 1,768 
Standard errors in parentheses 
      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
      
 
Note: Analysis based on SASAS 2012 Q1. 
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Table D.12 Relationship between class and satisfaction with governmental performance 
Average marginal effects from PROBIT (1)-(2)  
and OLS (3)-(6) regression 
System performance 
(Binary indicator) 
Infrastructure provision 
(Index on scale 0 to 1) 
Public services 
(Index on scale 0 to 1) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
    
    Class (Base: Persistently Poor)   
    Escapers 0.3086***  0.0777***  0.0681***  
 
(0.0206)  (0.0094)  (0.0090)  
Anxious 0.0359  0.0852***  0.0173*  
 
(0.0253)  (0.0103)  (0.0099)  
Climbers 0.2846***  0.1257***  0.0613***  
 
(0.0234)  (0.0103)  (0.0099)  
Elite 0.1480***  0.0882***  0.0262*  
 
(0.0353)  (0.0145)  (0.0140)  
Measures of social class       
LSM  0.1558  0.7066***  0.1573*** 
 
 (0.1050)  (0.0423)  (0.0421) 
LSM squared  -0.2050**  -0.4849***  -0.1282*** 
 
 (0.0988)  (0.0395)  (0.0395) 
Upward social mobility  0.2476***  0.0461***  0.0481*** 
  (0.0135)  (0.0062)  (0.0062) 
Life satisfaction  0.1358***  0.0399***  0.0391*** 
  (0.0159)  (0.0065)  (0.0065) 
        
Tertiary Education -0.0253 -0.0268 0.0111 0.0027 0.0028 -0.0092 
 
(0.0249) (0.0252) (0.0101) (0.0099) (0.0138) (0.0098) 
Employment (base: full-time)       
Part-time or less -0.0074 0.0156 -0.0065 0.0029 0.0376** 0.0290** 
 
(0.0301) (0.0302) (0.0124) (0.0120) (0.0173) (0.0119) 
Unemployed -0.0134 0.0122 -0.0067 0.0007 0.0196 0.0169* 
 
(0.0217) (0.0219) (0.0090) (0.0088) (0.0125) (0.0086) 
Inactive 0.0363 0.0480** 0.0066 0.0097 0.0255* 0.0262*** 
 
(0.0222) (0.0222) (0.0092) (0.0088) (0.0130) (0.0088) 
Race (base: Black African)       
Coloured -0.0776*** -0.0881***  -0.0321***  -0.0565*** 
 
(0.0241) (0.0242)  (0.0098)  (0.0097) 
Indian or Asian -0.1688*** -0.1722***  -0.0659***  -0.1324*** 
 
(0.0314) (0.0318)  (0.0126)  (0.0125) 
White -0.1848*** -0.1571***  -0.0312***  -0.1382*** 
 
(0.0288) (0.0297)  (0.0117)  (0.0117) 
       
Constant   0.5013*** 0.2826*** 0.4973*** 0.4278*** 
 
  (0.0270) (0.0284) (0.0261) (0.0283) 
       
 Demographic controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Geographical sub-type fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Province fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
 Observations 3,874 3,840 3,918 3,881 3,910 3,873 
R-squared 0.112 0.128 0.1553 0.2284 0.1473 0.1597 
Standard errors in parentheses   
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
    
 
Note: Analysis based on SASAS 2012 Q1+Q2.  
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Table D.13 Relationship between class and attitudes toward voting 
 PROBIT regression  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(average marginal effects) (Strongly) Disagree: (Strongly) Disagree:              (Strongly) Agree: (Strongly) Disagree: 
 Whether I vote or 
not makes no 
difference. 
After being elected 
all parties are the 
same, so voting is 
pointless. 
It is the duty of 
all citizens to 
vote. 
Voting is meaningless 
because no politician 
can be trusted. 
  
     Class (Base: Persistently Poor) 
    Escapers 0.1717*** 0.1625*** 0.0607** 0.1258*** 
 
(0.0347) (0.0344) (0.0279) (0.0350) 
Anxious 0.0704* 0.0864** -0.0013 0.0653 
 
(0.0398) (0.0396) (0.0313) (0.0402) 
Climbers 0.2108*** 0.2152*** 0.0604* 0.1770*** 
 
(0.0383) (0.0380) (0.0312) (0.0386) 
Elite 0.1981*** 0.2088*** 0.0444 0.1530*** 
 
(0.0538) (0.0535) (0.0443) (0.0539) 
      
Tertiary Education 0.0598 0.0946** 0.0346 0.0902** 
 
(0.0375) (0.0370) (0.0312) (0.0369) 
 
    
Employment (base: full-time)     
Part-time or less 0.0964** 0.0153 -0.0540 0.0165 
 
(0.0470) (0.0462) (0.0369) (0.0464) 
Unemployed 0.0039 -0.0064 -0.0390 -0.0137 
 
(0.0337) (0.0335) (0.0274) (0.0337) 
Inactive 0.0233 0.0194 -0.0049 0.0213 
 
(0.0352) (0.0350) (0.0290) (0.0352) 
Race (base: Black African)     
Coloured 0.0239 0.0287 0.0202 0.0221 
 
(0.0374) (0.0370) (0.0313) (0.0372) 
Indian or Asian -0.1104** -0.1448*** -0.0591 -0.1378*** 
 
(0.0497) (0.0494) (0.0398) (0.0504) 
White 0.0144 0.0830* -0.0309 0.0183 
 
(0.0442) (0.0438) (0.0361) (0.0438) 
  
    Demographic controls YES YES YES YES 
Geographical sub-type fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Province fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
  
    Observations 1,850 1,849 1,853 1,849 
R-squared 0.0340 0.0487 0.0314 0.0351 
Standard errors in parentheses 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    
 
Note: Analysis based on SASAS 2012 Q1. 
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Table D.14 Determinants of the relationship between class and attitudes toward voting 
 PROBIT regression  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(average marginal effects) (Strongly) Disagree: (Strongly) Disagree:              (Strongly) Agree: (Strongly) Disagree: 
 Whether I vote or 
not makes no 
difference. 
After being elected 
all parties are the 
same, so voting is 
pointless. 
It is the duty of 
all citizens to 
vote. 
Voting is meaningless 
because no politician 
can be trusted. 
  
     Indicators of social class 
    LSM 0.1898 0.2706 0.1866 -0.0687 
 
(0.1683) (0.1661) (0.1297) (0.1667) 
LSM squared 0.0085 -0.0804 -0.1188 0.1969 
 
(0.1570) (0.1552) (0.1235) (0.1554) 
Upward social mobility 0.1268*** 0.1105*** 0.0365* 0.1078*** 
 0.1898 0.2706 0.1866 -0.0687 
Life satisfaction 0.0377 0.0673*** 0.0374* 0.0133 
 (0.0253) (0.0250) (0.0204) (0.0254) 
      
Tertiary Education 0.0445 0.0806** 0.0282 0.0756** 
 
(0.0382) (0.0377) (0.0317) (0.0377) 
Employment (base: full-time)     
Part-time or less 0.1124** 0.0321 -0.0449 0.0258 
 
(0.0472) (0.0464) (0.0371) (0.0466) 
Unemployed 0.0135 0.0056 -0.0335 -0.0033 
 
(0.0342) (0.0340) (0.0280) (0.0343) 
Inactive 0.0255 0.0227 -0.0083 0.0265 
 
(0.0353) (0.0350) (0.0291) (0.0353) 
Race (base: Black African)     
Coloured 0.0083 0.0124 0.0057 0.0151 
 
(0.0378) (0.0374) (0.0315) (0.0377) 
Indian or Asian -0.1218** -0.1563*** -0.0687* -0.1480*** 
 
(0.0509) (0.0506) (0.0407) (0.0516) 
White 0.0017 0.0789* -0.0425 0.0096 
 
(0.0461) (0.0457) (0.0375) (0.0457) 
  
    Demographic controls YES YES YES YES 
Geographical sub-type fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Province fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
  
    Observations 1,839 1,838 1,841 1,838 
R-squared 0.0355 0.0520 0.0334 0.0351 
Standard errors in parentheses 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    
 
Note: Analysis based on SASAS 2012 Q1. 
  
Appendix D                                                                                                                                                            187 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Table D.15 Relationship between class and support for civil rights and condemnation of 
corruption 
Ordered PROBIT regression (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(coefficients) Freedom of  
Opinion 
Freedom of  
Association 
Freedom of  
Press & Media 
Right to  
Protest 
Combating Fraud  
& Corruption 
           
 Class (Base: Persistently Poor)   
  
 
Escapers -0.2267*** 0.0055 -0.2522*** 0.0017 -0.0840 
 
(0.0771) (0.0809) (0.0773) (0.0777) (0.0837) 
Anxious -0.0889 0.0435 0.0971 -0.0706 0.2297** 
 
(0.0872) (0.0908) (0.0865) (0.0869) (0.0982) 
Climbers -0.2262*** 0.0110 -0.0864 -0.1353 0.0958 
 
(0.0853) (0.0889) (0.0847) (0.0849) (0.0945) 
Elite -0.1290 -0.1324 0.0730 -0.1262 0.2603* 
 
(0.1194) (0.1234) (0.1188) (0.1184) (0.1360) 
 
     
Tertiary Education 0.4092*** 0.3040*** 0.2642*** -0.0119 0.0543 
 
(0.0826) (0.0855) (0.0821) (0.0814) (0.0934) 
Employment (base: full-time)      
Part-time or less -0.1979* -0.2474** -0.1525 0.0566 -0.2377** 
 
(0.1018) (0.1053) (0.1024) (0.1020) (0.1117) 
Unemployed -0.1634** -0.0237 -0.1108 -0.0262 0.0374 
 
(0.0739) (0.0771) (0.0738) (0.0739) (0.0831) 
Inactive -0.1322* -0.0001 -0.1191 0.0357 -0.1236 
 
(0.0771) (0.0802) (0.0772) (0.0770) (0.0872) 
Race (base: Black African)      
Coloured 0.2276*** -0.0498 0.2464*** -0.3279*** 0.3279*** 
 
(0.0815) (0.0846) (0.0810) (0.0812) (0.0938) 
Indian or Asian 0.3803*** -0.1394 0.4479*** -0.2655** 0.2549** 
 
(0.1083) (0.1131) (0.1086) (0.1087) (0.1245) 
White 1.0040*** -0.1419 1.0373*** -1.0057*** 0.2614** 
 
(0.0989) (0.1004) (0.0988) (0.0971) (0.1103) 
 
  
  
 
Demographic controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Geographical sub-type fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Province fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES 
 
  
  
 
Observations 1,841 1,847 1,852 1,843 1,860 
R-squared 0.0527 0.0175 0.0677 0.0477 0.0378 
Standard errors in parentheses 
    
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    
 
 
Note: Analysis based on SASAS 2012 Q1. 
Estimated constant effects at cut-off values have been omitted from the regression table. 
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Table D.16 Determinants of the relationship between class and support for civil rights and 
condemnation of corruption 
Ordered PROBIT regression (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(coefficients) Freedom of  
Opinion 
Freedom of  
Association 
Freedom of  
Press & Media 
Right to  
Protest 
Combating Fraud  
& Corruption 
           
Measures of social class   
  
 
LSM -0.3011 0.6554* -0.2007 0.6782* 0.0866 
 
(0.3642) (0.3803) (0.3647) (0.3663) (0.4048) 
LSM squared 0.2654 -0.5970* 0.5043 -0.6795** 0.4815 
 
(0.3401) (0.3557) (0.3406) (0.3420) (0.3840) 
Upward social mobility -0.2112*** 0.0007 -0.2423*** -0.0095 -0.1249** 
 (0.0547) (0.0570) (0.0547) (0.0547) (0.0610) 
Life satisfaction 0.0303 -0.0018 -0.0392 -0.0434 -0.0632 
 (0.0556) (0.0580) (0.0558) (0.0556) (0.0625) 
 
     
Tertiary Education 0.3944*** 0.3053*** 0.2241*** 0.0044 0.0101 
 
(0.0842) (0.0871) (0.0838) (0.0828) (0.0954) 
Employment (base: full-time)      
Part-time or less -0.1906* -0.2475** -0.1527 0.0575 -0.2293** 
 
(0.1024) (0.1058) (0.1031) (0.1026) (0.1125) 
Unemployed -0.1609** -0.0164 -0.1086 -0.0349 0.0533 
 
(0.0752) (0.0784) (0.0752) (0.0752) (0.0845) 
Inactive -0.1240 0.0039 -0.1141 0.0186 -0.1164 
 
(0.0774) (0.0804) (0.0775) (0.0772) (0.0875) 
Race (base: Black African)      
Coloured 0.2143*** -0.0439 0.2344*** -0.3209*** 0.3125*** 
 
(0.0825) (0.0856) (0.0821) (0.0820) (0.0949) 
Indian or Asian 0.3290*** -0.1223 0.3871*** -0.2237** 0.1992 
 
(0.1110) (0.1161) (0.1113) (0.1114) (0.1281) 
White 0.9733*** -0.1404 1.0034*** -0.9819*** 0.1801 
 
(0.1030) (0.1049) (0.1031) (0.1012) (0.1153) 
 
  
  
 
Demographic controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Geographical sub-type fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Province fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES 
 
  
  
 
Observations 1,830 1,836 1,841 1,834 1,850 
R-squared 0.0542 0.0172 0.0710 0.0480 0.0408 
Standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
 
Note: Analysis based on SASAS 2012 Q1.  
Estimated constant effects at cut-off values have been omitted from the regression table.  
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Table D.17 Determinants of the relationship between class and support for civil rights and 
condemnation of corruption, controlling for closeness to the ANC 
Ordered PROBIT regression (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(coefficients) Freedom of 
Opinion 
Freedom of 
Association 
Freedom of 
Press & Media 
Right to 
Protest 
Combating Fraud 
& Corruption 
           
Measures of social class   
  
 
LSM -0.1985 0.5576 -0.0708 0.7499* 0.0556 
 
(0.3834) (0.4014) (0.3845) (0.3866) (0.4267) 
LSM squared 0.1490 -0.5053 0.4494 -0.7827** 0.4999 
 
(0.3629) (0.3804) (0.3639) (0.3651) (0.4111) 
Upward social mobility -0.1879*** 0.0223 -0.2064*** -0.0591 -0.0953 
 (0.0586) (0.0614) (0.0586) (0.0587) (0.0656) 
Life satisfaction 0.0389 -0.0230 -0.0375 -0.0658 -0.0526 
 (0.0592) (0.0621) (0.0595) (0.0594) (0.0666) 
      
Feeling close to the ANC -0.2449*** 0.0251 -0.2737*** 0.1636*** -0.0969 
 (0.0622) (0.0652) (0.0621) (0.0624) (0.0688) 
 
     
Tertiary Education 0.4053*** 0.3310*** 0.1496 0.0205 0.0769 
 
(0.0932) (0.0968) (0.0924) (0.0915) (0.1066) 
Employment (base: full-time)      
Part-time or less -0.1922* -0.3131*** -0.2006* 0.0091 -0.1912 
 
(0.1096) (0.1137) (0.1106) (0.1098) (0.1210) 
Unemployed -0.1591* -0.0581 -0.1142 -0.0310 0.0462 
 
(0.0815) (0.0854) (0.0816) (0.0816) (0.0915) 
Inactive -0.1592* -0.0517 -0.1596* 0.0018 -0.1300 
 
(0.0840) (0.0877) (0.0842) (0.0839) (0.0951) 
Race (Base: Black African)      
Coloured 0.1252 0.0008 0.1478 -0.1874** 0.2552** 
 
(0.0921) (0.0964) (0.0921) (0.0919) (0.1066) 
Indian or Asian 0.2457* -0.0293 0.3304*** -0.1604 0.1756 
 
(0.1269) (0.1336) (0.1274) (0.1276) (0.1481) 
White 0.8937*** -0.1317 0.8565*** -0.8806*** 0.0777 
 
(0.1155) (0.1182) (0.1149) (0.1137) (0.1297) 
 
     
Demographic controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Geographical sub-type fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Province fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES 
 
  
  
 
Observations 1,613 1,615 1,620 1,610 1,625 
R-squared 0.0599 0.0187 0.0734 0.0506 0.0423 
Standard errors in parentheses 
    
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    
 
 
Note: Analysis based on SASAS 2012 Q1.  
Estimated constant effects at cut-off values have been omitted from the regression table. 
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